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ABSTRACT 
Treaty 7 First Nations, who have occupied the South Saskatchewan River Basin since 
time immemorial, have water rights protected by s.35 of the Constitution, Treaty 7, and 
the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930.  This thesis suggests that Alberta has 
devised a legal regime that circumvents the treaty relationship between the Crown and 
Treaty 7 First Nations.  Section 52 of the Constitution and the principles of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law require that Crown legislation and action must be 
consistent with the Constitution.  Because Aboriginal and treaty rights are protected 
under s.35(1) of the Constitution, Alberta’s consultation guidelines must address the 
protection of existing Aboriginal and treaty rights.  This thesis examines whether the 
treaty or any subsequent Crown legislation or Crown action has extinguished the 
Aboriginal and treaty rights of Treaty 7 First Nations and draws the conclusion that the 
Aboriginal rights of Treaty 7 First Nations not only continue to exist, but are afforded 
additional protection by Treaty 7 and the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement.  This 
leads to the conclusion that Alberta’s consultation policy fails to recognize and affirm 
Aboriginal and treaty rights in their entirety as they currently exist.  To the extent that 
Alberta’s Aboriginal consultation policies and regulations are inconsistent with s.35(1) 
they are null and void. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
The waters of the South Saskatchewan River Basin have been fully allocated 
under Alberta’s water licencing regime, with less than .1% having been allocated to First 
Nations.  This thesis strives to answer the question:  What is the legal basis for the duty 
to consult with Treaty 7 First Nations on issues relating to water resources?  Because the 
depth of consultation depends on the strength of the legal obligation to consult, each 
chapter focuses on one form of s.35 Aboriginal right.  The legal basis for consultation 
with Treaty 7 First Nations on water issues, include reconciliation, unextinguished title, 
unextinguished aboriginal rights, Treaty rights, and rights under the NRTA.  Each 
chapter applies the analysis of the existence of the legal basis for the duty to consult in 
the context of Treaty 7, describes the scope of the duty to consult based on the 
application of the law to the facts, and analyses whether the duty to consult has been met 
by the present provincial legal regime.  In the final chapter, I will attempt to describe 
what constitutes adequate consultation. 
1. Importance of the Thesis Topic 
In Alberta’s overheated economy, consultation with First Nations is one of the 
hottest topics in policy-making regarding natural resources generally and water 
resources in particular.  To date there is no national standard for consultation with 
Aboriginal people.  In an effort to meet the Supreme Court’s requirements for Crown 
consultation, the Alberta government has devised a framework and guidelines for 
consultation which places the onus on proponents such as industry developers and
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 municipal governments to consult.  First Nations resist attending meetings with 
representatives of industry or municipalities for fear that it might be construed as 
consultation.  It’s a Mexican stand-off over water with all parties acknowledging that 
something must be done to address the province’s dwindling freshwater resources and 
no-one daring to move forward. 
Running parallel to Alberta’s consultation process is the management of 
watersheds through watershed policy and advisory councils (WPACs).  Under Alberta’s 
Water for Life Policy implemented pursuant to the Water Act, WPACs are formed for 
each watershed area.  Membership on WPACs is made up of “stakeholders” who attend 
meetings voluntarily.  In theory, WPACs create and analyze policies that directly affect 
stakeholders and interests groups living within the watershed.  Water management plans 
created by WPACs, such as the South Saskatchewan River Basin Water Management 
Plan, will ideally be approved by the province after review.  There is no obligation for 
WPACs to consider Aboriginal and Treaty rights and participation by First Nations in 
decision-making by WPACs is not mandatory.  The subject of shared governance of 
water resources is being hotly debated by members of the Alberta Water Council:  Some 
say WPACs have failed and there needs to be another, more effective, means to govern 
water resources. 
This thesis suggests that Alberta has devised a legal regime that circumvents the 
treaty relationship between the Crown and Treaty 7 First Nations.  Section 52 of the 
Constitution and the principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law require that 
Crown legislation and action must be consistent with the Constitution.  Because 
Aboriginal and treaty rights are protected under s.35(1) of the Constitution, Alberta’s 
consultation guidelines must address the protection of existing Aboriginal and treaty 
3 
rights.  This thesis examines whether the treaty or any subsequent Crown legislation or 
Crown action has extinguished the Aboriginal and treaty rights of Treaty 7 First Nations 
and draws the conclusion that the Aboriginal rights of Treaty 7 First Nations not only 
continue to exist, but are afforded additional protection by Treaty 7 and the Natural 
Resources Transfer Agreement.   This leads to the conclusion that Alberta’s consultation 
policy, failing to recognize and affirm Aboriginal and treaty rights in their entirety as 
they currently exist, is inconsistent with s.35(1) and are null and void. 
2. Scope of Research 
I limited my research to examining existing case law and secondary sources.  
Ideally, I would have liked to interview individuals involved in negotiations regarding 
water resources, but I when I approached members of Treaty 7 First Nations Councils 
for an interview, I was denied by their counsel.  Clearly, these issues are sensitive, so out 
of respect, I have limited my research almost entirely to published materials.  I have 
relied on my own experience as a member of the Bow River Basin Council Legislation 
and Policy Committee for information about the workings of Watershed Policy and 
Advisory Councils.  I have no doubt that my conclusions would have been influenced by 
the views Treaty 7 First Nation members had I been able to interview them.   
I am conscious that individuals involved in the area of watershed management 
are at least aware of Aboriginal and Treaty rights to water.  Many of the people I have 
met know that there is a duty to consult, but do not know the degree of consultation that 
is required or how to meet this obligation.  There is a fair amount of resentment among 
stakeholders that the province has devolved the obligation to consult to ordinary 
Albertans.  The people that I have met appear to be trying to do their best without any 
guidance from Alberta Environment.  Even individuals working within Alberta 
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Environment are aware of the problems surrounding consultation with First Nations, but 
feel powerless to do anything without direction from the Minister.  When I have referred 
to the Alberta Environment’s failures to consult, I am referring to the Minister of 
Environment.  It is my hope that some of my findings may shed some light on how 
WPACs might more effectively engage Treaty 7 First Nations in watershed governance. 
3. Thesis Outline 
Chapter Two summarizes the law of consultation and applies the standard set by 
leading case law to Alberta’s current consultation policy.  This chapter considers which 
parties owe a duty to consult, when the duty to consult arises, how consultation is part of 
the process of managing the Treaty relationship, the range of consultation required, and 
First Nations’ obligations in the consultation process.  Alberta’s consultation guidelines 
developed for industry and Alberta Environment (AENV) use are analyzed as well as 
Alberta’s Water for Life Policy which mandates the formation of WPACs for watershed 
management.  
Chapter Three considers the duty to consult arising from the goal of 
reconciliation which is the over-arching purpose of s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1985.  
The definition of reconciliation has evolved over time from it initial inception in 
Sparrow which defined it as reconciliation of federal power with federal duty.  Van der 
Peet expanded the definition of reconciliation to include reconciling prior occupation by 
Aboriginal peoples with Crown sovereignty and reconciling Aboriginal legal 
perspectives with British legal perspectives.  The concept of reconciliation was 
broadened further in Gladstone and Delgamu’ukw to include reconciliation of 
Aboriginal societies with the broader political community.  The Supreme Court in Haida 
described reconciliation as balance and compromise.  Most importantly, for Treaty First 
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Nations, Mikisew introduced the idea of reconciliation as an on-going process of 
managing the Treaty relationship.  Chapter one critiques the characterization of 
reconciliation and suggests that the majority view in the leading cases leads to the 
erosion of Treaty rights by applying a balancing of interests analysis.  The legal 
principles arising from the leading Supreme Court cases are applied to the Peigan 
Irrigation Agreement and the Water for Life Strategy as examples of the process of 
reconciliation. 
Chapter Four indentifies the Blackfoot Confederacy’s Aboriginal rights and title 
existing at the time of Treaty 7.  The tests for indentifying Aboriginal rights and title 
protected by s.35(1) of the Constitution are applied. 
Chapter Five consider the effect of Treaty 7 on the Aboriginal rights and title 
possessed by the Blackfoot Confederacy at the time of treaty signing.  Applying the 
principles of Treaty interpretation, Treaty 7 and the historical context of the terms of 
Treaty 7 are briefly analyzed.  The chapter considers whether Aboriginal water rights 
and title to water and waterbeds were extinguished or altered by Treaty 7. 
Chapter Six assesses whether the Aboriginal and treaty rights of Treaty 7 First 
Nations were extinguished by legislation, Crown policy, or Crown action.  Applying the 
principles for interpreting constitutional documents, the purpose and effect of the NRTA 
is examined, including the creation of trust obligations, the geographical expansion of 
livelihood rights, incidental rights, and lands to which Indians have a right of access 
Finally, Chapter Seven draws the conclusion that Treaty 7 First Nations remain 
in possession of their original Aboriginal rights and title which have been afforded 
additional protection by Treaty 7 and the NRTA, thus Alberta’s consultation policy must 
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recognize and affirm them in their full vigour in order to be consistent with s.35(1) of 
the Constitution.  This chapter also suggests areas of future study. 
7 
CHAPTER TWO:  ALBERTA’S CONSULTATION POLICY 
1. Introduction 
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 19821 protects existing and “potential” 
Aboriginal rights, obligating the Crown, by its honour, to determine, recognize and 
respect those rights, and participate in processes of negotiation. “While this process 
continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult and, where indicated, 
accommodate Aboriginal interests.”2  While consultation is the Crown’s responsibility, 
third-party stakeholders such as the oil and gas industry, agricultural operations, and 
urban municipalities may be required to consult directly with Treaty 7 First Nations on 
use of water for economic purposes.  The ultimate responsibility for ensuring that 
meaningful and substantial consultation takes place rests with the Crown. 
While it is arguable that First Nations have Aboriginal and treaty rights to water, 
First Nations have few if any water licences:3  When the North-west Irrigation Act4 was 
passed, the Department of Indian Affairs did not see the utility in maintaining their water 
licences and allowed them to lapse. There are now no “new” allocations of water 
resources in the South Saskatchewan River Basin. 
                                                 
1  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 11 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982]. 
2  Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 70 (Q.L.); 2004 SCC 73at para. 25 [hereinafter Haida]. 
3  Jim Big Plume, Land Department, Tsuu T’ina Nation, informed me that the Tsuu 
T’ina Nation has a licence to extract .075% of the water from the Bow River.  I was not 
able to verify this fact. 
4  North-West Territories Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 50. 
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In the province of Alberta, the oil and gas industry has been allocated more than 
one quarter of all the fresh groundwater allocated in the province.5  Most of the water 
used for oilfield injection turns saline and does not re-enter the hydrologic cycle.  This 
practice may have an impact on water quantity and ultimately affect fish and wildlife 
ecosystems that will, in turn, diminish the supply of fish and game that make possible 
the exercise of Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
In southern Alberta, the other major use of surface and groundwater is for 
irrigation agriculture.  Irrigation Districts have ownership of a large proportion of the 
available water licences and are currently transferring some of those licences to 
municipalities whose development depends on the long-term availability of fresh water.6 
 
Figure 2-1.  Groundwater Allocations in Alberta by Specific Use 
                                                 
5  Mary Griffiths and Dan Woynillowicz, Oil and Troubled Waters: Reducing the 
impact of the oil and gas industry on Alberta’s water resources. (Pembina Institute) 
6  See Figure 2-1 (above) and Figure2-2 on page 38. 
http://www3.gov.ab.ca/env/water/GWSW/quantity/waterinalberta/allocation/AL3_purpo
se.html, access on-line August 11, 2007. 
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The current allocation scheme and consequent environmental degradation 
presents a problem for the Crown:  The water policy of the provincial Crown is 
inconsistent with the Crown’s vested duty to conserve game under Treaty 7 and to 
conserve fish and game under the terms of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement7  
that protects Indian livelihood. 
Treaty 7 First Nations have only had minimal involvement in the drafting of 
Alberta’s Consultation Guidelines and Water for Life Strategy, and no participation in 
drafting the South Saskatchewan River Basin Water Management Plan, the purpose of 
which is to strike a balance between environmental protection and water allocation and 
use.  These approved policies comprise the regime for water use, allocation, and 
consultation for regulatory approvals.  It is the writer’s opinion that while these policies 
may meet the province’s conception of the legal requirements for consultation and 
accommodation, Alberta’s water policies fall far short of the constitutional requirements 
for meaningful and substantial consultation. This chapter summarizes the constitutional 
requirements for consultation and applies these standards to Alberta’s Consultation 
Guidelines and Water for Life strategy to determine how consultation processes in 
Alberta measure up to the Supreme Court’s standards. 
2. What is Adequate Consultation? 
Subsequent chapters will examined in detail whether Aboriginal rights to water, 
which existed prior to contact and at various stages of colonization, survived the 
assertion of Crown sovereignty to be classified as what we now recognize as Aboriginal 
rights, Aboriginal title, Treaty rights, and livelihood rights as protected by the NRTA.  I 
                                                 
7  Natural Resources Transfer Agreements, being Schedules to the Constitution 
Act, 1930 (U.K.), 20-21 George V, c.26 [herinafter NRTA]. 
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have concluded in the chapters following that no imperial acts to date have effectively 
extinguished the entire bundle of Treaty 7 First Nations’ water rights.  Given that even 
the potential existence of some form of Aboriginal right to water triggers the duty to 
consult, the Crown clearly has a duty to consult with Treaty 7 First Nations regarding 
the use of the waters within Treaty 7 territories.  Below is a brief summary of the 
consultation requirements.8 
3. The Principles of Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law 
The standard used to determine the adequacy of consultation is whether 
consultation has been “consistent with the honour of the Crown.”9  This test has 
developed as it has largely because it is retrospective, assessing past conduct at the 
justificatory stage of the Sparrow analysis.  The Court has perhaps not had the 
opportunity to consider the larger question of whether recently developed provincial or 
federal regulations governing the constitutional process are consistent with the 
Constitution. 
Section 52 of the Canadian Constitution10 reads: 
(1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that 
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, of no force or effect. 
In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court explained that  
                                                 
8  An analysis of what constitutes meaningful and substantial consultation is 
worthy of a thesis in and of itself.  The purpose of this section is merely to summarize 
the main requirements set out by the Supreme Court. 
9  Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 71 (QL); 2005 SCC 69 at para. 67 [hereinafter Mikisew], Haida, supra note 2 
at para. 38. 
10  Constitution Act 1982, supra note 1. 
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The essence of constitutionalism in Canada is embodied in s. 52(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, which provides that "[t]he Constitution of Canada is the 
supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."11 
It has been argued that the Treaties form part of the law of Canada and, indeed, are 
constitutional documents.12  If that is the case, then any government consultation must 
also be consistent with the treaties. 
Like the constitutionalism principle, “[t]he rule of law principle requires that all 
government action must comply with the law, including the Constitution.”13   
Having transformed the Canadian system of government  
from a system of Parliamentary supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy. 
The Constitution binds all governments, both federal and provincial, including 
the executive branch (reference omitted). They may not transgress its 
provisions: indeed, their sole claim to exercise lawful authority rests in the 
powers allocated to them under the Constitution, and can come from no other 
source (emphasis mine).14 
The only lawful authority for the provincial government to regulate resource use is the 
Constitution and its package of constitutional documents including the Treaties and the 
NRTA.  Thus, the process of consultation, negotiation, and reconciliation must consider 
what lawful authority is vested in the provincial Crown as well as what residual 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights exist in the context of the various constitutional documents.  
If all government action must comply with the Constitution, then provincial consultation 
                                                 
11  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61 (QL); [1998] 2 S.C.R. 
217 at para. 72 [hereinafter Quebec Reference]. 
12  James [sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, “Empowering Treaty Federalism” (1994) 
58 Sask. L. Rev. 241. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Quebec Reference, supra note 11, quoting Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The 
Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, at p. 455. 
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policies must be consistent not only with the s.35(1) protection of Aboriginal rights, but 
also with the treaties. 
Indeed, if the province refuses to negotiate “in a manner consistent with 
constitutional principles and values” the province puts at risk the legitimacy of claim to 
jurisdiction over water resources “and perhaps the negotiation process as a whole.”15  
The constitutionalism principle implies that the province must be consistent with the 
mandated protection of existing Aboriginal and treaty rights and the Crown’s obligations 
under Treaty 7 and the NRTA:   The legitimacy of Crown jurisdiction would be called 
into question if it merely assumed that all Aboriginal and treaty rights have been 
extinguished by treaty or statute, giving the provincial Crown unfettered jurisdiction 
over water resources. 
The province of Alberta has done exactly what it cannot legitimately do under 
the constitutionalism principle.  The province assumed that all Aboriginal rights and title 
to water have been extinguished leaving no residual water rights to Treaty 7 First 
Nations.  The provincial Crown then passed the Water Act, enacted a regulatory regime 
governing water resource planning and allocation, and created consultation guidelines 
that devolve responsibility for consultation to third party industries, all without seriously 
contemplating the Treaty relationship and the obligations and jurisdictions arising 
therefrom. 
3.1 Who Owes the Duty to Consult? 
The Crown, not industry, is charged with the duty to consult with First Nations 
on proposed developments.  In Haida, the terms of the tree harvesting licence approved 
                                                 
15  Ibid. at para. 95. 
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for Weyerhaeuser mandated the company to specify what measures that it would take to 
identify and consult with aboriginal people claiming an aboriginal interest in or to the 
area. The Court recognized that, while the Crown is ultimately responsible for 
consultation, the procedural details of consultation may be delegated to industry.  Given 
that “the duty to consult and accommodate…flows from the Crown's assumption of 
sovereignty over lands and resources formerly held by the Aboriginal group” the Crown 
is solely responsible for consultation and accommodation.  The Crown is also legally 
responsible for “the consequences of its actions and interactions with third parties, that 
affect Aboriginal interests.”  However, “[t]he Crown may delegate procedural aspects of 
consultation to industry proponents seeking a particular development; this is not 
infrequently done in environmental assessments.”16  
Even though there is no requirement that third parties consult with or 
accommodate First Nations, it does not mean that “they can never be liable to Aboriginal 
peoples. If they act negligently in circumstances where they owe Aboriginal peoples a 
duty of care, or if they breach contracts with Aboriginal peoples or deal with them 
dishonestly, they may be held legally liable. But they cannot be held liable for failing to 
discharge the Crown's duty to consult and accommodate.”17  The Court very clearly 
stated that, although third parties may be involved in consultation with First Nations, 
“the ultimate legal responsibility for consultation and accommodation rests with the 
Crown. The honour of the Crown cannot be delegated” (emphasis mine).18  Industry 
does not “owe any independent duty to consult with or accommodate” First Nations 
                                                 
16  Haida, supra note 2 at para. 53. 
17  Ibid. at para. 56. 
18  Ibid. at para. 53. 
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concerns, “although the possibility remains that it could become liable for assumed 
obligations.”19 
If responsibility for consultation cannot be delegated, the determination of what 
constitutes adequate or appropriate consultation cannot be left to the discretion of third 
parties.  The Crown is ultimately responsible for determining the procedural 
requirements of consultation and for monitoring the quality of consultation, even if the 
actual consultation is carried out by third parties.  Anything less would be an abdication 
of the Crown’s duty.  Alberta has, by establishing Consultation Guidelines, attempted to 
discharge the Crown’s duty to consult and devolve responsibility for developing 
consultation plans to third party industries such as forestry, mining, and oil extraction 
and processing. 
3.1.1 Third Party Consultation 
Although it was determined in Haida that “[t]he duty to consult and, if 
appropriate, accommodate cannot be discharged by delegation”20 to third parties, it is 
Alberta’s official policy for all resource industries to consult with First Nations, 
particularly in the oil industry, as there may be live issues with regard to ‘rights and 
traditional uses’ of land within the territories being exploited for oil resources. This 
policy would constitute a prohibited delegation of the Crown’s obligation, particularly in 
the treaty context in which there is a clear relationship between the Crown and Treaty 7 
First Nations.  Nonetheless, Alberta takes the position that it has discharged its duty to 
consult by setting consultation policy.  It is unclear what constitutes adequate 
consultation by industry with First Nations as there are few decisions on point. 
                                                 
19  Ibid. at para. 10. 
20  Ibid. 
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Some communities have consultation agreements guiding their communications 
with industry, while others do not.  For example, the Wood Buffalo First Nation opposed 
a Steam-Assisted Gravity Drainage (SAGD) Project operation stating that insufficient 
information was available to assess underground water systems and potential 
contamination of the MacKay River and natural springs.  They were not opposed to the 
project per se, providing there was sufficient environmental testing and mitigation.  
Wood Buffalo requested a consultation agreement with Petro-Canada to address the 
concerns of its members because the MacKay River project would be on its traditional 
lands, and to facilitate meaningful consultation so that the First Nation could give its full 
support to the project.  The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (now the Energy 
Resources Conservation Board) determined that Petro-Canada’s consultation program 
led to effective and meaningful communication between the parties.21 The “progressive 
approach” employed by Petro-Canada “established relationships that should continue to 
produce positive results by promoting a shared understanding of both technical and 
social issues that are important to [First Nations] stakeholders.”22   
It is clear from the discussion below that Alberta’s consultation guidelines that 
Crown Alberta has taken control over establishing standards for consultation while 
devolving responsibility for consultation to industry proponents.  
                                                 
21  The AEUB/ERCB’s ability to consider constitutional questions may be a double-
edged sword:  One side, it allows First Nations to submit Statements of Concern to the 
AEUB/ERCB based on failure to engage in meaningful and substantial consultation, 
thus preserving their rights to future appeals on other than purely scientific grounds, but 
on the other side, it allows the AEUB/ERCB, a creature of provincial statute, to 
determine constitutional rights which may render First Nations vulnerable to the erosion 
of their rights through bad precedent. 
22  Petro-Canada Oil and Gas Steam-Assisted Gravity Drainage Project Mackay 
River Project Athabasca Oil Sands Area, Decision 2000-50, Application No. 1032550. 
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3.2 When Does the Duty to Consult Arise? 
In the context of a proposed development, there is potential for conflict over the 
determination of when consultation must take place.  Generally, the duty to consult 
arises from the Crown's honour and the goal of reconciliation.  Consultation must take 
place “when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of 
the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it.”23 
There is a legal duty to consult “prior to proof of claims” and “before determination of 
the right.”24  Proof of the right is not the trigger for a legal duty to consult and 
accommodate “even in the context of justification.” 25   
The court suggests that any knowledge “of a credible but unproven claim” is 
sufficient to trigger a duty to consult and accommodate, however, the scope of the duty 
will vary with the situation:  If a claim is “dubious,” “peripheral,” or “tenuous” a “mere 
duty of notice” may suffice.  The parties themselves should “assess these matters, and if 
they cannot agree, tribunals and courts can assist. Difficulties associated with the 
absence of proof and definition of claims are addressed by assigning appropriate content 
to the duty, not by denying the existence of a duty.”26  
                                                 
23  Haida, supra note 2 at para. 35, see Halfway River First Nation v. British 
Columbia (Ministry of Forests), [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. 45 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 71, per 
Dorgan J. 
24  Haida, ibid. 
25  Ibid. at para. 34, R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, R. v. 
Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013; [1996] S.C.J. No. 47 (QL) [hereinafter Sparrow], and R. v. 
Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; [1996] S.C.J. No. 79 (QL) [hereinafter Gladstone]. 
26  Haida, ibid. at para. 37. 
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Clearly, the duty to consult arises when Aboriginal “interests are being seriously 
pursued in the process of treaty negotiation and proof.”27  The Haida situation arose in 
the context of unresolved land claims.  There it was determined that in such a situation, 
although the Crown is not “rendered impotent” during the process of Treaty 
negotiations, the Crown, “acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over 
Aboriginal interests”: 
It may continue to manage the resource in question pending claims resolution. 
But, depending on the circumstances, discussed more fully below, the honour 
of the Crown may require it to consult with and reasonably accommodate 
Aboriginal interests pending resolution of the claim. To unilaterally exploit a 
claimed resource during the process of proving and resolving the Aboriginal 
claim to that resource, may be to deprive the Aboriginal claimants of some or 
all of the benefit of the resource. That is not honourable. 28 
The federal and provincial Crowns have an obligation to consult with Treaty 7 
First Nations concerning the possible impacts of developments on their Treaty and 
Aboriginal rights upon the First Nation asserting a credible but unproven claim to the 
existence of such a right.  The assertion of the claim will put the Crown on notice as to 
the possible existence of the right, and will trigger a duty on the part of the Crown to 
make further reasonable inquiry.  While the government is not required to consult 
regarding every development “no matter how remote or unsubstantial the impact,”29 
In the treaty context, where First Nations clearly have a right to engage in 
traditional livelihood pursuits throughout a defined treaty territory, the Crown must 
“consult and, if appropriate, accommodate First Nations' interests before reducing the 
area over which their members may continue to pursue their hunting, trapping and 
                                                 
27  Ibid. at para. 27. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Mikisew, supra note 9 at para. 55. 
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fishing rights.”30  The court has made no determination regarding Treaty First Nations’ 
proprietary rights to lands within the “ceded territory” in the context of a treaty.  As we 
will see in Chapter Five, Treaty 7 First Nations may not have ceded their proprietary 
rights or jurisdiction over water.  It is unclear what the scope of the duty to consult 
would be in such a situation. 
3.2.1 Consultation as Managing the Treaty Relationship 
Where there is a treaty relationship, it could be argued that the Crown has real or 
constructive knowledge that any development may adversely affect the Treaty rights of 
First Nation and impact the treaty relationship.  In Mikisew, the Supreme Court held that 
consultation has an added element of “managing change” and “managing” the 
relationship between the Crown and First Nation. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]he Crown has a treaty right to "take 
up" surrendered lands.”  Where “the impacts [are] clear, established and demonstrably 
adverse to the continued exercise of the [First Nation] hunting and trapping rights over 
the lands in question, the Crown is “under an obligation to inform itself of the impact its 
project will have on the exercise” of those rights and to communicate its findings to the 
First Nation affected.31   The Crown is obligated to deal with Treaty First Nations "in 
good faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing"32 In Badger, which did not 
consider consultation directly, the Supreme Court held that in the context of 
infringement of Aboriginal rights under the NRTA, the special trust relationship and the 
                                                 
30  Ibid. at para. 56. 
31  Ibid. at para. 55. 
32  Delgamu’ukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108 (QL); [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
1010 at para. 168 [hereinafter Delgamuukw]. 
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responsibility of the government vis-à-vis the aboriginal people must be taken into 
consideration when deciding whether the aboriginal group was adequately consulted 
with respect to the conservation measures.33 
3.3 Characteristics of Consultation 
The characteristics of what would constitute adequate consultation are contextual 
and relative.  The Supreme Court has set a basic standard by which to assess the 
adequacy of consultation, but have left the determination of the process to the parties 
themselves.  The reason given is that reconciliation, of which consultation and 
accommodation are a part, is a political process in which the Courts do not have role 
other than to set basic standard for review if necessary.34  The few decisions that exist 
have established that, while “consultation must be meaningful”35 and substantive, “there 
is no duty to reach agreement,”36 which appears to be contrary to the overarching 
purpose of s.35 to reconcile First Nations with the assertion of sovereignty.  
Consultation and accommodation “entails [the] balancing of Aboriginal and other 
interests.”37  The content of the duty varies with the circumstances: from a minimum 
"duty to discuss important decisions" where the "breach is less serious or relatively 
minor"; through to "significantly deeper than mere consultation" that is required in 
"most cases"; to "full consent of [the] aboriginal nation" on very serious issues.”38 
                                                 
33  R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771; [1996] S.C.J. No. 39 (QL) [hereinafter 
Badger] at para. 97, quoting Sparrow, supra note 25 at 1114. 
34  This subject is more fully dealt with in chapter three. 
35  Haida, supra note 2 at para. 10. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid. at para. 14. 
38  Ibid. at para. 24. 
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3.4 What is the Range of Consultation Required? 
Generally, “the scope of the duty is proportionate to a preliminary assessment of 
the strength of the case supporting the existence of the right or title, and to the 
seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title claimed.”39  The Court 
would prefer that the parties be able to assess the strength of the case or seriousness of 
the potential impact, but all too often, that is the fundamental point on which the parties 
have very divergent views.  If it cannot be resolved consensually, the only recourse is to 
take the question to Court.  Alberta’s consultation guidelines reflect the province’s view 
that treaty First Nations possess only rights to engage in traditional activities, not land or 
water rights.  First Nations maintain that they have residual title to their lands and waters 
within their traditional territories. 
Clearly, the scope and content of the duty to consult is dependent on context.  
What is required of the government may vary with the strength of the claim and the 
circumstances.40  The duty to consult is triggered at a low threshold, but “adverse impact 
is a matter of degree, as is the extent of the Crown's duty.”41 The more serious the 
impact the more important will be the role of consultation.42  Thus the provincial 
government and industry must be diligent in consulting with First Nations on the 
strength of their claims as well as the seriousness of the adverse impact of all proposed 
projects.  If the province or developers fail in their assessment, this would be grounds for 
                                                 
39  Ibid. at para. 39. 
40  Ibid. at para. 38. 
41  Mikisew, supra note 9 at para 55. 
42  Ibid. at para. 63. 
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administrative review by the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB)43 or by the 
judiciary. 
The history of the relationship between the Crown and the First Nation may also 
be a significant factor in determining the level of consultation required. 44  The Supreme 
Court stated in Mikisew, that where specific Treaty promises have been made, “the role 
of consultation may be quite limited.”45  This dicta seems to contradict the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Delagmu’ukw where it was determined the full consent of First 
Nations may be required, particularly when hunting and fishing may be adversely 
affected.46 
While all parties would have liked the Supreme Court to have set specific 
guidelines, the Court felt it is “not useful to classify situations into watertight 
compartments,” as different situations require different responses. “In all cases, the 
honour of the Crown requires that the Crown act with good faith to provide meaningful 
consultation appropriate to the circumstances”47 with a view to substantially addressing 
First Nations’ concerns as they are raised through a meaningful process of 
consultation.48 
                                                 
43  The AEUB has been divided into the Alberta Utilities Commission and Alberta 
Energy Board.  The AEUB has been conferred the power to consider constitutional 
matters provided they were referenced in a Statement of Concern.  The Environmental 
Appeals Board, the board responsible for most Water Act approvals, does not have such 
power. 
44  Mikisew, supra note 9 at para. 63. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Delgamuukw, supra note 32 at para. 168. 
47  Haida, supra note 2 at para. 41. 
48  Delgamuukw, supra note 32 at para. 168; Haida, ibid. at para. 42. 
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The fact that consultation may be inconvenient or cause delay does not weaken 
the Crown’s obligation.  In R. v. Noel,49 the court held that the short time frame required 
for a decision to establish a hunting corridor did not entitle the Northwest Territories 
Government to overlook the rights of First Nations: 
Consultation must require the government to carry out meaningful and 
reasonable discussions with the representatives of Aboriginal people involved.  
The fact that the time frame for action was short does not justify the 
government to push forward with their proposed regulation without proper 
consultation.50 
The Court has stated that  
Every case must be approached individually… flexibly, since the level of 
consultation required may change as the process goes on and new information 
comes to light. The controlling question in all situations is what is required to 
maintain the honour of the Crown and to effect reconciliation between the 
Crown and the Aboriginal peoples with respect to the interests at stake. Pending 
settlement, the Crown is bound by its honour to balance societal and Aboriginal 
interests in making decisions that may affect Aboriginal claims. The Crown 
may be required to make decisions in the face of disagreement as to the 
adequacy of its response to Aboriginal concerns. Balance and compromise will 
then be necessary.51 
The parties must be committed to a meaningful process of consultation52 that may 
not lead ultimately to agreement.53  In the consultation process, sharp dealing is not 
permitted54  but hard bargaining does not breach a First Nation’s right to be consulted.55  
This is where the protection of Aboriginal rights under s.35 breaks down:  
Reconciliation may require consultation, negotiation and bargaining, but if Aboriginal 
                                                 
49  R. v. Noel, [1995] 4 C.N.L.R. 78. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Haida, supra note 2 at para. 45. 
52  Ibid. at para. 42. 
53  Ibid., Mikisew, supra note 9 at para. 66. 
54  Haida, ibid. at para. 42. 
55  Ibid. 
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rights are capable of bargained into extinguishment without the consent of First Nations, 
the supremacy of the constitution is undermined.   
The range of the Crown’s duty to consult was considered in Delgamu’ukw.  The 
Crown’s duty ranges from “no more than a duty to discuss important decisions,” to the 
obligation to “give notice, disclose information, and discuss any issues raised in 
response to the notice,”56 to good faith consultation, and to obtain the full consent of the 
First Nation. 57   
In situations where a First Nation has a strong prima facie case, “the right and 
potential infringement is of high significance to the Aboriginal peoples, and the risk of 
non-compensable damage is high…deep consultation, aimed at finding a satisfactory 
interim solution, may be required.” 58 
Haida and Taku discussed the indicia of adequate consultation and 
accommodation.  In Haida the Court recognized that the potential adverse impacts were 
great and irreversible:  The old growth forest was vital to the Haida economy and 
culture, and could never be replaced.  Furthermore, the First Nation’s claim of title to the 
Haida Gwaii was strong but would take many years to prove.  In the mean time, if 
logging was not curtailed, “their heritage would be irretrievably despoiled.”59  In Taku, 
the same duty arose, but the Court found that the First Nation had been consulted and 
efforts had been made to accommodate their interests, thus the mining project could go 
forward despite the lack of agreement. 
                                                 
56  Ibid. at para. 43. 
57  Delgamuukw, supra note 32 para. 168. 
58  Haida, supra note 2 at para. 44. 
59  Ibid. at para. 7. 
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3.4.1 Consultation at the Low End of the Spectrum 
At the low end of the spectrum, where the strength of the Aboriginal right 
claimed is relatively weak, the duty to consult may be confined to merely providing 
notice, information, and listening the First Nation’s responses with a view to mitigating 
negative impacts on Aboriginal rights.  Merely giving notice (such as posting an ad in 
the local newspaper) will not be sufficient.  In Mikisew, the Supreme Court stated that 
the Crown must not only provide information about the project, but also address 
Aboriginal interests and potential adverse impact on those interests.  This requires the 
Crown to keep itself well informed of the status of Aboriginal rights. Furthermore, the 
Crown is required to solicit and to listen carefully to the Aboriginal concerns, and to 
attempt to minimize adverse impacts on the First Nations’ rights.  The Crown must 
provide First Nations with “all necessary information in a timely way so that they have 
an opportunity to express their interests and concerns.” Adequate notice is required “to 
ensure that their representations are seriously considered and, wherever possible, 
demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of action.” 60   
In Mikisew, the Supreme Court held that communications by the federal Minister 
of Environment in the form of “standard information about the proposed road in the 
same form and substance as the communications being distributed to the general public 
of interested stakeholders,” 61 along with open houses, was not adequate consultation.   
                                                 
60  Halfway River, supra note 23 at paras. 159-160; Mikisew, supra note 9 at para.. 
64. 
61  Mikisew, ibid. at paras. 9 and 20. 
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3.4.2 Consultation at the High End of the Spectrum 
In Delgamu’ukw, Chief Justice Lamer contemplated situations where First 
Nations consent may be required, particularly where the province’s legislation may 
impact or infringe traditional hunting and fishing in an area where there was the 
existence of potential Aboriginal title.  Qualifying the circumstances where veto power 
could be exercised, the Supreme Court in Haida denied that Aboriginal groups have a 
veto in [consultations] in situations where final proof of a claim to Aboriginal title is 
pending.  Consent from Aboriginal groups in consultations is only required “in cases of 
established rights, and then by no means in every case. 62  Apparently contradicting that 
Court’s earlier statement, the Supreme Court further stated, in Mikisew, that the duty to 
consult does not give veto power to First Nations.63 This dicta appears to give an unfair 
veto power to the Crown in consultations in situations where agreement cannot be 
reached. 
The Court clearly prefers a process of balancing interests approach to 
consultation:  However, the balancing of interests risks the assimilation of Aboriginal 
peoples if the honour of the Crown and the process of reconciliation is not faithfully 
adhered to.  
3.5 First Nations Obligations in the Consultation Process 
The Crown needs to have “an idea of the asserted rights and of their strength 
sufficient to trigger an obligation to consult and accommodate.” To facilitate the 
Crown’s knowledge, “claimants should outline their claims with clarity, focusing on the 
                                                 
62  Haida, supra note 2 at para. 48. 
63  Mikisew, supra note 9 at para. 66. 
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scope and nature of the Aboriginal rights they assert and on the alleged infringements.”64  
If possible, the First Nation’s assertion of right should be supported by evidence.  This 
will not only serve to put the Crown on notice and trigger its duty to make further 
inquiries:  It will also strengthen the scope of the consultation obligation owed by the 
Crown following assertion of the right.  Aboriginal claimants must not frustrate the 
Crown's reasonable good faith attempts to consult with them.65  First Nations should not 
take unreasonable positions to thwart the government from making decisions or acting in 
cases where, despite meaningful consultation, agreement is not reached.66 
4. Accommodation 
The Siamese twin of consultation is accommodation.  The Supreme Court held in 
Mikisew that “[c]onsultation that excludes from the outset any form of accommodation 
would be meaningless.”  Consultation and accommodation is not simply a process 
“giving the Mikisew an opportunity to blow off steam before the Minister proceeds to do 
what she intended to do all along.”67  Rather, on-going consultation and accommodation 
is part of the “the long process of reconciliation” that began prior to Treaty-making.  If 
the meaning of adequate and substantial consultation is unclear, the meaning of 
accommodation is doubly so.  The concept of accommodation has been raised in cases 
such as Sparrow, Sioui, Coté, Delgamu’ukw, Haida, and Mikisew but the court has not 
fully developed the concept nor its requirements.  Accommodation appears to require the 
                                                 
64  Haida, supra note 2 at para. 36. 
65  Ibid. at para. 42. 
66  Ibid.; Halfway River, supra note 23 at para 44; Heiltsuk Tribal Council v. British 
Columbia (Minister of Sustainable Resource Management) (2003), 19 B.C.L.R. (4th) 
107 (B.C.S.C.) 
67  Mikisew, supra note 1 at para. 54. 
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balancing of competing societal interests with Aboriginal and Treaty rights68 “in a 
manner which does not strain ‘the Canadian legal and constitutional structure’”69 
Aboriginal societies are to be balanced with the broader political community by 
distributing resources fairly. Legitimate government objectives in enacting laws and 
setting policy regarding resource distribution includes "the pursuit of economic and 
regional fairness."70  This balancing of interests approach seems to be inconsistent with 
the protection of Aboriginal peoples’ s. 35 constitutional rights.  Where the interests of 
the Crown and First nations appear to be at odds, the Crown bears the burden of proving 
that its occupancy of lands “cannot be accommodated to the reasonable exercise of [First 
Nations] rights.”71  Restrictions on Aboriginal rights may “be accommodated with the 
Crown's special fiduciary relationship with First Nations".72  However, it appears that 
restrictions on constitutional rights contradict the constitutional fiduciary relationship of 
protection of rights with First Nation. 
The Supreme Court appears to suggest that consultation be conducted in stages. 
The outcome of initial good faith consultation may be an obligation of the Crown to 
accommodate First Nations concerns.73  Consultation may reveal that there is a strong 
prima facie case plus significant adverse effects, and thus accommodation is required to 
take “steps to avoid irreparable harm or to minimize the effects of infringement, pending 
                                                 
68  Sparrow, supra note 25. 
69  Delgamuukw, supra note32 at para. 82 
70  Ibid. at para. 161. 
71  R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 at 1072. 
72  R. v. Coté, [1996] S.C.J. No. 93; [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139; 138 D.L.R. (4th) 385; 202 
N.R. 161; [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 26 at para. 81. 
73  Haida, supra note 2 at para. 10. 
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final resolution of the underlying claim.”74 Clearly, consultation is not a linear process, 
as consultation that reveals the need for "... the process of accommodation of the treaty 
right [which] may best be resolved by consultation and negotiation.”75 
The Court grappled with the meaning of accommodation in Haida.  With no 
cases in Canada regarding the nature and scope of accommodation, the Court looked to 
the Maori example.76  Accommodation, the Court suggests entails gathering information 
to test policy proposals, putting forward proposals that are not yet finalized along with 
all relevant information upon which those proposals are based, seeking and listening to 
First Nations’ opinions on those proposals, and being prepared to amend policy 
proposals in the light of information received, and providing feedback.”77  The end result 
of meaningful consultation may be the conclusion that the Crown has obligation to 
accommodate First Nations by amending Crown policy.78 
The Court defines accommodation as seeking to harmonize, balance, and 
reconcile conflicting interests.  There is no duty to agree, but there is a requirement to 
make “good faith efforts to understand each other's concerns and move to address 
them.”79  The processes of reconciliation, consultation, negotiation, and ultimate 
accommodation, being essentially political, must nevertheless meet the standard of the 
                                                 
74  Ibid. at para. 47. 
75  Ibid., citing R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, at para. 22. 
76  New Zealand Ministry of Justice's Guide for Consultation with Maori (1997) in 
Haida, supra note 2 at para 46 relied on by Alberta Department of Aboriginal Affairs in 
developing Alberta’s Consultation Policy. 
77  Haida, ibid., quoting New Zealand Ministry of Justice's Guide for Consultation 
with Maori (1997). 
78  Haida, ibid. 
79  Ibid. at para. 49. 
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principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law.  That is, in so far a these political 
processes are government acts, they must be consistent with the s.35(1) protection of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
5. Alberta’s Consultation Guidelines 
It appears that Alberta has taken the Supreme Court’s recommendation seriously 
and has fashioned its consultation policy as “deep consultation”, setting out the process 
by which First Nations have “the opportunity to make submissions for consideration,” 
“provision of written reasons to show that Aboriginal concerns were considered and to 
reveal the impact they had on the decision,” complete with “dispute resolution 
procedures like mediation or administrative regimes with impartial decision-makers in 
complex or difficult cases.”80  Alberta’s consultation policy does not include, however, 
“formal participation in the decision-making process” as recommended. However, as the 
Supreme Court cautioned, “[t]his list is neither exhaustive, nor mandatory for every 
case.” 81 
The Supreme Court recommended in Haida that, to facilitate accommodation, 
provincial governments “set up regulatory schemes to address the procedural 
requirements appropriate to different problems at different stages.”82  By taking this pro-
active approach it was hoped that the reconciliation process would be strengthened and 
there would be less recourse to the courts.  Regulations could establish the consultation 
process, the minimum requirements in defined situations, and the roles and obligations 
of each party.  Provincial governments "may not simply adopt an unstructured 
                                                 
80  Ibid. at para. 44. 
81  Ibid. 
82  Ibid. at para. 51. 
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discretionary administrative regime which risks infringing aboriginal rights in a 
substantial number of applications in the absence of some explicit guidance."83  
British Columbia has had a Provincial Policy for Consultation with First Nations 
to direct the terms of provincial ministries' and agencies' operational guidelines. The 
Supreme Court noted that, although the policy fell short of a regulatory scheme, it 
provided a guide for decision-makers that prevented unstructured discretionary 
administrative decisions.  Taking the recommendation of the Supreme Court to heart, 
Alberta Environment drafted its Consultation Policy and Guidelines, the final draft of 
which was publish in May, 2006. 84  
5.1 Alberta Environment’s First Nation Consultation Guidelines 
The government of Alberta’s First Nations Consultation Policy on Land 
Management and Resource Development was approved May 16, 2005. This policy 
provided the basis upon which Alberta Environment developed its First Nation 
Consultation Guidelines85 which was published for discussion purposes on May 18, 
2006.  The guiding principles for consultation excerpted from the policy include the 
following: 
1. Consultation must be conducted in good faith. 
                                                 
83  R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; 138 D.L.R. (4th) 657; 202 N.R. 89; 110 
C.C.C. (3d) 97; [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 at para. 54.  Note that the infringement test is part 
of the reconciliation processes in Sparrow, but it is distinct process from consultation 
and accommodation as well as administrative decisions. 
84  Alberta Environment, “First Nation Consultation Guidelines (Regulatory 
Authorizations and Environmental Impact Assessments) Draft 1, May 18, 2006” 
accessed at 
http://www.aand.gov.ab.ca/AANDFlash/Files/AENV_FN_Guidelines_Draft_1_May_18
_2006.pdf, on July 31, 2006, [hereinafter Consultation Guidelines] 
85  Ibid. 
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2. Alberta is responsible for managing the consultation process. 
3. Consultation will occur before decisions are made, where land 
management and resource development may infringe First Nations rights 
and traditional uses. 
4. While each has very different roles, the consultation process requires the 
participation of First Nations, the project proponent and Alberta. 
5. Alberta’s consultation practices will be coordinated across departments. 
6. Parties are expected to provide relevant information, allowing adequate 
time for the other parties to review it. 
7. The nature of the consultation will depend on such factors as the extent of 
potential infringement, the communities affected, and the nature of the 
activities involved. 
8. Consultation should be conducted with the objective of avoiding 
infringement of First Nations rights and traditional uses.  Where 
avoidance is not possible, consultation will be conducted with the goal of 
mitigating such infringement. 
9. Consultation will occur within applicable legislative and regulatory 
timelines. 
It is notable that Alberta’s the Guidelines to not acknowledge the constitutional 
duty of consistency with aboriginal and treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples. All 
throughout Alberta’s Consultation policies, the term “traditional uses” is used rather 
than “traditional land uses.”  It is not clear whether these “traditional uses” will be 
interpreted in their modern context or whether the provincial definition freezes them in 
time. By this term the policy framers mean to include uses of public lands such as burial 
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grounds, gathering sites, and historic or ceremonial locations, and existing 
constitutionally protected Aboriginal, treaty, and NRTA rights to hunt, trap and fish and 
not proprietary interests in land, like aboriginal tenure or title.  By focussing on 
“traditional uses,” claims to unextinguished and unceded Aboriginal rights to water 
resources whether by virtue of title or of rights to water are side-stepped, which could be 
viewed as “sharp dealing”  in a manner unbefitting of the Crown. 
5.2 Process Under the Guidelines 
Although third parties have no duty to consult with First Nations, the 
implementation of the Crown’s duty to consult may be delegated to third parties.  The 
ultimate legal responsibility for meeting the requirements of meaningful and substantial 
consultation rests with the Crown, as the honour of the Crown cannot be delegated.  
Alberta acknowledges that the province has a duty to consult and is accountable for 
consultations undertaken with First Nations where legislation, regulations or other 
actions have the potential to adversely impact Aboriginal and treaty rights, but it 
delegates some aspects of consultation to project proponents.  This permanent delegation 
is neither valid nor legitimate, as project proponents have no treaty relationship with 
First Nations and owe no constitutional duties to Aboriginal peoples:  The decision to 
delegate the responsibility for consultation is a matter of expediency. While the province 
accepts its role in managing consultation, it expects that project proponents will provide 
project-specific information to Alberta Environment and the potentially adversely 
impacted First Nation, develop and implement a First Nations consultation plan, and 
directly notify First Nations at existing public notice points.  Alberta assumed that First 
Nations will take initiative in raising concerns and that project proponents will identify 
33 
strategies to avoid, mitigate, or accommodate adversely affecting First Nations rights 
and traditional uses. 
First Nations take issue with the Crown taking such a “hands-off” approach to 
consultation.  Proponents are self-interest and driven by profit motives with no 
constitutional obligation to protect Aboriginal and treaty rights.  The honour of the 
Crown may be met if the Crown consults with First Nations and get their approval of the 
consultation process to be engaged in with third parties before any consultation with 
industry begins, and if the Crown maintains a supervisory role ensuring that consultation 
between third parties and First Nations are conducted according to the plan approved by 
First Nations.  In this way industry would be charged with the responsibility for the 
technical aspects including full disclosure, environmental assessments, etc., and the 
Crown would maintain responsibility for meeting procedural requirements. 
Alberta’s unwritten policy, directed by budgetary concerns, is to require First 
Nations to establish one-point consultation mechanisms for consultation with the 
province and the project proponent.  At the province’s initiative, First Nations 
established Industry Relations Corporations (IRCs) and Alberta has been providing 
funding for their operation.  IRC shareholders are typically band members and the CEO 
is often a member of the community.  The staff of IRCs includes an environmental 
coordinator who reviews environmental assessments and an Elders’ coordinator who 
acts as a liaison between industry and the Elders and community members for 
consultation purposes. Rather than consulting with the community, industry proponents 
contact the First Nation’s IRC and conduct all consultations through the corporation.  In 
theory IRCs facilitate communication between First Nations and industry, but the CEO 
and directors of the IRCs are not usually politically accountable to the community and 
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may not accurately reflect the views of the community, and thus the legitimacy of 
conducting consultation through IRCs is questionable.    
After being notified of a development, First Nations must, according to the 
Guidelines, submit a valid statement of concern within the legislated submission period.  
These concerns must relate to the issues within the Director’s authority and must relate 
directly to the proposed project.  The person or entity filing the statement of concern 
must be directly affected by the activity. 
This raises the concern of the capacity of First Nations to respond efficiently and 
effectively to protect their rights in the context of Alberta’s overheated and rapidly 
developing economy.   The province of Alberta and some industry proponents are 
actively negotiating with First Nations in various parts of the province to simultaneously 
create certainty for industry and enhance the capacity of First Nations to participate in 
consultation.  The financial and technical demands placed on First Nations to consult 
have overwhelmed many small communities.  The lack of capacity to answer the 
demands of consultation portends a situation in which First Nations are vulnerable to 
being steamrolled by project proponents, particularly considering the time constraints 
created by the Guidelines. 
The Guidelines outline additional steps to the authorization process under the 
Water Act.  The guidelines apply, at the discretion of the Director, to large scale water 
diversion, wastewater, or water works projects and projects off-reserve that may have a 
potential to adversely impact First Nations rights and traditional uses on reserves.86  
                                                 
86  Alberta’s First Nations Consultation Guidelines on Land Management and 
Resource Development, September 1, 2006, Part IV at 1, accessed on-line at 
http://www.aand.gov.ab.ca/AANDFlash/Files/Albertas_Consultation_Guidelines.pdf . 
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Upon being provided with project specific information by the project proponent, Alberta 
Environment will assess whether the project requires First Nations consultation and, if 
so, will advise potentially adversely impacted First Nations of the proposed project and 
regulatory timeline.87  The project proponent will then be charged with the responsibility 
to develop a First Nations consultation plan to the satisfaction of the Director.  
Consultation may include advertisements in First Nations newspapers, community 
postings, face-to-face meetings with elected leaders or their delegated representatives, or 
any other means to inform members of the First Nation about the proposed project.88  
The project proponent is required to document their consultation efforts and outcomes, 
proposals for avoidance or mitigation, or where no agreement can be reached, written 
reasons.  Alberta Environment will then make a final determination as to whether or not 
consultation was adequate, and if not, delay or deny regulatory approval.  This begs the 
question of whether, if the consultation process itself was adequate, the First Nation 
could oppose the project.  Given Alberta Environment’s history of almost never denying 
project approvals, it is unlikely that First Nations’ opposition alone, without a Court 
decision, could stop a project from proceeding. 
6. Consultation Under the Water Act 
6.1 The Water for Life Strategy 
Water use has come to the foreground as various user groups compete for the 
limited water resources of Southern Alberta, the most prominent being urban centres, the 
                                                 
87  This appears to contradict the Court in Marshall which rejected Ministerial 
discretion in protecting treaty rights and appears to offend the constitutional prohibition 
against unstructured discretionary administrative regime which risks infringing 
constitutional rights. 
88  Consultation Guidelines, supra note 84 at 3. 
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oil industry, and irrigation farmers, whose priority is determined in keeping with the 
first-in-time-first-in-right licencing regime.  Alberta allocates water use by issuing water 
licences under the Water Act.  Developed pursuant to the Water Act, Alberta’s “Water 
for Life” strategy mandates a consultation process with stakeholders in the allocation of 
water resources.  The Alberta government, while being aware that Treaty and Aboriginal 
rights to water exist, has chosen to side-step dealing squarely with Aboriginal and Treaty 
water rights.  By failing to address Aboriginal and Treaty water rights in Alberta’s water 
legislation and policies, the province has adopted an unstructured discretionary 
administrative regime which risks infringing Aboriginal and Treaty rights.  It is clear 
from the chapters following that Treaty 7 First Nations have residual Aboriginal and 
treaty rights to water and thus have a right to be consulted whenever their Aboriginal 
and Treaty rights to water are impacted.  Alberta’s “Water for Life” consultation process 
deprives First Nations of their rightful role in the consultation process. 
6.1.1 Alberta’s Water Consultation Process 
In drafting the “Water for Life” strategy, the Alberta government held public 
consultations in the spring of 2002.  Responsibility for conducting consultations was 
contracted out to a consultant which conducted 15 community workshops, analysed 
2,100 workbooks completed by individuals, and did a random telephone survey of 1,000 
Albertans.  One of the water policy workshops included 13 representatives from 
Aboriginal and Métis communities and was concluded within five hours.   
In the spring of 2003, the Alberta government was to meet with stakeholders 
who attended the Minister’s Forum on Water.  Only eight of the “stakeholders” who 
participated were individuals from First Nations.  First Nations’ rights were not 
incorporated into Alberta’s water policy.  The Environmental Strategies Advisor who 
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coordinated the consultation process was unaware of which First Nations organizations 
were invited to participate in reviewing the draft discussion paper which was published 
in April, 2003.89  Alberta Environment relied on the Alberta Ministry of Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development to consult with the stakeholder First Nations.  The 
discussion papers were mailed out on April 11, 2003 and the deadline for input on 
Alberta’s water policy was May 31, 2003.  The speed at which the Water for Life policy 
was drafted and approved, combined with the minimal input by First Nations, casts a 
dark shadow of doubt as to whether First Nations were adequately consulted at this stage 
of the process. 
Although it is clear that First Nations have constitutionally protected rights and 
interests, the “Water for Life” strategy is completely silent on Aboriginal and Treaty 
rights.  Because of the extensive impact of water use on the exercise of First Nations 
Treaty rights and reserve economies, Alberta should have consulted First Nations in a 
manner consistent with the Crown’s on-going Treaty relationship with First Nations, not 
merely as members of the public or even as “stakeholders.”  All relevant information 
ought to have been provided to Treaty 7 First Nations in a timely manner.  They should 
have been consulted before or at the same time as the public.  The cumulative impact of 
Alberta’s water policy needs to be examined because it affects not only Treaty hunting 
and fishing rights, but also rights to self-government, inter-governmental relations and 
future economic development. First Nations involvement in monitoring the health of the 
watershed will be on-going and funding will be required so that there can be continuing 
meaningful consultation. 
                                                 
89  Personal interview with Justin Tone, Alberta Environment, July, 2004. 
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Because water resources often originate outside traditional territories, it would 
most convincingly be argued that a duty to consult with First Nations exists regarding 
the use of waters within the watershed of the rivers flowing through their traditional 
territories and reserves.  For the Treaty 7 First Nations, this includes, at minimum, the 
rivers named in Treaty 7:  the Bow River, South Saskatchewan River, Red Deer  
River, Maple Creek, Old Man River, and Crow’s Creek, Milk River, and St. Mary’s 
River.  All of these rivers are located within the larger South Saskatchewan River Basin 
pictured in figure 2-2.90 
 
Figure 2-2.  The South Saskatchewan River Basin 
                                                 
90  Map of the South Saskatchewan River Basin 
http://www3.gov.ab.ca/env/water/regions/ssrb/Images/SSRB_large.jpg,  accessed 
August 11, 2007. 
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6.1.2 Highlights of Alberta’s Water Policy 
Alberta’s Water Policy adversely affects First Nations rights and interests in a 
number of significant ways, which gives rise to the duty to consult. 
Alberta is committed to the principle of sustainable development.  The Draft 
Discussion paper states that Alberta is committed to “sustainable development” by 
which is meant “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”  “Sustainable development” is 
a term of compromise.  Encapsulated in this concept is the on-going tension between 
conservation and continuing development.  Sustainable development will require input 
by First Nations and the participation by First Nations as partners in the decision-making 
process, particularly because development most impacts those people who live closest to 
the land, a point that is not acknowledged in the Water for Life strategy. 
Alberta has taken a “watershed approach” to managing water resources.  In 
the “Water for Life” strategy, communities and stakeholders are responsible for 
watershed management and developing plans to ensure the supply and control the 
pollution of source water, including aquifers and groundwater.  The province intends to 
develop a watershed source protection framework in collaboration with Watershed 
Advisory Councils, Watershed Protection Groups, municipalities and stakeholders.  
There is no mention of how First Nations will be involved in watershed management, if 
at all. 
The watershed approach, if taken to its full extent, would mean that First Nations 
have a role to play in the management of virtually every body of water in Southern 
Alberta.  The watershed approach, if First Nations are involved in a meaningful way, 
would be a great opportunity for Treaty 7 First Nations to promote their interests in 
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water quality, quantity and flow because it extends past reserve and traditional territorial 
boundaries to source waters.  
Alberta is undertaking plans to monitor and control drinking water quality.  
Quality drinking water is, of course, a necessity.  It is not clear from the Water for Life 
strategy how Alberta would work with reserves to monitor and control drinking water 
quality.  Roles and responsibilities need to be defined as reserves may be viewed by the 
province as federal jurisdiction.  A cooperative approach that recognizes First Nations 
jurisdiction would be preferable, especially considering that pollutants potentially drain 
from outside First Nations lands into their drinking water resources.  First Nations need 
to be involved in setting a consistent policy to be applied on and off-reserve.  The issue 
of jurisdiction has come to the foreground in the conflict between the Town of 
Strathmore and the Siksika First Nation in a recent conflict over the EAB approvals of 
plans to dump the town’s sewage upstream from the reserve. 
The Provincial Water Advisory Council effectively deprives First Nations of 
their rights to self-government and jurisdiction over water resources.  A provincial 
Water Advisory Council is made up of stakeholders and advises government, guides the 
implementation of the Water Strategy, and investigates and reports on existing and 
emerging water issues.  While the Water for Life policy recognizes that the watershed 
approach to management ensures that those people who best understand and are 
immediately affected by water issues can help find solutions to address them, the 
province has made no commitment to reserving a role for First Nations on the Provincial 
Water Advisory Council.  The province intended that First Nations would form 
committees or participate in volunteer community-based watershed protection groups. 
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The existing framework does not acknowledge Treaty rights and responsibilities 
and potentially divests First Nations of their jurisdiction over water resources by 
creating a “balancing of interests” process in which First Nations interests are 
superseded by those of powerful, well-funded stakeholders.  The reason given by the 
province for not recognizing the unique position of First Nations is that watersheds 
transcend political, social and economic boundaries.  This argument simply doesn’t 
make sense considering federal jurisdiction in the areas of fisheries, navigation, national 
parks, and Indian reserves already overlaps with the province’s general jurisdiction.  
Alberta’s position was that involvement of stakeholders within each watershed would 
help Alberta succeed in improving water management.  The province hoped that First 
Nations would participate in Watershed Advisory Councils that would have membership 
on the Provincial Water Advisory Council to share information, evaluate water issues 
and receive advice.  A case in point is the Bow River Basin Council which is made up of 
representatives of a variety of stakeholders.  The BRBC has made attempts to consult 
with First Nations, but only as one of many interest groups.  To date the First Nations 
within the Bow River watershed, the Tsuu T’ina, Stoney and Siksika Nations play no 
active role in the BRBC. 
The watershed approach may be an opportunity for First Nations to assert 
their right to water and their inherent jurisdiction to govern matters pertaining to 
reserve land.  Through the use of trans-boundary agreements, First Nations may 
enhance their powers of governance. Alberta pays lip service to the idea of “shared 
governance” through a network of partnerships and collaboration between citizens, 
communities, industry and government.  Alberta has made no clear commitments to 
“shared governance” or shared jurisdiction with First Nations.  Classified merely as 
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“stakeholders,” First Nations are afforded the appropriate level of priority and their sui 
generis rights are not acknowledged.  Rather, they are considered citizens as any other 
provincial resident without unique rights and responsibilities and without any specific 
jurisdiction over water resources. 
Treaties and agreements govern the sharing of water between Canada and the 
United States, and between Alberta and B.C. and Saskatchewan.  Alberta must receive a 
fair share of quality water from its upstream neighbours and, in turn, must pass on a fair 
share of quality water to its downstream neighbours.  First Nations might consider 
establishing similar trans-boundary agreements that will ensure entire watersheds are 
managed appropriately.  This approach may be most beneficial for the very large 
southern reserves of Treaty 7 First Nations. 
The province considers healthy aquatic eco-systems for recreational use and 
does not seriously consider cultural, Aboriginal, or Treaty rights.  Security of the 
right to hunting and fishing for future generations of First Nations requires healthy 
aquatic ecosystems. Alberta’s Water for Life strategy calls for striking a balance 
between water used to support the economy and communities and water used to support 
healthy aquatic ecosystems.  It is silent on how this balance will be attained and who 
will be consulted.  The wording used suggests that the drafters have only considered the 
interests of recreational cottagers and sports hunters and fishermen and have not 
seriously considered hunting as a cultural, Aboriginal, or Treaty right.  The very survival 
of First Nations cultures depends on healthy environments where cultural knowledge can 
be passed on to further generations. 
Environmental assessments and consultation is only required for major 
water diversions, not for licenced use.  Alberta Environment has allocated water 
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licences and approvals for use by the oil and gas industry that is twice the amount of 
water used annually by the entire City of Calgary.  It is worthy to consider whether the 
Treaty 7 Tribal Council ought to press for consultation on major water licences to 
industry, especially considering that most of the water used is turned saline and only 
recycled with great difficulty and expense. 
Communities have become polarized over the issue of water management.  
The Town of Strathmore, having run out of space for its sewage, was granted temporary 
approval in February, 2007 to release its wastewater into the Bow River, just 15 
kilometres upstream from the Siksika reserve.  The town had been using six lagoons to 
store its sewage, but the latest population explosion led Strathmore to look for other 
options.  The town built a 20 mile long pipeline at the cost of $10 million to discharge 
treated wastewater into the Bow River.   
The central issue in the matter is whether the Siksika First Nation was adequately 
consulted prior to issuing the Approval.  The Siksika Nation filed an application for 
judicial review on May 19, 2006.  The judicial review was restricted to considering the 
sufficiency of consultation with the Siksika Nation by Alberta Environment prior to 
issuing the Approval.  On September 6, 2006 Justice McIntyre dismissed the Judicial 
Review for being premature. The Siksika Nation appealed to the Court of Appeal stating 
that the duty to consult and accommodate is a duty that exists independently of the result 
of the appeal process.  The duty to consult and accommodate cannot “be met or cured 
after the issuance of the approval.”   Furthermore, the appeal procedure set out under 
Part 4 of the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act is not an adequate 
44 
alternative remedy.  Unfortunately for those of us with an interest in consultation law, 
the matter was adjourned and has not yet been heard.91 
6.2 The South Saskatchewan River Basin Water Management Plan 
Alberta Environment prepared the South Saskatchewan River Basin Water 
Management Plan and led the planning process.  The consultation process was a 
combined effort by Alberta Environment, Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural 
Development, and Alberta Sustainable Resource Development, and Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada.  For the first five years of planning the SSRB consulted with four Basin 
Advisory Committees located in the Red Deer River, Bow River, Oldman River, and 
South Saskatchewan River sub-basins.  First Nations were not actively involved in the 
consultation process for reasons that are unclear.  Basin Advisory Committees, such as 
the Bow River Basin Council, maintain that they made efforts to include First Nations in 
the consultation process to no avail.  Nevertheless, without First Nations involvement 
the Committees provided their recommendations leading to the drafting and approval of 
the South Saskatchewan River Basin Water Management Plan.   
The province clearly takes the position that reserves do not include reserved 
water rights, and that Treaty water rights are not a priority right.  The provincial position 
is that “while water development and licensing took place during the past century, First 
Nations in the SSRB were not in a position to obtain water licences with sufficient 
priority for a reliable water supply.  With the exception of the Piikani [Peigan] Nation, 
                                                 
91  Environmental Appeals Board, “Status of Active Appeals” retrieved on-line 
April 6, 2007 from http://www.eab.gov.ab.ca/status.htm. 
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water needs remain unresolved.”92  Alberta Environment claims to have consulted with 
potentially affected First Nations, but the extent of that consultation is not clear.93 
7. Conclusion 
Alberta’s Consultation Guidelines and Water for Life strategy, may meet the 
province’s requirements for consultation, but do not provide the mechanism for 
meaningful and substantial consultation, and most importantly, do not meet the 
constitutional standard of consistency.  To a large extent Alberta has devolved its 
responsibility to consult with First Nations to project proponents.  While there are 
opportunities for First Nations to be involved in watershed management planning 
through the watershed advisory councils, their involvement is not mandatory.  The 
experience of developing the South Saskatchewan River Watershed Management Plan 
has shown that watershed management policies may be set without First Nations’ 
participation.  Even when they participate, they are only one of many “stakeholders” 
with no special acknowledgement given to their Treaty and Aboriginal rights to water. 
In the writer’s opinion, it appears that the fundamental problem stems from the 
starting point of consultation.  First Nations will only be consulted if the project 
proponent and AENV determine that their large scale water diversion, wastewater, or 
water works projects and projects off-reserve that may have a potential to adversely 
impact First Nations rights and traditional uses on reserves.  Upon such determination, 
                                                 
92  Alberta Environment, “Background Information for public consultation on the 
South Saskatchewan River Basin Draft Water Management Plan” and “Approved Water 
Management Plan for the South Saskatchewan River Basin (Alberta),” August 2006 
http://www3.gov.ab.ca/env/water/regions/ssrb/pdf/SSRB_Plan_Phase2.pdf , accessed on 
November 17, 2006. 
93  When the writer approached the individuals representing First Nations on the 
Basin Advisory Committees, their various legal counsel warned the writer and the 
individuals that discussion of consultation may prejudice negotiations. 
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responsibility for consultation is devolved to the project proponent with AENV taking 
monitoring consultation processes and results.  The cumulative environmental effects of 
water use is best dealt with at the level of water management planning, a process in 
which Treaty 7 First Nations have not been involved.  Post-project-proposal 
consultation, while necessary, is inadequate to address cumulative impacts or effects on 
the exercise of livelihood rights off-reserve. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  RECONCILIATION AND CONSULTATION 
1. Introduction 
It has been argued that the current challenge is for Canada to achieve 
reconciliation with First Nations in a manner that refrains from assimilation and restores 
Aboriginal people to a meaningful place within the constitutional order, and reinforces a 
relationship marked by collaboration and partnership.1  The Supreme Court has 
indicated that the aim of reconciliation is to balance Aboriginal and other interests.2  
Consultation is the most important means of achieving the overarching purpose of 
reconciliation. 
In describing how consultation serves the purpose of reconciliation, McLachlin 
C.J. stated in Haida that consultation and accommodation are on-going processes of fair 
dealing extending from the time of assertion of sovereignty and continuing beyond 
formal claims resolution.3  Reconciliation, then, is never concluded:  it is an on-going 
relationship stemming from the Constitutional guarantee of Aboriginal rights, the 
                                                 
1  Michael Hudson, “Reconciling Diversity with Unity:  Canadian Federalism in 
the 21st Century” unpublished paper presented to the Canadian Bar Association 
Canadian Legal Conference in Vancouver, August 14-16, 2005. 
2  R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 31 [Van 
der Peet]; Delgamu’ukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108 (QL); [1997] 3 
S.C.R. 1010  at para. 186 [Delgamuuk]; Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; [2004] S.C.J. No. 70 (Q.L.); 2004 SCC 73 at para. 14 
[Haida]. 
3  Haida, supra note 2 at para. 32. 
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assertion of Crown sovereignty over the lands and resources of Aboriginal peoples, and 
the honor of the Crown: 
Reconciliation is not a final legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather, it is a 
process flowing from rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 
1982. This process of reconciliation flows from the Crown's duty of honourable 
dealing toward Aboriginal peoples, which arises in turn from the Crown's 
assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de facto control of land 
and resources that were formerly in the control of that people. As stated in 
Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 2001 SCC 33, at para. 9, "[w]ith this 
assertion [sovereignty] arose an obligation to treat aboriginal peoples fairly and 
honourably, and to protect them from exploitation" (emphasis added).1Supreme 
Court decisions in the past 16 years have established that the central purpose of 
s.35(1) is reconciliation.  Although the cases dealing with reconciliation vary in 
definition, statement of purpose, and description of process, one principle is 
clear:  Negotiation and consultation with First Nations on issues of natural 
resource use are integral to the process of reconciliation.  The central objective 
of reconciliation, as a cornerstone of the constitutional relationship of 
Aboriginal peoples with Canada, will inform negotiations and consultations 
with regard to water rights and water resource management.  The questions 
remaining are:  what is reconciliation, what is to be reconciled, and how?  To 
these questions, the Supreme Court has provided no consistent answers. 
This chapter will analyze two political processes in Alberta employing 
negotiation and consultation and whether they meet the standard set by the Supreme 
Court for reconciliation and are consistent with s.35(1):  1) The Peigan Agreement that 
was negotiated between the Piikani (Peigan) First Nation, Alberta, and Canada and 
resulted in an agreement for the diversion of the Oldman River and use of the water for 
irrigation, and 2)  Alberta’s Water Act and Water for Life Strategy which sets out a 
process for on-going public participation in water management. 
2. Reconciliation Evolving in Constitutional Law 
                                                 
1  Ibid. 
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Section 35(1) was incorporated into the Constitution in keeping with the 
constitutional principle of the protection of minorities.2  Section 35(1) specifically 
protects the Aboriginal and Treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada: 
35(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. 
While the common law recognized the existence of Aboriginal rights, “[t]hrough the 
enactment of s.35(1), a ‘pre-existing legal doctrine was elevated to constitutional status, 
or in other words, s.35(1) had achieved ‘the constitutionalization of those rights.’”3 
The Sparrow4 case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1990, was the 
first in a long line of cases acknowledging the requirement of reconciliation under 
s.35(1) of the Constitution.  Over the years the purpose and object of reconciliation has 
transformed from the reconciliation of federal power with federal duty (as in Sparrow), 
to the reconciliation of Aboriginal societies with the broader political community (as in 
Delgamu’ukw).  The discussion below describes the characterization of reconciliation in 
the case law as it has evolved since 1990. 
2.1 Sparrow:  Federal Power to be Reconciled with Federal Duty 
In Sparrow, the Supreme Court held that, while federal legislative powers 
continue, including the right to legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867, they  must be read together with s. 35(1) which provides 
protection of Aboriginal and Treaty rights.  The Sparrow decision established that, 
although s.35(1) did not explicitly authorize the courts to assess the legitimacy of any 
                                                 
2  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61 (QL); [1998] 2 S.C.R. 
217. 
3  Van der Peet, supra note 2 at para. 23; Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para. 134. 
4  R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; [1990] S.C.J. No. 49 [Sparrow]. 
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government legislation restricting Aboriginal rights, the words “recognition and 
affirmation,” restrained the exercise of sovereign power.   The Court held that federal 
power must be reconciled with the federal duty to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect 
to Aboriginal peoples.  The best way to reconcile federal legislative power with federal 
duty to Aboriginal peoples was to require justification of government regulation that 
infringes or denies Aboriginal rights.  The reasons given for requiring reconciliation of 
federal powers with federal duties through the process of justification were the principle 
of liberal interpretation and the honour of the Crown: 
Such scrutiny is in keeping with the liberal interpretive principle enunciated in 
Nowegijick, supra, and the concept of holding the Crown to a high standard of 
honourable dealing with respect to the aboriginal peoples of Canada as 
suggested by Guerin v. The Queen, supra.5 
2.2 Van der Peet:  Reconciling Prior Occupation with Crown Sovereignty and 
Reconciling Aboriginal Legal Perspectives and British Legal Perspectives 
By 1996, the Supreme Court of Canada had refined its interpretation of the 
purpose of s.35(1) to reconcile the “pre-existence of distinctive aboriginal societies with 
the assertion of Crown sovereignty.”6  The Court determined that s.35(1) “provide[s] the 
constitutional framework through which the fact that aboriginals lived on the land in 
distinctive societies, with their own practices, traditions and culture, is acknowledged 
and reconciled with the sovereignty of the Crown.”7  Reconciliation is the foremost 
guiding principle behind the definition of s.35(1) Aboriginal rights. 
In Sparrow, the Court recognized that it was “crucial to be sensitive to the 
aboriginal perspective itself on the meaning of the rights at stake,” and, likewise, in Van 
                                                 
5  Sparrow, supra note 7 at para. 62. 
6  Van der Peet, supra note 2 at para. 49. 
7  Ibid. at para. 31. 
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der Peet, the Court determined that, “[i]n assessing a claim for the existence of an 
aboriginal right, a court must take into account the perspective of the aboriginal people 
claiming the right…”8  In Van der Peet, the Court added the requirement that Aboriginal 
perspectives be framed in guise of Canadian law: 
The definition of an aboriginal right must, if it is truly to reconcile the prior 
occupation of Canadian territory by aboriginal peoples with the assertion of 
Crown sovereignty over that territory, take into account the aboriginal 
perspective, yet do so in terms which are cognizable to the non-aboriginal legal 
system.9 
It could certainly be argued that this is a nearly impossible task because of the 
great difference between the individual-based property-and-commodity-oriented British 
legal system and the communal-based natural laws of Aboriginal peoples.  Madame 
Justice McLachlin, in her dissent in Van der Peet, characterized reconciliation 
differently. She shed some light on the purpose of s.35(1), stating that the desire for 
reconciliation of  these two vastly different legal systems was the impetus behind the 
adoption of s.35(1) protection for Aboriginal and Treaty rights: 
[T]he essence of aboriginal rights is their bridging of aboriginal and non-
aboriginal cultures: ‘…there will always be a question about which legal culture 
is to provide the vantage point from which rights are to be defined…a morally 
and politically defensible conception of aboriginal rights will incorporate both 
legal perspectives.’10 
The Supreme Court majority characterized the central purpose of reconciliation as 
balancing and incorporating the legal perspectives, but not the actual laws or legal 
systems, of the colonizer and the colonized: 
[T]he only fair and just reconciliation is, as Walters suggests, one which takes 
into account the aboriginal perspective while at the same time taking into 
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account the perspective of the common law. True reconciliation will, equally, 
place weight on each.11 
Madame Justice McLachlin’s dissent is examined in more depth below. 
2.3 Gladstone and Delgamu’ukw:  Reconciliation of Aboriginal Societies with the 
Broader Political Community 
Chief Justice Lamer, in Gladstone and Delgamu’ukw, following the reasoning in 
Van der Peet, stated that one of the purposes underlying the recognition and affirmation 
of aboriginal rights by s.35(1) is the “reconciliation of aboriginal prior occupation with 
the assertion of the sovereignty of the Crown.”12  He further explained that at the stage 
of justification, the purpose of reconciliation shifts from the reconciliation of the prior 
occupation of Aboriginal people with the assertion of Crown sovereignty to the 
reconciliation of Aboriginal societies with the broader political community: 
some limitation of those rights will be justifiable.  Aboriginal rights are a 
necessary part of the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the broader 
political community of which they are part; limits placed on those rights are, 
where the objectives furthered by those limits are of sufficient importance to 
the broader community as a whole, equally a necessary part of that 
reconciliation.13 (emphasis mine) 
Lamer C. J.’s analysis appears to shift from incorporating different legal 
perspectives to implementing a balancing-of-interests legal analysis.  It appears that this 
characterization of the reconciliation process compromises the protection of Aboriginal 
rights and operates at cross-purposes with the very essence of s.35(1).  Lamer C. J. 
justifies placing limitations on Aboriginal rights, explaining that it is a necessary aspect 
of reconciliation, as in the case of conservation legislation.  Goals that are consistent 
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with the reconciliation of Aboriginal societies with the larger Canadian society are 
compelling and substantial objectives justifying limitations on Aboriginal rights: 
Because conservation is of such overwhelming importance to Canadian society 
as a whole, including aboriginal members of that society, it is a goal the pursuit 
of which is consistent with the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the 
larger Canadian society of which they are a part.  In this way, conservation can 
be said to be a compelling and substantial objective which, provided the rest of 
the Sparrow justification standard is met, will justify governmental 
infringement of aboriginal rights.14 
After the goal of conservation is met, Lamer C. J. suggests that the distribution of 
resources be guided by: 
objectives such as the pursuit of economic and regional fairness, and the 
recognition of the historical reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by 
non-aboriginal groups…In the right circumstances, such objectives are in the 
interest of all Canadians and, more importantly, the reconciliation of aboriginal 
societies with the rest of Canadian society may well depend on their successful 
attainment.15 
The process of reconciliation thus evolved from placing equal emphasis on 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal legal perspectives to the pursuit of economic and 
regional fairness and recognition of the historical reliance upon the resources by non-
Aboriginals.  The Court explained the link between reconciliation of prior existing 
Aboriginal societies with asserted Crown sovereignty to the balancing-of-interests 
analysis, stating that “distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are part of, a 
broader social, political and economic community.”16 
The Supreme Court, applying this dictum in Gladstone to the Treaty context, 
stated that “[t]his observation applies with particular force to a treaty right.”  Where a 
Treaty contemplates the sharing of resources, and the Treaty right may be exercised on a 
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commercial scale, the Court will take into account the fact that First Nations “constitute 
only one group of participants, and regard for the interest of the non-Natives…may be 
shown in the right circumstances to be entirely legitimate.” In applying this principle to 
the treaty context, the balancing of interests analysis will consider the proportionality of 
the use of the resource.17 
2.4 Madame Justice Mclachlin’s Alternative View of Reconciliation 
The threat of assimilation was the motivation of Aboriginal people for pressing 
for protection of Aboriginal and Treaty rights.  The characterization of the process of 
reconciliation as an exercise of balancing of interests appears to weaken the protection 
of s.35(1) and expose Aboriginal and Treaty rights to erosion beyond recognition and 
meaningfulness.  In Lamer C.J.’s conception of reconciliation, limitations on Aboriginal 
rights are a necessary part of reconciliation.  The task is to determine which goals are 
indeed consistent with reconciliation and, furthermore, to decide who is charged with 
determining that these are compelling and substantial objectives.  The Court admits that, 
at the justification stage, “[t]he range of legislative objectives that can justify the 
infringement of aboriginal title is fairly broad.”18  This range of legislative objectives 
that fulfill the purpose of reconciliation includes 
the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric 
power…general economic development…protection of the environment or 
endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign 
populations to support those aims…19 
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It is hard to conceive of any resource-based Aboriginal right that would not be 
affected by this analysis.  The balancing-of-interests form of “reconciliation” could 
potentially erode Aboriginal rights to the point where there is very little of substance 
left. 
Madame Justice McLachlin did not agree with this approach.  In her view: 
“…the framers of section 35(1) deliberately chose not to subordinate the exercise of 
Aboriginal rights to the good of society as a whole.”20  Legislative objectives that would 
satisfy the criteria for a justified infringement of Aboriginal rights ought be confined to 
those that seek to ensure the responsible exercise of the right, such as conservation or the 
prevention of harm to others.  Legislative objectives that would negate or diminish the 
right itself could not be justified.   
Madame Justice Mclachlin objected to Chief Justice Lamer’s approach on the 
basis that it is: 
indeterminate and ultimately may speak more to the politically expedient than 
to legal entitlement…governments may abridge aboriginal rights on the basis of 
an undetermined variety of consideration.  While “account” must be taken of 
the native interest and the Crown’s fiduciary obligation, one is left uncertain as 
to what degree.  At the broadest reach, whatever the government of the day 
deems necessary in order to reconcile aboriginal and non-aboriginal interests 
might pass muster…upon challenge in the courts, the focus will predictably be 
on the social justifiability of the measure rather than the rights guaranteed.21 
In her view Lamer C.J.’s analysis “falls short of the ‘solid constitutional base upon 
which subsequent negotiations can take place.’”22  Agreeing that “reconciliation between 
aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities [is] a goal of fundamental importance,” she 
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was of the view that in working to achieve this goal, it was unnecessary to depart from 
the principle of justification as elaborated in Sparrow: 
one of the two fundamental purposes of s.35(1) was the achievement of a just 
and lasting settlement of aboriginal claims…such a settlement must be founded 
on reconciliation of aboriginal rights with the larger non-aboriginal culture in 
which they must, of necessity, find their exercise.  It is common ground that 
‘…a morally and politically defensible conception of aboriginal rights will 
incorporate both [the] legal perspectives’ of the ‘two vastly dissimilar legal 
culture’ of the European and aboriginal cultures’…The question is how this 
reconciliation of the different legal cultures of aboriginal and non-aboriginal 
peoples is to be accomplished.  More particularly, does the goal of 
reconciliation of aboriginal and non-aboriginal interests require that we permit 
the Crown to require a judicially authorized transfer of the aboriginal right to 
non-aboriginals without the consent of the aboriginal people, without treaty, 
and without compensation?  I cannot think that it does.23 
Where Lamer C.J. conceives of a broad range of legislative objectives that would 
justify infringement of Aboriginal rights and title, McLachlin J. warns of the danger of 
unrestrained infringements in the name of “reconciliation.”  McLachlin J. alludes to 
reconciliation through a process of treaty-making requiring consent and compensation.  
It appears altogether reasonable that reconciliation between pre-existing Aboriginal 
societies and the assertion of Crown sovereignty take the form of treaty-making in the 
modern context, particularly in situations where First Nations have a well-developed 
legal tradition governing relationships through treaty, as is the case in the Treaty 7 
territory. 
Section 35 is the promise to Aboriginal Canadians of recognition of their rights.  
Lamer C.J. has stated that fulfillment of the promise of Aboriginal rights protection is 
achieved through negotiation, with the ultimate purpose of reconciling Aboriginal 
interests with those of the larger society.  It is not surprising that First Nations are 
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uneasy with this type of “protection” that mandates the discussion of their rights in a 
broad political forum, with the only safeguard being the vague notion of the “honour of 
the Crown,” however powerful that concept may be in a legal context.  “Section 35 
represents a promise of rights recognition, and ‘[i]t is always assumed that the Crown 
intends to fulfill its promises.  This promise is realized and sovereignty claims 
reconciled through the process of honourable negotiation…”24 
Section 35 protects the integral and defining features of distinctive Aboriginal 
cultures even if such features did not receive legal recognition and approval from 
European colonizers.25  The underlying purpose of s.35(1) is the reconciliation of the 
pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown. The means to 
achieving reconciliation is settlement by Treaty or agreement, negotiated in good faith, 
and reinforced by the judgments of the Court. 
Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed 
Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights guaranteed by section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. 26 
Reconciliation, in keeping with s.35 and the honour of the Crown, will lead to 
just and enduring settlement of Aboriginal claims: 
…section 35 recognizes not only prior aboriginal occupation, but also a prior 
legal regime giving rise to aboriginal rights which persist, absent 
extinguishment.  And it seeks not only to reconcile these claims with European 
settlement and sovereignty but also to reconcile them in a way that provides the 
basis for a just and lasting settlement of aboriginal claims consistent with the 
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high standard which the law imposes on the Crown in its dealings with 
aboriginal peoples.27 
In Marshall and Bernard the Court grappled with devising a process for 
reconciling Aboriginal and Crown perspectives on the law.  The first step requires the 
court to examine the nature and extent of the Aboriginal practice prior to the assertion of 
Crown sovereignty, then to seek the corresponding common law right to determine the 
nature and extent of the modern right.28 
In Marshall and Bernard, Mclachlin J. explained the role of the Aboriginal 
perspective as being more than assisting “in the interpretation of Aboriginal practices in 
order to assess whether they conform to common law concepts of title.” 29  She 
recognized that Aboriginal laws themselves provide the Aboriginal perspective on the 
occupation of their land. “The relevant laws consisted of elements of the practices, 
customs and traditions of Aboriginal peoples and might include a land tenure system or 
laws governing land use.”30 
Quoting John Borrows, McLachlin J. acknowledged that Aboriginal law is more 
than mere evidence of occupation and land use: 
Aboriginal law should not just be received as evidence that Aboriginal peoples 
did something in the past on a piece of land. It is more than evidence: it is 
actually law. And so, there should be some way to bring to the decision-making 
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process those laws that arise from the standards of the indigenous people before 
the court.31 (emphasis added) 
True reconciliation requires taking into account Aboriginal laws and 
perspectives.  Mclachlin J. expanded on this approach in Marshall and Bernard when 
she explained that “[t]aking the Aboriginal perspective into account does not mean that a 
particular right, like title to the land, is established. The question is what modern right 
best corresponds to the pre-sovereignty Aboriginal practice, examined from the 
Aboriginal perspective.”32  She quoted the following observation of John Borrows: 
The idea is to reconcile indigenous and non-indigenous legal traditions by 
paying attention to the Aboriginal perspective on the meaning of the right at 
stake.33 
Borrows explains that First Nations law and non-Aboriginal legal systems are not 
necessarily inconsistent.  The “over-reliance on non-Aboriginal legal sources has 
resulted in very little protection for Indigenous peoples.”  He argues that the assertion of 
Crown sovereignty and the co-existence of British common law with First Nations law 
did not alter First Nations law, customs or conventions.  “The suis generis doctrine 
reformulates similarity and difference and thereby captures the complex, overlapping, 
and exclusive identities and relationships of the parties.”34 
2.5 Haida:  Reconciliation as Balance and Compromise 
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Following the Supreme Court majority’s opinions in Van der Peet,35 and 
Delgamuukw,36  the court advocated consultation, an exercise in balancing of interests, 
as a means of achieving reconciliation: 
[The] duty to consult and accommodate by its very nature entails balancing of 
Aboriginal and other interests and thus lies closer to the aim of reconciliation at 
the heart of Crown-Aboriginal relations...37 
In Haida the Court once again emphasized the balancing of interests, this time 
characterizing the balancing act as between Aboriginal concerns with the potential 
impact on asserted rights and other societal interests: 
Balance and compromise are inherent in the notion of reconciliation. Where 
accommodation is required in making decisions that may adversely affect as yet 
unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims, the Crown must balance Aboriginal 
concerns reasonably with the potential impact of the decision on the asserted 
right or title and with other societal interests.38 
3. Checks and Balances on Consultation and Reconciliation 
If reconciliation was to be merely a balancing of interests, clearly the protection 
of Aboriginal rights guaranteed by s.35(1) would be rendered meaningless and the 
supremacy of the constitution as dictated by s.52(1) would be merely a pipe dream.  It is 
some consolation, therefore, that the Court acknowledges checks and balances on the 
process of reconciliation.  In particular, consultation is to be guided by the principle of 
the honour of the Crown early in the claims process. 
The basis for consultation as a means to reconciliation is “the principle of the 
honour of the Crown” which, the Court stated, “must be understood generously” as 
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extending “from the assertion of sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the 
implementation of treaties. Nothing less is required if we are to achieve “the 
reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the 
Crown”39 
The potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be 
determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting 
honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. While this process 
continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult and, where 
indicated, accommodate Aboriginal interests.40 
The honour of the Crown arises from the “Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over 
an Aboriginal people and de facto control of land and resources that were formally in 
control of that people.”41  The Court noted that it is because First Nations were never 
conquered that reconciliation is required, and that one means to reconcile First Nations’ 
claims with the sovereignty of the Crown is through negotiated treaties.  With the 
assertion of sovereignty “arose an obligation to treat aboriginal peoples fairly and 
honourably, and to protect them from exploitation.”42 
Because the goal of reconciliation and the honour of the Crown go hand in hand, 
reconciliation and consultation are required at the early stages of claims resolution, even 
before there is proof of a valid claim to Aboriginal rights: 
To limit reconciliation to the post-proof sphere risks treating reconciliation as a 
distant legalistic goal, devoid of the "meaningful content" mandated by the 
"solemn commitment" made by the Crown in recognizing and affirming 
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Aboriginal rights and title: Sparrow, supra, at p. 1108. It also risks unfortunate 
consequences. When the distant goal of proof is finally reached, the Aboriginal 
peoples may find their land and resources changed and denuded. This is not 
reconciliation. Nor is it honourable.43 
In Haida the Supreme Court mandated consultation and accommodation even 
before final claims resolution “as an essential corollary to the honourable process of 
reconciliation that s. 35 demands.”  Consultation is required because it “preserves the 
Aboriginal interest pending claims resolution” and encourages the development of a 
relationship between the parties conducive to negotiations, which the Court state, is “the 
preferred process for achieving ultimate reconciliation.” 44  The process of fair dealing 
and reconciliation “begins with the assertion of sovereignty and continues beyond 
formal claims resolution.”  Reconciliation does not end with the resolution of Aboriginal 
claims.45 
In Haida, an Aboriginal title case, the Court did not consider reconciliation and 
consultation post-Treaty:  Maintaining the Treaty relationship as a means of 
reconciliation was considered in Mikisew.46 
4. Mikisew:  Reconciliation as “Managing” the Treaty Relationship 
Where there is an existing treaty relationship, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that on-going consultation and reconciliation are inherent in that relationship.  If 
reconciliation entails a process of reconciling the prior occupation of Aboriginal peoples 
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with the assertion of Crown sovereignty in the political arena and resolving Aboriginal 
claims in keeping with the honour of the Crown, the most reasonable means of achieving 
that end is treaty-making or “managing” the existing treaty relationship.  In Mikisew, the 
Supreme Court recognized that “unilateral Crown action (a sort of "this is surrendered 
land and we can do with it what we like" approach)…is the antithesis of reconciliation 
and mutual respect.”47  The Attorney General of Alberta denied that a duty of 
consultation can be an implied term of Treaty 8 because of the vastness of the Treaty 8 
territory and the scattered settlement of First Nations.  The Court rejected this argument 
and recognized that the Treaty 8 signatories “did in fact contemplate a difficult period of 
transition and sought to soften its impact as much as possible.”  The Court reiterated the 
“overarching objective of reconciliation rather than confrontation” as stated Haida and 
Taku.48 
The Mikisew decision is significant because, where previous cases recognized 
that the fundamental objectives of reconciliation are to reconcile “aboriginal people and 
non-aboriginal peoples and their respective claims [and] interests,” Mikisew added to 
those objectives the reconciliation of “ambitions.”  This definition of reconciliation 
broadened from reconciling pre-existing Aboriginal societies with the assertion of 
Crown sovereignty to reconciling Aboriginal societies with non-Aboriginal societies. 
This characterization of reconciliation is problematic for several reasons.  It is 
the Crown that has an historical relationship with Aboriginal people, not all non-
Aboriginal people (which includes by definition every immigrant new and old).  It is the 
Crown that is held to a standard of fairness and honour.  There is no standard to which 
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all non-Aboriginal immigrant Canadians can be held in their dealings with Aboriginal 
peoples.  Furthermore, the inclusion of interests and ambitions appears to open up 
Aboriginal territories to exploitation by new immigrants with new interests and new 
ambitions irrespective of the Crown’s historical relationship.  This new characterization 
of “reconciliation” could override the Treaties, particularly if equal weight is not given 
to Aboriginal legal traditions, Treaties and the common law. 
5. Does Reconciliation Require Limitations on Aboriginal Rights? 
While Lamer C.J. reasoned in Gladstone that the Sparrow test required 
expansion because of the lack of inherent limits on the aboriginal right to commercial 
fishing, Mclachlin J. suggested that Aboriginal rights are inherently limited by 
Aboriginal laws and customs and thus it is unnecessary to impose limitations by 
expanding the test of justification beyond what is required for conservation purposes.  In 
her view, “[t]here is no need to impose further limits on it to affect reconciliation 
between aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples.”49  Expansive limitations on Aboriginal 
rights in the name of “regional fairness” and economics go beyond what is required for 
reconciliation and threatens the very existence of Aboriginal rights: 
The extension of the concept of compelling objective to matters like economic 
and regional fairness and the interests of non-aboriginal fishers, by contrast, 
would negate the very aboriginal right to fish itself, on the ground that this is 
required for the reconciliation of aboriginal rights and other interests and the 
consequent good of the community as a whole. This is not limitation required 
for the responsible exercise of the right, but rather limitation on the basis of the 
economic demands of non-aboriginals. It is limitation of a different order than 
the conservation, harm prevention type of limitation sanctioned in Sparrow.50 
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McLachlin J. was also concerned that the test articulated by Lamer C.J. would 
leave Aboriginal rights vulnerable to abridgement by governments “on the basis of an 
undetermined variety of considerations” without setting the parameters for consideration 
of the Crown’s fiduciary duty to protect the rights of Aboriginal peoples.  Should 
government decisions be challenged in the Courts, in all likelihood, government 
decisions would stand, provide they met the test of “reasonableness.”  In her view, this is 
not adequate protection of Aboriginal rights: 
While "account" must be taken of the native interest and the Crown's fiduciary 
obligation, one is left uncertain as to what degree. At the broadest reach, 
whatever the government of the day deems necessary in order to reconcile 
aboriginal and non-aboriginal interests might pass muster. In narrower 
incarnations, the result will depend on doctrine yet to be determined. Upon 
challenge in the courts, the focus will predictably be on the social justifiability 
of the measure rather than the rights guaranteed. Courts may properly be 
expected, the Chief Justice suggests, not to be overly strict in their review; as 
under s. 1 of the Charter, the courts should not negate the government decision, 
so long as it represents a "reasonable" resolution of conflicting interests. This, 
with respect, falls short of the "solid constitutional base upon which subsequent 
negotiations can take place" of which Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. wrote in 
Sparrow, at p. 1105.51 
Madam Justice McLachlin agreed with Lamer C.J. that reconciliation entails 
reconciling “aboriginal rights with the larger non-aboriginal culture in which they must, 
of necessity, find their exercise” but foresaw that the balancing-of-interests analysis 
articulated by Lamer C.J. would lead to the erosion of Aboriginal rights. 
It is unnecessary to adopt the broad doctrine of justification because there are 
other means of “resolving” or “calibrating” the different legal perspectives of Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal people.52  Given the internal limit of Aboriginal rights to natural 
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resources, the task of reconciliation is then shifted to establishing the traditional right 
through the process of consultation and negotiation: 
As suggested in Sparrow, the government should establish what is required to 
meet what the aboriginal people traditionally by law and custom took from the 
river or sea, through consultation and negotiation with the aboriginal people.53 
She recognizes that this may in fact be a relatively small percentage of the 
resource in question. Because Aboriginal societies did not value excess or accumulated 
wealth, “the measure will seldom, on the facts, be found to exceed the basics of food 
clothing and housing, supplemented by a few amenities.”  Beyond the “limited priority” 
for Aboriginal resource users, non-Aboriginal users “may enjoy the resource as they 
always have, subject to conservation.”54 
6. How has Reconciliation Occurred to Date? 
Development of water resources has required negotiations with Treaty 7 First 
Nations.  Most recently the Peigan Water Use Agreement was concluded to allow the 
province to divert the waters of the Oldman River for irrigation.  This Agreement is an 
example of the balancing-of-interests form of reconciliation.  The results of the 
Agreement have yet to be seen, however there are rumblings of dissatisfaction with the 
Agreement within the constituents of the Piikani First Nation.  The Water Act and Water 
for Life Strategy also employ a balancing-of-interests strategy in overall water 
management.  Each will be considered in turn below. 
6.1 The Peigan Water Use Agreement 
The balancing-of-interests approach, rather than an Aboriginal rights approach, 
seems to have been taken in the 2001 Settlement Agreement concluded between Canada, 
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the Piikani First Nation, and Alberta relating to use of water from the Oldman reservoir.  
The Piikani First Nation acknowledged “that Alberta operates the Reservoir to supply 
water throughout the Oldman River and the South Saskatchewan River basins.”  They 
furthermore agreed that during times of drought, Alberta would consult with all users in 
the Oldman River Basin, including the Piikani First Nation, and would “equitably 
distribute the stored water in the Reservoir to attempt to address the water needs of all 
such users along with the aquatic environment.”55 
Canada and Alberta signed the Peigan Agreement in order to discontinue 
litigation as to their respective rights, including ownership, entitlements or jurisdiction in 
relation to water from the Oldman River as it passes through the Piikani Reserve.  
Canada and Alberta apparently signed the agreement in recognition of the Piikani First 
Nation’s interest in sharing the benefits derived from the water stored in the Oldman 
River Dam Reservoir without admitting that the Piikani First Nation has existing Treaty 
or Aboriginal rights to the waterbed of the Oldman River or to the water itself.  That 
being said, Canada and Alberta agreed that the Agreement would not be taken to limit, 
diminish, or extinguish existing Aboriginal or treaty rights “except to the extent 
necessary to allow the implementation and continuation” of the Agreement. 
All parties recognized “that it is in their best interests to resolve issues dealt with 
in this Agreement through negotiation or mediation.”  Like any negotiated settlement, 
there was clearly accommodation by all parties.  The Piikani First Nation did not get 
explicit recognition of their Treaty and Aboriginal rights to the Oldman River.  They 
agreed to discontinue their actions wherein they claimed Aboriginal and Treaty rights 
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and interests to the riverbed and waters of the Oldman River and agreed to release 
Canada and Alberta from any such claims during the time in which the Agreement was 
in force.  They abandoned their claims in exchange for a settlement package that 
included monies that would be, in part, invested in the Atco Power Limited hydro-
electric project and irrigation project on the reserve.  They also reserved for themselves, 
above and beyond water for household use and domestic livestock grazing: 
reasonable quantities of water for their on-reserve use from the Oldman River 
in order to meet the current and future needs of the Peigan for agricultural, 
irrigation, commercial, industrial or such other contemporary and traditional 
uses necessary for the health, economy environment and well-being of the 
Peigan people.56 
For the purpose of the agreement, the parties agreed that this would amount to 35,000 
acre feet per year.  If this quantity is not enough, at the request of the Piikani First 
Nation, Alberta will enter into negotiations to increase the quantity allotted. 
Furthermore it was agreed that a Follow-up Environmental Impact Assessment on 
the effects of the Reservoir on the reserve would be completed and that the parties would 
continue, by co-operative effort, to evaluate how the Piikani First Nation and the 
Oldman River valley are affected by the reservoir.  Consultation will take place on an 
annual basis to report use of the Piikani First Nation’s usage of the water.  In addition, a 
representative of the Piikani First Nation will sit on the public advisory committee for 
the Water Management Review of the South Saskatchewan River Basin.57 
The Peigan Agreement appears to be the type of negotiated settlement envisioned 
by Mr. Justice Lamer in so far as it balances the interests of all parties and provides the 
Piikani First Nation with a share of the benefit of water-related projected in the Oldman 
                                                 
56  Peigan Agreement para 10.1. 
57  Peigan Agreement para 13. 
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River Valley.  The Agreement appears to do so without compromising the Aboriginal 
and Treaty rights of the Piikani First Nation, at least not explicitly.  However, it remains 
to be seen how the terms of the Agreement play out ‘on the ground.’  It would not be 
surprising if the Piikani First Nation became concerned about lack of consultation in 
decisions regarding up-stream water use.  While an allowance has been made to have 
one individual from the Piikani First Nation sitting on the public advisory committee for 
the Water Management Review of the South Saskatchewan River Basin, it is 
conceivable that this minor role will not be viewed as adequate in the years ahead.  The 
Piikani First Nation may have to rely on the evolving common law with regard to 
consultation to assert their on-going involvement in decisions relating to water 
management off-reserve that may affect their interests.  It is conceivable that additional 
water management agreements will be required to enable the Piikani First Nation to play 
a more active role in decision-making regarding water use off-reserve that may affect 
water resources on reserve, particularly as Alberta Environment considers rerouting 
water from one river to another to serve urban centres and licence transfers from 
irrigation districts to municipalities. 
6.2 Alberta’s Water Act and Water for Life Strategy 
Alberta’s Water Act and Water for Life Strategy appears to provide an 
opportunity for reconciliation, however it is characterized.  However, First Nations have 
not been meaningfully consulted on establishing either Alberta’s Water for Life policy 
or its consultation guideline policy.  Meaningful and substantial consultation must begin 
with consultation on the policies that establish the framework for water management.  
Not having done that, the province’s Water for Life Strategy is a house built on the sand:  
having failed to acknowledge and protect Aboriginal and treaty rights and adhere to the 
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principle of constitutionalism, the Water for Life Strategy does not have a firm 
foundation.  
The Government of Alberta, led by Alberta Environment, has established a 
network of partnerships that it views as integral to achieving stewardship of water 
resources.  The Government of Alberta will maintain partnerships with Provincial Water 
Advisory Councils, Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils, and Watershed 
Stewardship Groups.  Alberta remains accountable and will continue to oversee water 
and watershed management activities in the province while working with these partners 
in planning. 
Of the three “partners in planning,” watershed planning and advisory councils 
(WPACs) have potentially the most significant role in managing Alberta’s water 
resources, and in directly influencing policy and legislation development, tracking and 
reporting on the condition of watersheds and influencing change within watersheds.  
WPACs are established to involve communities and stakeholders in watershed 
management. WPACs are intended to lead in watershed planning, develop best 
management practices, foster stewardship activities within the watershed, report on the 
state of the watershed, and educate users of the water resource.58 
One such WPAC in the Treaty 7 area is the Bow River Basin Council (BRBC) 
peopled by volunteers representing “stakeholders” including municipal governments, 
industry, environmentalists, recreational users, and First Nations.  Any interested 
individual or organization can join the Bow River Basin Council.  The BRBC is the 
advisory body that has developed a water management plan affecting the traditional 
                                                 
58  “Water for Life:  Alberta’s Strategy for Sustainability” accessed at 
http://www.waterforlife.gov.ab.ca/docs/strategyNov03.pdf on August 8, 2007. 
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territories of the Stoney, Tsuu T’ina, and Siksika Nations.  First Nations are not 
currently represented on the Council despite the fact that very important decisions are 
being debated and decided that affect the entire watershed. 
The reason for the lack of participation of First Nations on the BRBC is not 
apparent.  There is a willingness on behalf of other stakeholders to involve First Nations 
in watershed planning, and indeed numerous participants recognize Treaty 7 First 
Nations’ special constitutional protection.  It appears that First Nations are immobilized 
by the fear that any participation on the Council will be construed as “consultation” and 
may somehow diminish their ability to claim Treaty water rights should they be 
compromised.  Or perhaps, there is no faith in a voluntary, consensus-based process 
within a group that is over-populated by representatives from non-Aboriginal 
municipalities and industries.  Furthermore, it appears that the two groups are simply not 
communicating about either the procedural or the substantive issues surrounding their 
potential participation in on-going water management issues.  Members of the Bow 
River Basin Council have made efforts to engage their First Nations' neighbours at the 
community level with the understanding that participation with Water Policy and 
Advisory Councils does not replace the government's duty to consult. 
Most importantly, First Nations take the position that they are not obligated to 
participate in watershed management planning at the WPAC level:  They maintain that 
their relationship is with the Crown and any negotiations that take place should occur at 
the government-to-government level.  There is some merit to this argument, as the treaty 
relationship is between the Crown and First Nations and the duty to consult cannot be 
devolved to third parties.  However, there is nothing to stop First Nations from 
participating in all levels of decision-making at once, except the fear their participation 
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might be somehow construed as consultation.  This could be remedied by putting 
consultation agreements and waivers in place at the outset to clarify the purpose of 
specific negotiations. 
In my view it is time for First Nations to take initiative be actively participating 
in the formation of WPACs.  WPAC’s are an opportunity to engage in negotiations as 
recommended by the Supreme Court as a process for reconciling competing interests.  
First Nations' participation in the watershed planning process would ensure that they 
have the opportunity to have their views taken into consideration.  Most importantly, 
WPACs represent an opportunity to assert jurisdiction and share governance of the 
watershed in a way that reconciles Aboriginal interests, legal systems, and cultures with 
the assertion of Crown sovereignty and other competing interests. 
In Alberta’s view, the purpose of consultation is to facilitate reconciliation of 
First Nations rights and traditional uses (not including rights arising from 
unextinguished proprietary rights) with land and resources development activities.59  
Involvement in WPACs goes way beyond consultation as it is currently defined by 
Alberta and industry.  In practice, First Nations are only notified and consulted when a 
specific development is contemplated by a proponent within the Nation’s traditional 
territory.  Watershed planning is very much broader than that and requires proactive 
strategic planning and management.  A WPAC has the power to create a Watershed 
Management Plan which, when approved by Alberta, is the standard by which all future 
proposals for development are to be measured.  Involvement on WPACs would put First 
Nations in the drivers seat.  Until now, First Nations have been side-lined:  Proponents 
                                                 
59  Alberta Environment, First Nation Consultation Guidelines (Regulatory 
Authorizations and Environmental Impact Assessments), Draft 1, May 18, 2006 at 2. 
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have posted notices in newspapers, paid a few dollars to some Elders, and gone on to 
complete their projects with very little input from local communities.  This process of 
minimal consultation has led some community leaders to tender allegations of genocide. 
WPACs could and should be inclusive of Treaty 7 First Nations, acknowledging 
that reconciliation is mandated by s.35(1) and Treaty 7 and affirming the special 
constitutional status of First Nations:  First Nations are not merely stakeholders with a 
vague interest in water management.  WPACs could be formed recognizing that the 
Treaty “provides a framework within which to manage the continuing changes in land 
use already foreseen [at the time of signing] and expected, even now, to continue well 
into the future.”60 
7. Conclusion 
The overarching purpose of s.35(1) is reconciliation.   It is clear from reviewing 
the case law, that there is no consistent characterization of the process of reconciliation.  
The definition of reconciliation ranges from reconciling pre-existing Aboriginal societies 
with the assertion of Crown sovereignty to reconciling Aboriginal societies with non-
Aboriginal societies, to reconciling Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal rights, interests, and 
ambitions. 
The characterization of reconciliation as a balancing of societal interests with 
Aboriginal interests is problematic because it circumvents the Crown’s historical 
relationship with Aboriginal people.  Only the Crown can be held to a standard of 
fairness and honour.  There is no standard to which all non-Aboriginal immigrant 
Canadians can be held in their dealings with Aboriginal peoples.  By including interests 
                                                 
60  Mikisew, supra note 49 at para 63. 
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and ambitions in the balancing of interests process, Aboriginal peoples are at risk of 
being exploited due to competing societal interests and ambitions, including industrial 
interests and ambitions, irrespective of the Crown’s historical relationship with Treaty 7 
First Nations.  This characterization of reconciliation would constitute a breach of the 
treaty relationship, particularly if equal weight is not given to Aboriginal legal traditions, 
treaties and the common law. 
The objective of the Peigan Agreement was to balance the interests of all parties, 
the Piikani First Nation, Alberta, and Canada.  Under this Agreement, the Piikani First 
Nation receives a share of the benefit of water-related projects in the Oldman River 
Valley.  The Agreement does not preclude the Piikani First Nation from playing a 
participating in shared governance of water resources off-reserve. 
The Water for Life Strategy created by Alberta in accordance with the province’s 
Water Act creates an opportunity for Treaty 7 First Nations to participate in watershed 
governance through WPACs.  However, in order for shared governance to be actualized, 
Treaty 7 First Nations’ meaningful involvement in WPACs must be mandatory and 
WPACs must acknowledge the unique constitutional position of Treaty 7 First Nations.  
Acknowledgement and affirmation of Treaty 7 First Nations’ s.35 rights would affect the 
constitution of the membership of WPACs as well as watershed management plans.  
Unless or until the special relationship between the Crown and Treaty 7 First Nations is 
recognized by WPACs, Alberta’s Water for Life Strategy will not and cannot fulfill the 
goal of reconciliation. 
Reconciliation may be achieved through negotiations between Treaty 7 First 
Nations and the Crown, guided by the principles of the Crown’s honour, the duty of 
fairness, and constitutionalism.  Adherence to these principles would protect Aboriginal 
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peoples from exploitation.  Where there is an existing treaty relationship, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that on-going consultation and reconciliation are inherent in that 
relationship. 
There is no uniform standard for reconciliation:  While Chief Justice Lamer 
recommends a balancing-of-interests approach to reconciliation, Madame Justice 
Mclachlin’s analysis is closer to the heart of the purpose of s.35.  The process of 
reconciliation must not subordinate Aboriginal and Treaty rights to societal interests:  
Reconciliation is best achieved by on-going Treaty negotiations.  True reconciliation 
requires taking into account Aboriginal laws and perspectives.  It may be argued that 
Treaty 7, being a pre-confederation treaty allowing the Crown to assert sovereignty 
throughout Blackfoot Confederacy territory, is also a constitutional document.  Thus, 
any negotiations with Treaty 7 First Nations in the name of reconciliation, including 
consultation, must be consistent with the terms of Treaty 7.  
The government should, through the process of consultation and accommodation, 
strive to establish “what is required to meet what the aboriginal people traditionally by 
law and custom took from the river or sea.”61  Expansive limitations on Aboriginal rights 
in the name of “regional fairness” and economics go beyond what is required for 
reconciliation, threaten the very existence of Aboriginal rights, and violate the principle 
of constitutionalism. 
The fundamental issue for consultation with Treaty 7 First Nations is the 
establishment of a process for deciding water management policies.  The question that 
must be answered through consultation with Treaty 7 First Nations is how Treaty 7 First 
Nations will be consulted in a meaningful and substantial way that is consistent with the 
                                                 
61  Van der Peet, supra note 2 at para 311. 
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principle of constitutionalism and the protection of their s.35 rights.  This begs the 
question of whether Treaty 7 First Nations have sufficient rights to water to require 
consultation.  The depth of consultation required depends on the nature and scope of 
their rights to water.  The following chapters examines whether Aboriginal and Treaty 
water rights have been extinguished by the assertion of Crown sovereignty, by treaty, 
and by the NRTA and legislation.  If Treaty 7 First Nations’ water rights have survived, 
consultation is required whenever the Crown contemplates conduct that might adversely 
affect those rights. 
The Treaty relationship between Treaty 7 First Nations and the Crown provides 
the framework within which consultation and negotiation can take place.  In my view, 
anything short of shared governance of the watershed is a breach of Treaty 7 water 
rights.  Only through shared governance can Treaty 7 First Nations’ interests, legal 
systems, and cultures be reconciled with the assertion of Crown sovereignty and other 
competing interests.  Shared governance implies a level playing field in which Treaty 7 
First Nations are not merely “stakeholders” whose interests in water resources can easily 
be ignored or minimized by more powerful and wealthy stakeholders such as Irrigation 
Districts and urban municipalities.  Shared governance further implies recognition of the 
special constitutional place of Treaty 7 First Nations and respect for the treaty 
relationship between the Crown and Treaty 7 First Nations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND TITLE TO WATER 
1. Introduction 
The principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law require all provincial 
government laws and actions to comply with the constitution:  Government policies and 
decisions regarding consultation with Treaty 7 First Nations must be consistent with 
s.35(1) protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights.  Whether or not the Crown is required 
to consult and the nature and scope the consultation required depends on whether there 
is a prima facie case for Aboriginal rights and title, and the nature and scope of those 
rights.  To make out a prima facie case, First Nations must not only prove that they once 
possessed Aboriginal rights and title, but also that their Aboriginal rights and title have 
not somehow been extinguished. 
This chapter identifies the tests for proving Aboriginal rights and title and applies 
these tests to Aboriginal rights and title to water as they existed prior to any treaties, 
historic acts by the Crown or legislation. 
Subsequent chapters examine whether these original Aboriginal rights and title 
were extinguished, altered, or protected by treaty, and whether, after entering treaty, this 
bundle of rights was extinguished by Crown policy or Crown action, or by legislation. 
Only after existing Aboriginal rights and title to water are identified can we determine 
whether they are afforded protection under s.35(1) giving rise to a duty to consult prior 
to the province considering any action that may adversely effect those rights.
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2. The Test for Identifying Aboriginal Rights protected by Section 35(1) 
Aboriginal rights existed and were recognized under the common law. They 
were not created by s. 35(1) but subsequent to s. 35(1) they cannot be extinguished. 
They can, however, be regulated or infringed if such regulation or infringement satisfies 
the justificatory test laid out in R. v. Sparrow, part of which is the requirement that there 
must have been meaningful and substantial consultation. 
The onus of establishing a prima facie infringement of an aboriginal right rests 
with the claimant:  The first step is to identify the precise nature of the claim.1  In Van 
der Peet, Lamer C.J. articulated the test for identifying Aboriginal rights, emphasizing 
rights to participate in activities: 
…in order to be an aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, 
custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group 
claiming the right.2 
Bastarache J. greatly simplified the test to prove the existence of Aboriginal 
rights dividing it into two steps:  1) Identifying the precise nature of the claim; and 2) 
Determining whether the practice, custom, or tradition was integral to the distinctive 
culture.  Below, these steps will be applied to determine what Aboriginal water rights 
existed in the area covered by Treaty 7 prior to the signing of Treaty 7. 
2.1 Step One:  Identify the Precise Nature of the Claim 
Justice Bastarache, writing for the Court, in Sappier redefined the Van der Peet 
test on “how to define the distinctive culture” of the Aboriginal groups and how to 
                                                 
1  R. v. Sappier, 2006 SCC 54, J.E. 2006-2331, 50 R.P.R. (4th) 1, [2007] 1 
C.N.L.R. 359, 274  D.L.R. (4th) 75, 355 N.R. 1, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686, 214 C.C.C. (3d) 
161, 799  A.P.R. 199, 309 N.B.R. (2d) 199, 2006 CarswellNB 676, per Bastarache. 
2  R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para 46.  All 
references are to Lamer C.J. writing for the majority unless otherwise specified. 
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determine which pre-contact practices were integral to their distinctive culture.   Echoing 
the supreme Court in N.T.C. Smokehouse3, he stated that the key factors to consider in 
identifying the precise nature of the claims are “the nature of the action which the 
applicant is claiming was done pursuant to an aboriginal right, the nature of the 
governmental regulation, statute or action being impugned, and the practice, custom or 
tradition being relied upon to establish the right.”4  
The Court reiterated, in Sappier, that Aboriginal rights protect Aboriginal 
practices, customs and traditions, not Aboriginal rights to resources: 
Aboriginal rights are founded upon practices, customs, or traditions which were 
integral to the distinctive pre-contact culture of an aboriginal people. They are 
not generally founded upon the importance of a particular resource. In fact, an 
aboriginal right cannot be characterized as a right to a particular resource 
because to do so would be to treat it as akin to a common law property right.5 
That said, Bastarache J., referring to the Adams6 decision, explained that the Supreme 
Court has recognized Aboriginal rights based on evidence showing the importance of the 
resource to pre-contact cultures.  This begs the question of whether s.35 can only be 
used as a shield and defence when Aboriginal rights holders contravene legislation.  
Surely s.35 protection is meaningless if it cannot also be used as a sword to proactively 
protect Aboriginal rights by conserving the resources upon which Aboriginal rights 
holders rely.  For example, the right to fish for subsistence on lakes and rivers within 
traditional territories is a meaningless if there are no fish or if the fish are contaminated 
and would pose a health risk if eaten.  The promise of s.35 would be empty if the 
                                                 
3  R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672. 
4  Sappier, supra note 1 at para. 20, quoting Van der Peet, supra note 2 at para. 53 
5  Ibid. at para. 21. 
6  R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; 138 D.L.R. (4th) 657; 202 N.R. 89; 110 
C.C.C. (3d) 97; [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 1. 
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resource upon which Aboriginal people rely for their practices, customs, and traditions is 
destroyed. 
The first step in identifying the precise nature of the claim is to grasp the 
importance of the resource to the Aboriginal group.  In order to understand the 
importance of the resource, the Court “seeks to understand how that resource was 
harvested, extracted and utilized.” 
The task of this Court is to define aboriginal rights in a manner which 
recognizes that aboriginal rights are rights but which does so without losing 
sight of the fact that they are rights held by aboriginal people because they are 
aboriginal. The Court must neither lose sight of the generalized constitutional 
status of what s. 35(1) protects, nor can it ignore the necessary specificity which 
comes from granting special constitutional protection to one part of Canadian 
society. The Court must define the scope of s. 35(1) in a way which captures 
both the aboriginal and the rights in aboriginal rights. 7 
The claimed right must relate to pre-contact culture or way of life of the Aboriginal 
group.  The Court has required that the claimant prove that the practice, custom, or 
tradition was “integral to the distinctive culture” or the particular Aboriginal society.  To 
pass this part of the test, the identified practice will ultimate “define the distinctive way 
of life of the community as an Aboriginal community.”8 
Accurately characterizing the pre-contact practice will influence considerations 
of how the practice “might have evolved to its present-day form.”9 
In Sappier the Court explained that the characterization of resource use for 
personal uses was too general because such a characterization did not identify a practice 
that defined the way of life or distinctiveness of the Aboriginal community.  By re-
                                                 
7  Sappier, supra note 1 at para 22. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Ibid. at para 23. 
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characterizing the right as a right to harvest wood for domestic uses for “such things as 
shelter, transportation, tools, and fuel” which are directly associated with the nomadic 
hunting and fishing lifestyle of the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet people, the right was specific 
enough to trigger s.35 protection. 
2.2 Step two:  Central significance of Practices, Customs, and Traditions 
Identifying whether the tradition, practice or custom is an integral part of the 
distinctive culture of an Aboriginal community is important to the process of 
reconciliation and consultation.10  The Supreme Court in Van der Peet had required that 
the practice, custom or tradition must be a “central and significant part of the society’s 
distinctive culture” to qualify for s.35 protection.  Certain things would not be 
considered distinctive.  For example, qualities that are true of every human society (e.g., 
eating to survive), or “aspects of the aboriginal society that are only incidental or 
occasional to that society.” 11  Aboriginal rights claimants were required to prove that a 
specific “practice, custom or tradition is a defining feature of the culture in question:”12 
To recognize and affirm the prior occupation of Canada by distinctive 
aboriginal societies it is to what makes those societies distinctive that the court 
must look in identifying aboriginal rights. The court cannot look at those 
aspects of the aboriginal society that are true of every human society (e.g., 
eating to survive), nor can it look at those aspects of the aboriginal society that 
are only incidental or occasional to that society; the court must look instead to 
the defining and central attributes of the aboriginal society in question. It is 
only by focusing on the aspects of the aboriginal society that make that society 
distinctive that the definition of aboriginal rights will accomplish the purpose 
underlying s. 35(1) (emphasis mine).13 
                                                 
10  Van der Peet, supra note 2 at para 31. 
11  Ibid. at para 56. 
12  Ibid. at para 59. 
13  Ibid. at para. 56 
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The statement of Lamer C.J. in Van der Peet had been interpreted to mean that 
Aboriginal practices required for survival could not be the subject of a claim to 
Aboriginal rights.  Because every human society uses water for domestic purposes, the 
test as articulated in Van der Peet would be an insurmountable barrier to prove 
Aboriginal rights to water, except for ceremonial purposes, such as the sundance, and 
possibly for watering horses. 
Bastarache J. in Sappier reformulated the ‘integral to a distinctive culture test’: 
Although intended as a helpful description of the Vanderpeet test, the reference 
in Mitchell to a "core identity" may have unintentionally resulted in a 
heightened threshold for establishing an aboriginal right. For this reason, I think 
it necessary to discard the notion that the pre-contact practice upon which the 
right is based must go to the core of the society's identity, i.e. its single most 
important defining character. This has never been the test for establishing an 
aboriginal right. This Court has clearly held that a claimant need only show that 
the practice was integral to the aboriginal society's pre-contact distinctive 
culture.14 
Bastarache J. explained Lamer C.J.’s reasoning, revealing that the pre-contact 
practice, custom or tradition relied need not be distinct; it need only be distinctive.15  
Barriers to recognizing Aboriginal rights were created by “[T]he notion that the pre-
contact practice must be a "defining feature" of the aboriginal society, such that the 
culture would be "fundamentally altered" without it.”  Bastarache J. cautioned Courts to 
be wary of using this as the test of distinctiveness.  ‘Distinctiveness’ is really about 
Aboriginal specificity:  Aboriginal people were the original organized society occupying 
and using Canadian lands, therefore the focus of the Court should be 
on the nature of this prior occupation on the nature of this prior occupation. 
What is meant by "culture" is really an inquiry into the pre-contact way of life 
of a particular aboriginal community, including their means of survival, their 
                                                 
14  Sappier, supra note 1 at para. 40. 
15  Ibid. at para. 36. 
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socialization methods, their legal systems, and, potentially, their trading habits. 
The use of the word "distinctive" as a qualifier is meant to incorporate an 
element of aboriginal specificity. However, "distinctive" does not mean 
"distinct", and the notion of aboriginality must not be reduced to "racialized 
stereotypes of Aboriginal peoples" (J. Borrows and L. I. Rotman, "The Sui 
Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does it Make a Difference?" (1997), 36 
Alta. L. Rev. 9, at p. 36). 
In determining what is ‘distinctive’ the Court is urged to “seek to understand 
how the particular pre-contact practice relied upon related to that way of life.” 
Uses of resources may, in certain contexts meet the integral to a distinctive 
culture test even when it is for survival purposes: 
That the standard an aboriginal community must meet is distinctiveness, not 
distinctness, arises from the recognition in Sparrow, supra, of an aboriginal 
right to fish for food. Certainly no aboriginal group in Canada could claim that 
its culture is "distinct" or unique in fishing for food; fishing for food is 
something done by many different cultures and societies around the world. 
What the Musqueam claimed in Sparrow, supra, was rather that it was fishing 
for food which, in part, made Musqueam culture what it is; fishing for food was 
characteristic of Musqueam culture and, therefore, a distinctive part of that 
culture. Since it was so it constituted an aboriginal right under s. 35(1).16 
In Sappier, the Court rejected the argument that qualities common to every 
human society could to be protected as Aboriginal rights.  Extending Adams17 and 
Coté,18 the Court stated the scope of s. 35 should extend to protect the means by which 
an aboriginal society traditionally sustained itself.  The Court, referring to R. v. Jones, 
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 (S.C.C.), at para. 28; and Mitchell, at para. 12, explained that the 
Van der Peet test emphasizes practices that are vital to the life of the aboriginal society 
in question.  
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17  Adams, supra note 6. 
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Applying this analysis to water rights would mean that Treaty 7 First Nations 
should be able to establish Aboriginal rights to water for transportation, for drinking and 
household purposes, and for raising horses.  The rivers throughout their traditional 
territories were important trade routes throughout history.  The use of horses became 
central to plains Indians culture as horses facilitated buffalo-hunting, warfare, and 
mobility.19  Treaty 7 First Nations ought also to be able to demonstrate that access to and 
use of pure water in the natural environment is an aspect of their distinctive cultural 
practice of the Sundance and other ceremonies.  Access to clean water was “vital to the 
life of the aboriginal society.”  However, the Court stated clearly that “there is no such 
thing as an aboriginal right to sustenance.” We might draw the conclusion, then, that 
there is no Aboriginal right to water.  The Court went on to state that “[T]he traditional 
means of sustenance, meaning the pre-contact practices relied upon for survival, can in 
some cases be considered integral to the distinctive culture of the particular aboriginal 
people.”  By extension, there may be pre-contact practices involving water use, such as 
household use, livestock watering, and ceremonial purposes that are protected as 
Aboriginal rights.  The practice of domestic use of water is “directly related to the way 
of life of Treaty 7 First Nations.”20  The fact that water was used “for survival purposes 
[may be] sufficient…to meet the integral to a distinctive culture threshold.”21  The 
protection of the ‘means’ of water use may be rendered meaningless, particularly if the 
water is not of a quality to sustain traditional practices.  
                                                 
19  A relatively ‘recent’ cultural adaptation, horse husbandry was introduced prior to 
European contact and by 1750 had extended throughout the American plains through a 
process of cultural diffusion. 
20  Sappier, supra note 1 at para. 46. 
21  Ibid. at para. 46. 
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For example, the pre-contact lifestyle of Treaty 7 First Nations was to move from 
place to place for hunting and gathering depending on the availability of species 
according to the seasons.  The ability to camp at specific sites throughout the semi-arid 
plains was determined by the availability of potable water drawn from rivers and streams 
for drinking, washing, tanning hides, watering horses, and other domestic purposes.  One 
might argue that there is no Aboriginal right to the water itself, however, if the quantity, 
quality, and flow of water is compromised to the extent that Treaty 7 First Nations are 
no longer able to hunt, gather, or raise horses at specific sites, is this not a breach of their 
Aboriginal right traditional uses of water? 
Bastarache J.’s reasoning appears to support this proposition: 
I can therefore find no jurisprudential authority to support the proposition that a 
practice undertaken merely for survival purposes cannot be considered integral 
to the distinctive culture of an aboriginal people. Rather, I find that the 
jurisprudence weighs in favour of protecting the traditional means of survival of 
an aboriginal community.22 
2.2.1 Continuity of the Claimed Right with Pre-contact Practice 
Where Van der Peet emphasized the necessity of proving that the nature of the 
practice giving rise to a claim to Aboriginal rights was distinctive of the particular 
cultural group, the new approach under Sappier emphasizes, the issue of how Aboriginal 
pre-contact practices are analogous to modern practices or are progenitors of modern 
processes. The pre-contact practice, “along with its associated uses…must be allowed to 
evolve.”23  The Court “has consistently held that ancestral rights may find modern form” 
and that ‘existing aboriginal rights’ must be interpreted flexibly so as to permit their 
                                                 
22  Ibid. at para 38. 
23  Ibid. at para 48. 
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evolution over time.”  In fact, “[i]f Aboriginal rights are not permitted to evolve and take 
modern forms, then they will become utterly useless.” 24 
The Court must determine the nature of an Aboriginal right in contemporary 
circumstances by evaluating whether the claimed modern practice has logically evolved 
from the pre-contact activity and is analogous or equivalent to the pre-contact activity 
“carried on in a modern economy by modern means.”25 
2.2.2 Site-specific Rights 
Aboriginal rights are not merely an incident of their ownership of the land as 
suggested in Sikyea.26  Aboriginal title is actually a sub-category of Aboriginal rights.  
“Aboriginal rights arise from the prior occupation of land, but they also arise from the 
prior social organization and distinctive cultures of aboriginal peoples on that land.”27  
The Aboriginal claimant’s relationship to the land as well as “the practices, customs and 
traditions arising from the claimant’s distinctive culture and society” are of relevance to 
the identification and definition of Aboriginal rights. 28  Aboriginal rights are not limited 
to “circumstances where an aboriginal group’s relationship with the land is of a kind 
sufficient to establish title to the land.”29 
                                                 
24  Ibid. at para 49 referring R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; [1990] S.C.J. No. 
49 at p.1093. 
25  McLachlin C.J. explained in R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, 2005 SCC 43 
(S.C.C.), at para. 25 
26  R. v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150 at 152 (N.W.T.C.A.); aff’d [1964] S.C.R. 
642. 
27  Van der Peet, supra note 2 at para 74; refered to in Delgamu’ukw v. British 
Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108 (QL); [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at para 141. 
28  Van der Peet, supra note 2 para 74. 
29  R. v. Adams, supra note 6. 
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Aboriginal rights may be exercised on a specific site even though Aboriginal title 
cannot be proven. 30  If a site-specific right is established, this does not mean that it is 
exercisable anywhere because it is independent of aboriginal title:  It continues to be a 
right exercisable “on the tract of land in question.”31 
The Supreme Court explained further in Delgamu’ukw that Aboriginal rights can 
be characterized as laying along a spectrum with respect to their degree of connection 
with the land.  At one end of the spectrum are Aboriginal rights that are the practices, 
customs and traditions integral to distinctive cultures:  At the other end of the spectrum 
is Aboriginal title.  Somewhere in the middle are site-specific activities that are 
exercised in particular places and may be “intimately related to a particular piece of 
land” to which Aboriginal title cannot be proven.  The Court in Adams gave the example 
of nomadic cultures where people changed the location of their villages in accordance 
with the seasons and conditions.32  Although they may be unable to prove title to their 
traditional territories they may be able to prove site-specific rights. 
In Saanichton Marina, a pre-Sparrow case, the B.C. Court of Appeal dealt with 
the claim by a Band to a Treaty right to carry on a fishery at a specific location.  The 
Court determined that 
[w]hile the right does not amount to a proprietary interest in the sea bed…it 
does protect the Indians against infringement of their right to carry on the 
fishery, as they have done for centuries.33 
                                                 
30  Ibid.. 
31  Ibid. at para 30.  The site-specific requirement for Aboriginal hunting and fishing 
rights is also recognized in R. v. Coté, [1996] S.C.J. No. 93; [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139; 138 
D.L.R. (4th) 385; 202 N.R. 161; [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 26. 
32  Ibid.; Delgamu’ukw, supra note 27 at para 138. 
33  Claxton v. Saanichton Marina Ltd., [1989] 3 C.N.L.R. 46. 
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Thus, an Aboriginal practice, falling short of title, may nonetheless be protected, as long 
as it satisfies the “necessary geographical element.”34  The geographical component of 
aboriginal rights is necessary to both ground and limit the extent of territory over which 
there exist specific rights.  The geographic limits of the Aboriginal rights of the 
Blackfoot confederacy are described as the body of Napi, extending throughout 
southwestern Alberta (see Figure 1 below).35  
3. The Test for Establishing Aboriginal Title to the Waterbeds in Southern 
Alberta 
Equal weight must be given to considerations of the British common law 
proprietary interests in land and Aboriginal legal systems and perspectives in 
determining whether an Aboriginal group occupied a territory sufficient to establish 
Aboriginal title.   
Aboriginal title is one type of Aboriginal right.  The test for proof of Aboriginal 
title is an adaptation of the test for Aboriginal rights, the purpose of which is “to 
reconcile the prior presence of aboriginal peoples in North America with the assertion of 
Crown sovereignty” by recognizing and affirming “both aspects of that prior presence – 
first, the occupation of land, and second, the prior social organization and distinctive 
cultures of aboriginal peoples on that land…”36 
                                                 
34  Sappier, supra note 1 at para 51. 
35  “Metaphysics in Blackfoot Stories, Places and Ways of Knowing” Powerpoint 
presentation presented at Traditional Land Use Conference, Nakota Lodge, Morley, 
Alberta, March 16, 2007 by Kerry Scott, Piikani Chief & Council.  To determine the 
specific sites and Aboriginal practices, customs, and traditions at those sites would 
require considerable research and is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
36  Delgamu’ukw, supra note 27 at para 141. 
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In that respect, Aboriginal title is a sui generis or unique right in land.  
Aboriginal title is a particular kind of Aboriginal right in land conferring the right to use 
the land for a variety of activities, so long as these activities are not irreconcilable with 
the nature of Aboriginal attachment to the land.37   
In Delgamu’ukw, the Court set the framework for establishing claims to 
Aboriginal title.  The criteria to be satisfied in making out a claim for Aboriginal title are 
as follows: 
i) the land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty; 
ii) if present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation pre-
sovereignty, there must be a continuity between present and pre-
sovereignty occupation; and 
iii) at sovereignty, that occupation must have been exclusive.38 
In applying these criteria to Treaty 7 First Nations’ title to their traditional 
territories, it is evident that they had Aboriginal title. 
3.1 Occupation at the Time of Assertion of Sovereignty 
Prior to British presence on the plains, the ancestors of Treaty 7 First Nations a 
territory extending from the Rocky Mountains in the West to the Cypress Hills in the 
East and Peace Point in the North to Wyoming in the South.  Their laws and languages 
reflected their understanding of their relationship with the land.  Indeed, the very names 
for the rivers that have survived colonization and translation are a testament to their 
relationship with the waters. 
                                                 
37  Ibid. at para 111. 
38  Delgamu’ukw, supra note 27. 
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The land that Napi gave the Blackfoot is marked out by his body. Because of 
this they understood their land to have special places of power and significance. 
These places were regarded as sacred in the sense that they required respect and 
human self discipline. A lot of these places were used and still are, where 
possible, as vision quest areas.39 
The place names marking the land that was known as the territory of the 
Blackfoot Confederacy is shown below: 
 
Figure 4-1.  The body of Napi 
This is the territory within which the Blackfoot followed the buffalo, their most 
important food source.  Allied with one another, the Siksika, Kaini, Piikani, Tsuu T’ina, 
                                                 
39  F. David Peat, Lighting the Seventh Fire:  The Spiritual Ways, Healing, and 
Science of the Native American (Secaucus, N.J.:  Carol Publishing Group, 1994). 
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and Nakoda people defended their territories against the intrusion of the Cree and other 
tribes from the south. 
3.1.1 Occupation… 
To satisfy the first criteria, the occupation of the land claimed had to be more 
than an occasional presence.  Aboriginal title exists only where the connection of the 
Aboriginal people to the particular piece of land on which the Aboriginal activities were 
taking place was of “central significance” to the distinctive culture of the group.40  The 
Aboriginal group’s “pattern of land holdings under aboriginal law” must be 
considered,41 along with the use of land and the resources thereon.  Aboriginal 
perspectives on occupation may be gleaned from traditional Aboriginal laws, including 
their system of land tenure or laws governing land use because those laws were elements 
of the practices, customs and traditions of aboriginal people.  Furthermore, to determine 
whether occupation is sufficient to establish title, consideration must be given to “the 
group’s size, manner of life, material resources, and technological abilities, and the 
character of the lands claimed…”42 
Lamer C. J. explained the connection between the occupation and the central 
significance of the particular piece of land: 
Occupancy is determined by reference to the activities that have taken place on 
the land and the uses to which the land has been put by the particular group.  If 
lands are so occupied, there will exist a special bond between the group and the 
                                                 
40  Adams, supra note 6 at para 26. 
41  Delgamu’ukw, supra note 27 at para 147. 
42  Ibid. at para 149 quoting Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989) at pp. 201-2. 
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land in question such that the land will be part of the definition of the group’s 
distinctive culture.43 
Where occupation has been established and a substantial connection maintained, 
the central significance of the land to the claimant group’s culture will be assumed, and 
need not be separately proven.44 
The map of the Blackfoot Confederacy territory in Figure 4-1 demonstrates the 
connection of Treaty 7 First Nations with the land.  Depending almost exclusively on the 
buffalo hunt for their sustenance, they used the entire territory, following the buffalo 
herds as they migrated throughout the region. 
Occupation the beds of waters or lands adjacent to streams and rivers might be 
established by the existence of structures such as fishing weirs, or by evidence that the 
watercourse was used for fishing,45 hunting, or gathering aquatic plants.  There is 
evidence that Treaty 7 First Nations had preferred areas along the river valleys which 
they claimed as their seasonal camping grounds.  There were places along the river that 
were ideal for buffalo and other hunting, gathering medicines, grazing and watering their 
horses.  It may also be possible to establish “occupation” of certain sites along rivers that 
were regularly used for travel,   such as Blackfoot Crossing. 
Occupation might also be proven by showing that other groups were prevented 
from using certain places.  Historical records show that the Blackfoot Confederacy 
solidly defended their territories against intrusion.  For example, they would only allow 
the Cree to hunt within their territories upon establishing treaties of peace.  The explicit 
                                                 
43  Delgamu’ukw, supra note 27 at para 128. 
44  Ibid. at para 151. 
45  This is theoretical only, as the Blackfoot did not traditionally eat fish. 
93 
permission granted in Treaty 7 to the Queen to travel on navigable streams lends 
credence to the idea that Treaty 7 First Nations occupied and controlled the waterways 
to the exclusion of others. 
3.1.2 …at the date of sovereignty 
In Delgamu’ukw, the Court set the relevant date of inquiry for the assertion of 
Aboriginal title as “the time at which the Crown asserted sovereignty over the land 
subject to the title,”46 whereas, the relevant date of inquiry for proof of Aboriginal rights 
has been set as the date of European contact.  In the establishment of title, the date of the 
assertion of British sovereignty becomes key.  The Canadian government takes the 
position that the date of assertion of British sovereignty was 1670, the year the Hudson’s 
Bay Company was granted a charter over Rupertsland.  This position is supported by 
two Federal Court cases, decided before Delgamu’ukw.47  The government’s alternate 
date for the assertion of British sovereignty is 1869, when Rupertsland was transferred 
to Canada.  Both of these “assertions” of British sovereignty over the territory occurred 
without the knowledge of Treaty 7 First Nations who maintained their freedom to 
traverse borders and who governed their territories by a system of Treaties between the 
Siksika, Piikani, Kaini, Tsuu T’ina, and Nakoda peoples, protecting their territories from 
invasion from their enemies, principally the Cree,  Sioux, and Shoshone.  The assertion 
of British sovereignty only took on meaning with the presence of the RCMP sent by 
invitation of the Blackfoot confederacy to keep the destructive forces of the American 
whiskey trade out of Blackfoot territory.  “Aboriginal title pre-dated colonization by the 
                                                 
46  Delgamu’ukw, supra note 27 at para 142. 
47  Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
(No.2), [1980] 1 FMC 518 at 562; Sawridge Band v. Canada, [1995] 4 C.N.L.R. 121 at 
143. 
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British and survived British claims of sovereignty.”48  The Blackfoot maintained their 
autonomy for more than 200 years after the Hudson’s Bay Charter was granted and 
dominated the prairie without interference until the buffalo were decimated and the 
people were demoralized by the whiskey trade in the late 1800’s.  Arguably, if a similar 
burden of proof of actual occupation and not merely intention to occupy is imposed on 
the Crown, the date of sovereignty might be the date that there was a Northwest 
Mounted Police presence on the prairies, or the date of the Treaty.  In any event, Treaty 
7 is evidence that the Crown recognized Aboriginal occupation of, and Aboriginal title 
to, what is now southern Alberta. 
3.2 Continuity of Occupation 
In Delgamu’ukw Lamer C.J. recognizes “conclusive evidence of pre-sovereignty 
occupation may be difficult to come by.”  In such cases  
an aboriginal community may provide evidence of present occupation as proof 
of pre-sovereignty occupation in support of a claim to aboriginal title.   What is 
required, in addition, is a continuity between present and pre-sovereignty 
occupation, because the relevant time for the determination of aboriginal title is 
at the time before sovereignty.49 
Continuity of occupation is a requirement to prove Aboriginal title, but there is 
“no need to establish ‘an unbroken chain of continuity’ between present and prior 
occupation.” The Court recognized that occupation and land use “may have been 
disrupted for a time, perhaps as a result of the unwillingness of European colonizers to 
recognize aboriginal title.”  Too strict a requirement of continuity could undermine “the 
                                                 
48  Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322 at 340 
49  Delgamu’ukw, supra note 27 at para 152. 
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very purpose of s.35(1) by perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal 
peoples at the lands of colonizers who failed to respect’ aboriginal rights to land.” 50 
Aboriginal title may exist despite a disruption in occupation, and despite a 
change in the “precise nature of occupation.”  If such is the case, it does not necessarily 
preclude a claim for aboriginal title, as long a substantial connection between the people 
and the land is maintained.”51 
Assuming Treaty 7 is a peace treaty and not a land cession treaty,52 there is 
ample evidence of continuity of occupation of the waterbeds and waters in southern 
Alberta, although the “precise nature of the occupation” changed.  When Treaty 7 First 
Nations were forced to give up the buffalo hunt, they made the transition to ranching and 
farming which required more intensive water use, especially for irrigation purposes. 
3.2.1 Internal Limits 
The nature of the occupation is subject to internal limits, “i.e., uses which are 
inconsistent with continued use by future generations of aboriginals.”  Internal limits on 
uses of land flow from the special bond between Aboriginal peoples and the land 
claimed such that the land is part of the group’s definition of themselves.  In this type of 
situation, Aboriginal title lands cannot be used in a manner “irreconcilable with the 
nature of the occupation of that land and the relationship that the particular group has 
had with the land which together have given rise to aboriginal title in the first place.”  
Because group’s very identity depends on their relationship with the land, there is “an 
                                                 
50  Ibid. at para 153. 
51  Ibid. 
52  The distinction between peace treaties and land cession treaties is more fully 
dealt with in Chapter 4. 
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inherent limitation” on Aboriginal uses of land preventing them from using the land in a 
manner that would preclude them from using it for traditional purposes. 53 
This reasoning raises interesting questions, particularly for the Stoney and 
Piikani peoples.  If a Treaty 7 First Nation could successfully prove title to a waterbed 
based on occupation for fishing and hunting purposes, would they forfeit their title by 
participating in a development project such as a hydro-electric dam resulting in the 
flooding of the lands and waters once used for fishing and hunting?  If that is the case, 
governments and industrial developers can do what First Nations cannot without 
compromising their title, despite the pre-sovereignty continuous occupation of their 
traditional territories – participate in large-scale development projects that alter the use 
of the land and water. 
3.3 Exclusive Occupation at the Time of Sovereignty 
To prove Aboriginal title, Aboriginal people must show exclusive occupation, 
that is, the ability to exclude others from the lands held pursuant to that title.  Proof of 
exclusivity should have regard to “the factual reality of occupation, as encountered by 
the Europeans” as well as the context of Aboriginal society at the time of sovereignty.  If 
lands were used by “a number of bands, those shared lands would not be subject to a 
claim for aboriginal title, as they lack the crucial element of exclusivity.”54  But if other 
Aboriginal groups frequented the claimed lands and the Aboriginal group demonstrated 
their “intention and capacity to retain exclusive control,”55 they may be able to prove 
exclusive possession. 
                                                 
53  Delgamu’ukw, supra note 27 at para 154. 
54  Ibid. at para 159. 
55  Ibid.; McNeil, supra note 42 at 204. 
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Aboriginal laws and treaties may be evidence of exclusive occupation:  
“Aboriginal laws under which permission may be granted to other aboriginal groups to 
use or reside even temporarily on land would reinforce the finding of exclusive 
occupation.”56  Control over who is permitted to access Aboriginal lands is evidence of a 
group’s exclusive control.57  Exclusivity is evidenced by the intention and capacity to 
retain exclusive control.58 
Treaty 7 appears to have officially granted the Queen and her subjects the right 
of navigation which was otherwise maintained as the exclusive right of Treaty 7 First 
Nations: 
...reserving to Her Majesty, as may now or hereafter be required by Her for the 
use of Her Indian and other subjects, from all the Reserves hereinbefore 
described, the right to navigate the above mentioned rivers, to land and receive 
fuel cargoes on the shores and banks thereof, to build bridges and establish 
ferries thereon, to use the fords thereof and all the trails leading thereto…59 
If more than one Aboriginal group occupied a particular territory, there may be 
shared exclusivity compatible with Aboriginal title so long as the right to exclude others 
was maintained.  For shared exclusivity to exist, those that shared territory would have 
to be willing to share with each other to the exclusion of others.  “There clearly may be 
cases in which two aboriginal nations lived on a particular piece of land and recognized 
each other's entitlement to that land but nobody else's.”60 
                                                 
56  Ibid. at para 157 
57  McNeil, supra note 42 at 204. 
58  Delgamu’ukw, supra note 27 at para 156; McNeil, supra note 42 at 204. 
59  Treaty No. 7, made 22nd Sept., 1877, between her Majesty the Queen and the 
Blackfeet and other Indian Tribes, at the Blackfoot Crossing of the Bow River, Fort 
Macleod (Ottawa:  Queen’s Printer and controller of Stationery, 1966). 
60  Delgamu’ukw, supra note 27 at para 158. 
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First Nations in southern Alberta had Treaty relationships with one another that 
protected their shared exclusive possession of certain tracts of land against 
encroachment by other enemy First Nations.  First Nations in southern Alberta belonged 
to the Blackfoot Confederacy and together protected their lands from encroachment by 
the Cree and from First Nations south of the American border.61  
It is clear that Treaty 7 First Nations satisfied the requirements for proof of 
Aboriginal title to the waters and waterbeds.  Treaty 7 First Nations occupied southern 
Alberta prior to the assertion of sovereignty and the Crown recognized that occupation 
by entering into Treaty with them.  Their occupation of the waters and waterbeds has 
been continuous, although the “precise nature of the occupation” changed following the 
disappearance of the buffalo and the settlement of Treaty 7 First Nations on reserves.  
Their occupation was exclusive, though shared, as is evidenced by the peace treaties by 
which the Blackfoot Confederacy was established and by their exclusion of other First 
Nations and the explicit clause in Treaty 7 limiting access to the rivers for travel 
purposes.  If Treaty 7 did not extinguished Aboriginal title to the waters and waterbeds 
of southern Alberta, Treaty 7 First Nations may have a prima facie claim to Aboriginal 
title giving rise to the duty to consult regarding adverse affects to their waters. 
4. Conclusion 
Prior to entering into treaty the Blackfoot Confederacy possessed a bundle of 
rights related to water including rights to navigation, rights to gather aquatic plants and 
medicines, rights to hunt, rights to assert jurisdiction, and rights to use water for all 
manner of domestic use and livelihood such as drinking, washing, tanning hides, and 
                                                 
61  See generally, Hugh Dempsey, Crowfoot:  Chief of the Blackfeet (Halifax:  
Goodread Biographies, 1988). 
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watering stock.  These practices customs and traditions, related as they are to the 
Blackfoot Confederacy’s pre-contact way of life, satisfy the test in Sappier that specific 
practices customs and traditions were integral to the distinctive culture. 
Furthermore, Treaty 7 First Nations satisfied the requirements for proof of 
Aboriginal title to the waters and waterbeds.  Treaty 7 First Nations occupied southern 
Alberta prior to the assertion of sovereignty and the Crown recognized that occupation 
by entering into Treaty with them.  Their occupation of the waters and waterbeds has 
been continuous, although the “precise nature of the occupation” changed following the 
disappearance of the buffalo and the settlement of Treaty 7 First Nations on reserves.  
Their occupation was exclusive, though shared, as is evidenced by the peace treaties by 
which the Blackfoot Confederacy was established and by their exclusion of other First 
Nations and the explicit clause in Treaty 7 limiting access to the rivers for travel 
purposes.   
Section 52 of the Constitution and the rule of law mandates that provincial 
government action, including consultation with First Nations, must be consistent with 
the protection of existing Aboriginal and treaty rights.  The question to be answered is 
whether any Aboriginal rights or title survived Treaty 7 and subsequent legislation.  If 
Treaty 7 did not extinguished Aboriginal title to the waters and waterbeds of southern 
Alberta, Treaty 7 First Nations may have a prima facie claim to Aboriginal title giving 
rise to the duty to consult regarding adverse affects to their waters. 
The Crown has the legal duty to consult and accommodate First Nation’s rights 
and interests when it has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of 
the Aboriginal title and it contemplates conduct that might adversely affect Aboriginal 
title.  To determine the scope of the Crown’s duty to consult, it is necessary to make a 
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preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the existence of Aboriginal 
title to the waters and waterbeds of the rivers adjacent to their reserves and throughout 
their traditional territories, and the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the 
right or title claimed. 
The question remains whether their Aboriginal title to the waters and waterbeds 
extinguished by Treaty 7.  Chapter 5 explores the meaning of Treaty 7 and the principles 
of Treaty interpretation in depth.  For the purpose of this chapter, I will refer only to the 
text of the Treaty and will assume that it is possible for Aboriginal groups to assert title 
to the waterbeds and waters within their territories.  Aboriginal title must be addressed 
separately from Aboriginal rights, even those that are intimately connected with land 
use.62  If First Nations occupied a piece of land but did not do so exclusively, they might 
retain rights short of title, such as site specific rights.63 
                                                 
62  Adams, supra note 6. 
63  Delgamu’ukw, supra note 27 at para 159. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  THE EFFECT OF TREATY 7 ON WATER RIGHTS 
1. Introduction 
The principle of constitutionalism and the rule of las demans that provincial 
regulation and action must be consistent with s.35 of the Constitution.  Thus, provincial 
laws, regulations and policies relating to consultation must protect existing Aboriginal 
and treaty rights.  Thus we must identify existing Aboriginal and treaty rights to 
determine whether Alberta’s water and consultation policies are consistent with the 
protection of s.35 rights. 
The preceding chapter we determined that Aboriginal rights and title existed 
prior to Treaty.  Aboriginal rights, defined as the right to engage in practices, customs, 
and traditions within a specific territory included rights to navigation, rights to gather 
aquatic plants and medicines, rights to hunt, rights to assert jurisdiction, and rights to use 
water for all manner of domestic use and livelihood such as drinking, washing, tanning 
hides, and watering stock.  Aboriginal title to water and waterbeds existed throughout 
the territory described by the Blackfoot Confederacy as the body of Napi, the Creator-
being. 
This Chapter examines whether Treaty 7 extinguished Aboriginal rights and title 
in whole or in part.  Extinguishment of Aboriginal rights requires clear and plain intent 
of the Crown to do so and extinguishment of Aboriginal title can only be achieved when 
First Nations cede their title to the Crown, collectively, and willingly at a public 
meeting.  If extinguishment is a term of the treaty, the principles of treaty interpretation 
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require that there was a common intention of the Crown and First Nations parties to 
extinguish Aboriginal title and rights. 
The question of whether Treaty 7 effectively extinguished Aboriginal rights or 
title can only be answered after ascertaining the purpose and intent of the treaty as 
understood by the First Nations and the Crown.  The Supreme Court has established 
principles of treaty interpretation to assist in identifying the common intention of the 
parties.  There is a distinct difference between the First Nations’ view that the Treaty 7 
was a peace treaty and the Crown’s view that the treaty was a transfer of land.  In the 
view of some Treaty 7 First Nations individuals, Aboriginal rights to hunt and 
Aboriginal rights to traditional territories were not extinguished:  They claim Treaty 7 
was a fraud.  Treaty 7 First Nations had their own form of symbolic writing.  When the 
Chiefs put their “X” on the Treaty, it did not mean that they accepted the terms of Treaty 
7:  The “X’s” on the Treaty actually meant “full-stop” or a rejection of the Treaty.1 
It is not unheard of for First Nations to press claims of Aboriginal title to 
waterbeds as well as the water itself, even after having entered into land cession 
Treaties.  The Saugeen Ojibway Nation filed a Statement of Claim in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice,2 claiming unextinguished Aboriginal title to the vast expanse 
of water and lakebed on Lake Huron and Georgian Bay in Ontario.  The foundation of 
their claim is that the waters form part of the Saugeen Ojibway First Nation traditional 
territories.  They had exclusively occupied their traditional territory at the time of the 
                                                 
1  This story was told to me by a member of the Piikani First Nation who did not 
want to be identified, and it was verified by several Nation members as being part of the 
oral history of the Piikani First Nation. 
2  Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation and Saugeen First Nation v. The 
Attorney General of Canada, and Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario, Statement 
of Claim filed by John A. Othuis, Olthuis, Kleer, Townshend, December 23, 2003. 
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effective assertion of British sovereignty.  Although they had entered into land cession 
treaties, the waters or waterbeds within their traditional territories had been specifically 
exempted from the land cession Treaties.  Throughout the years following the Treaties, 
the Saugeen Ojibway Nation continued to assert their water rights.  The waters of Lake 
Huron had supported the livelihood of the First Nations for thousands of years and the 
Saugeen Ojibway Nation had maintained exclusive possession of the territory.  The 
people of Saugeen Ojibway Nation oppose a proposed $100 million pipeline to supply 
drinking water to Walkerton as well as the pipeline through Collingwood that supplies 
water to the Honda plant.  The First Nation would now like to see the water taken from 
their unceded waters metered and paid for by the communities that use it.3  
Similar to the Saugeen Ojibway Nation, the First Nations of the Treaty 7 may 
have an argument for unceded Aboriginal title to the waterbeds of the rivers flowing 
through their territories, despite the signing of Treaties.  There is no question that the 
First Nations living in the Treaty 7 area had Aboriginal title to their territories, and with 
that title a right to the use of all waters within their territories. 
This chapter will examine the meaning of the treaty by applying the principles of 
treaty interpretation, will consider whether the Treaty 7, as understood by the parties, 
extinguished Aboriginal rights and title to water, and will suggest what, if any 
Aboriginal rights and title to water existed after Treaty 7. 
                                                 
3  Roberta Avery, Birchbark Writer, Owen Sound, February, 2004, “Band claims 
water rights” (http://www.ammsa.com/birchbark/topnews-Feb-
2004.html#anchor1035625). 
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2. What is the Meaning of Treaty 7? 
2.1 The Principles of Treaty Interpretation 
Treaties constitute a unique type of constitutional agreement. Attracting special 
principles of interpretation, they represent an exchange of solemn promises between the 
Crown and the various First nations. It is an agreement whose nature is sacred.  
Treaty 7 First Nations have maintained from the date of signing that the treaty 
terms, agreed to orally, were binding both First Nations and the Crown and her 
representatives.  However, English-Canadian jurisprudence has, until fairly recently, 
disregarded the oral history and oral terms of the Treaty, assuming that the only binding 
terms were written in the Treaty document.  It is the position of Treaty 7 First Nations 
that the true terms of Treaty 7 include what was agreed orally by the parties and mutual 
promises made during negotiations, although Alberta takes exception to that proposition.  
Evidence of oral terms and promises may be gleaned from many sources, including the 
Commissioner’s Report, witnesses’ accounts, and oral history.   
The goal of Treaty interpretation is to choose from among the various possible 
interpretations of common intention the one which best reconciles the interests of both 
parties at the time the Treaty was signed.4  The examination of Treaty 7 negotiations 
below suggests that the interpretation of Treaty 7 that best reconciles the divergent 
interest of the parties is the view that Treaty 7 was meant to preserve peaceful co-
existence and order on the western plains, and to ensure the livelihood of First Nations 
who faced annihilation along with the disappearing buffalo herds.  There can be no 
reconciliation of the divergent views on the subject of the cession of Aboriginal title. 
                                                 
4  R. v. Sioui, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 127. 
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In order to assess and impute a common intention, one must examine the text, the 
historical context and evidence of the intentions and understanding of the parties, 
including oral histories.  Because Treaties are a unique fusion of British common law 
and aboriginal customary law, the Court has suggested a number of principles of 
interpretation.  A compilation of the principles of Treaty interpretation can be found in 
the two leading Supreme Court cases of R. v. Marshall5 and R. v. Badger.6  
The first stage in Treaty interpretation is to discover the common intention of the 
parties.  In determining the signatories' respective understanding and intentions, the 
court must be sensitive to the unique cultural and linguistic differences between the 
parties.  The words of the Treaty must be given the sense which they would naturally 
have held for the parties at the time:  The words in the treaty must not be interpreted in 
their strict technical sense nor subjected to rigid modern rules of construction.  Rather, 
they must be interpreted in the sense that they would naturally have been understood by 
the Indians at the time of the signing.”7  Ambiguities or doubtful expressions in the 
wording of the Treaty or document must be resolved in favour of the Indians.  Any 
limitations which restrict the rights of Indians under Treaties must be narrowly 
construed.  That being said, the terms of the Treaty cannot be altered “[w]hile construing 
the language generously… by exceeding what “is possible on the language” or realistic.” 
Treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples must not be interpreted in a static or rigid 
way.  They are not frozen at the date of signature.  The interpreting court must update 
                                                 
5  R. v. Marshall, [1999] 4 C.N.L.R. 161; [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456; [1999] S.C.J. No. 
55 (QL) at 199-200. 
6  R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771; [1996] S.C.J. No. 39 (QL). 
7  R. v. Badger, supra note 5 at para 52. 
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Treaty rights to provide for their modern exercise.  This involves determining what 
modern practice is an outgrowth of a core Treaty right. 
In determining the common intention of the parties, the honour of the Crown is 
presumed, and is always at stake:  It is always presumed that the Crown intends to fulfill 
its promises and no appearance of “sharp dealing” will be sanctioned.  An extension of 
this principle is that Treaties will be interpreted in a manner which maintains the 
integrity of the Crown. 
2.2 Historical Context of Treaty 7 
Treaty 7 was negotiated and signed by the Siksika, Kainaiwa, Piikani, Tsuu 
T'ina, and Nakoda First Nations at Blackfoot Crossing in 1877.  One of the greatest 
problems in negotiations was that no one individual present could speak all of the 
languages of the people present at Blackfoot Crossing.8 The translation of the technical 
words might well have led to different understandings.  The Treaty 7 Elders say that 
Jerry Potts, interpreter for the Blackfoot, did not speak Blackfoot or English fluently and 
could not explain the meaning of “cede,” “release,” or “surrender.”9  The understanding 
left in the minds of the Blackfoot was that they were to share the surface of the land with 
the newcomers in return for being protected from outside incursion by the Queen’s 
subjects. 
Treaty 7 may be given several different interpretations.  In the following 
discussion we will examine the meaning of the Treaty as a Peace Treaty and as a 
guarantee of continued hunting and economic development.  If Treaty 7 is characterized 
                                                 
8  Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council et al., The True Spirit and Original Intent of 
Treaty 7 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1996) at 124 
[hereinafter Treaty 7 Elders]. 
9  Treaty 7 Elders, supra note 7 at 126. 
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as a peace Treaty, Treaty 7 First Nations may have residual jurisdiction, unextinguished 
Aboriginal title to natural resources including water within the ceded Treaty 7 territory.  
If the Treaty is a land cession Treaty, Treaty 7 First Nations may, nonetheless, possess 
residual jurisdiction and unceded title to the watercourses and water beds.  At the very 
least they possess Treaty rights to beneficial use of, and shared jurisdiction over, water 
resources.  In the proper circumstances “Aboriginal title and Treaty rights can co-exist in 
relation to the same land though the source of entitlement for each right is distinct.”10  In 
an effort to properly characterize and interpret Treaty 7 it is important to consider the 
historical context of Treaty negotiations. 11 
When a generous and liberal interpretation is made of the treaty in accordance 
with Blackfoot Confederacy understandings, it appears that the promise of continued 
hunting was a guarantee of the First Nation’s signatories continued right and ability to 
hunt.  However, First Nations freedom to hunt was limited by the treaty to land not taken 
up by settlement, mining, trading or other purposes.  Waterways were not likely viewed 
by First Nations as lands capable of being “taken up” thus remaining unrestricted for 
                                                 
10  R. v. Bernard, [2003] 4 C.N.L.R. 48, N.B.C.A. per Daigle, J.A.  rev’g R. v. 
Bernard, [2002] 3 C.N.L.R. 114 summary appeal court.  The Appeal Court’s decision 
was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as R. v. Marshall; R. v. 
Bernard, [2005] 3 C.N.L.R. 214 and was reversed on the basis that commercial logging 
is not a logical evolution of a Treaty or Aboriginal right. 
11  The court emphasized the importance of the historical facts in R. v. Blais, [2003] 
2 S.C.R. 236; [2003] S.C.J. No. 44; 2003 SCC 44, a case that considered whether Metis 
were “Indians” for the purpose of s.13 of Manitoba’s NRTA.  While the Court focused 
on principles of constitutional interpretation, it emphasized the importance of analyzing 
the historical context to arrive at a correct interpretation.  The success of an Aboriginal 
rights case clearly depends on the strength of the historical facts.  Lawyers often fall 
prey to the notion that legal arguments and interpretations can establish Aboriginal 
rights.  However, the Court has signaled to the profession that a more thorough historical 
analysis is required for future successes.  This means doing the time-intensive, detailed 
work of sorting through archival haystacks to uncover historical needles, then piecing 
them together to find accurate meanings and interpretations. 
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hunting. First Nations retained rights to the rivers while the government reserved for 
itself the delegated right to navigate on certain rivers in the Treaty 7 Territory.  
Furthermore, First Nations chose their reserves, which were guaranteed to them in the 
written text of the treaty and oral promises, along the rivers to support hunting, their 
existing horse herds, cattle ranches and agriculture.  It was not likely in the minds of 
either of the parties that huge dams would be built along the rivers and thus could not be 
“read in” as land taken up for “other purposes.” 
The Supreme Court recognized in Badger that the historical context as well as 
oral promises must be taken into account when interpreting the written text of the 
Treaties: 
[W]hen considering a treaty, a court must take into account the context in 
which the treaties were negotiated, concluded and committed to writing.  The 
treaties, as written documents, recorded an agreement that had already been 
reached orally and they did not always record the full extent of the oral 
agreement.12 
The Court recognized that there would be differences between the oral tradition 
and written Treaties:  Treaties were drafted in English using specific legal language 
steeped in the tradition of British common law and had not been fully or accurately 
translated into the signatories’ languages.  Even if they had been, First Nations would 
likely have emphasized and remembered the oral promises because of their oral 
tradition. 
As a result, it is well settled that the words in the treaty must not be interpreted 
in their strict technical sense nor subjected to rigid modern rules of 
construction.  Rather, they must be interpreted in the sense that they would 
naturally have been understood by the Indians at the time of the signing.  This 
applies, as well, to those words in a treaty which impose a limitation on the 
right which has been granted. 
                                                 
12  Badger, supra note 5 at para 52. 
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To get a sense of the content of the Treaty right to water, it is essential to review 
the historical context of Treaty 7.  Treaty 7 First Nations were by no means dependent 
on European trade prior to signing the Treaty.  However, both Treaty 7 First Nations and 
the Hudson’s Bay Company recognized that it was in their common interest to co-exist 
peacefully.13  The Hudson’s Bay Company recognized that the Prairie Indians were not 
dependent on trade goods and staples, and to induce them to trade, they would have to 
encourage consumption of alcohol and tobacco.14  By the time of Treaty signing the 
HBC had refrained from trading in alcohol and the Americans had taken up the trade. 
By the 1870’s the Blackfoot Confederacy had proven themselves to be a force to 
be reckoned with and dominated the plains of southern Alberta from the Cypress Hills in 
the East to the foothills of the Rockies and South to Montana and beyond. The land 
                                                 
13  Revisionist fur trade historians have theorized that although First Nations were 
not hapless victims or the fur trade neither did they form “partnerships” with fur traders:  
They used their alliances with fur traders to their own advantages and maintained 
peaceful co-existence because it was mutually beneficial.   Daniel Francis, Toby 
Morantz, Partners in Furs: A History of the Fur Trade in Eastern James Bay, 1600-
1870, (McGill-Queen's University Press:  2003). 
14  Simpson, in 1821 commented that he was “convinced that they must be ruled 
with a rod of iron, to bring and to keep them in a proper state of subordination, and the 
most certain way to effect this is by letting them feel their dependence upon us.”  While 
this was accomplished in the woodlands by locking Indian traders into debt service with 
the company, “[t]he plains Indians are a bold and independent race…and with them 
Tobacco and Spirits are the principle commodities; a Quart of Mixed Liquor will at time 
procure more Pounded Meat and Grease than a Bale of Cloth, indeed our whole profit in 
that Trade is upon those articles, and if Provisions were paid for in Dry Goods they 
would eat up all the gains of the Fur Trade.”  The debt system would not work, “as they 
can live independent of us, and by withholding ammunition, tobacco and spirits, the 
staple articles of the trade, for one year they will recover the use of their Bows and spear 
and lose sight of their smoking and Drinking habits; …it will therefore be necessary to 
bring those Tribes round by mild and cautious measures which soon be effected.” 
(Citation unavailable.  Originally obtained from Dr. Frank Tough, Department of Native 
Studies, University of Saskatchewan, 1993. 
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described by the Blackfoot as Napi’s body15 likely constituted their Aboriginal territory 
at the time of the assertion of British sovereignty. These First Nations had not been 
locked into debt service to the Hudson’s Bay Company as their northern neighbors had 
been and were free of any need of the white man.  They could obtain guns, ammunition, 
and horses through trade or spoil from the Americans.  No need for the Queen’s 
assistance arose until the buffalo, their main source of livelihood, had been depleted, and 
trading for American whiskey had so weakened their social fabric and physical strength 
that they required outside help. 
By 1877, the year the Commissioners came to the Treaty 7 area, many of the 
First Nations of the Blackfoot Confederacy of southern Alberta were ready to enter into 
Treaty with the British.  They hoped that by entering Treaty, they would be assured of 
the protection of the RCMP from their enemies and the assistance of the RCMP in 
driving out the whiskey traders that preyed on their susceptibility to alcohol and 
impoverished them in the trade of buffalo hides for whiskey.  Oddly, Treaty 7 is silent 
on the prohibition of alcohol on reserves, which illustrates the lack of mutual 
understanding. 
Chiefs whose Nations had not yet experienced the complete loss of the buffalo 
were opposed to signing the Treaty.  Crowfoot, having mixed feelings of his own, 
recognized that the presence of the police was a boon to his people, but he was also 
aware of the risk that Treaty 7 First Nations might be losing their territories and natural 
resources.  Speaking on behalf of all the Nations, Crowfoot accepted the terms of the 
Treaty as reported by Commissioner Laird: 
                                                 
15  See Figure 4-1 on page 90 for the map. 
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The plains are large and wide.  We are the children of the plains, it is our home, 
and the buffalo has been our food always.  I hope you look upon the Blackfeet, 
Bloods and Sarcees as your children now, and that you will be indulgent and 
charitable to them…The advice given me and my people has proved to be very 
good.  If the Police had not come to the country, where would we all be now?  
Bad men and whiskey were killing us so fast that very few, indeed, of us would 
have been left today.  The Police have protected us as the feathers of the bird 
protect it from the frosts of winter.  I wish them all good, and trust that all our 
hearts will increase in goodness from this time forward.   I am satisfied.  I will 
sign the treaty.”16 
Despite his acceptance of the Treaty, Crowfoot’s plea demonstrated his fears that the 
Treaty would result in great loss for Treaty 7 First Nations: 
Great Father!  Take pity on me with regard to my country, with regard to the 
mountains, the hills and the valleys; with regard to the prairies, the forests and 
the waters; with regard to all the animals that inhabit them, and do not take 
them from myself and my children for ever. (emphasis mine)17 
His impassioned plea, as recorded by Laird, was likely what prompted 
Lieutenant Governor David Laird’s assurance that the Band’s lands could not be taken 
without the consent of the Blackfoot people.  Governor Laird made no mention of 
whether ‘lands’ included waters on the land.  In his official report on treaty negotiations 
he explained: 
On Tuesday we met the Indians at the usual hour.  We further explained the 
terms outlined to them yesterday, dwelling especially upon the fact that by the 
Canadian Law their reserves could not be taken from them, occupied or sold, 
without their consent.(emphasis mine)18  
                                                 
16  Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians (Toronto, 1880:  
reprint Toronto, Coles, 1971) at 272 (Hereinafter, Morris). 
17  Father C. Scollen to Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Irvine, April 13, 1879, No. 14924 
in the Indian Affairs Archives, Ottawa, quoted in Hugh Dempsey, Crowfoot:  Chief of 
the Blackfeet (Halifax:  Goodread Biographies, 1988) at 105 (Hereinafter Dempsey). 
18  David Laird, Lieutenant Governor of the North-West Territories and Special 
Indian Commissioner, to unknown recipient, undated (ca October 1877) in Morris, supra 
note 15 at 257. 
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Lieutenant Colonel McLeod, Laird’s co-Commissioner, reiterated this promise during 
the closing ceremonies: 
The Chiefs all here know what I said to them three years ago when the police 
first came to the country – that nothing would be taken away from them without 
their own consent.  You all see today that what I told you was true…as surely 
as my past promises have been kept, so surely shall those made by the 
Commissioners be carried out in the future.  If they were broken I would be 
ashamed to meet you or look you in the face; but every promise will be 
solemnly fulfilled as certainly as the sun now shines down upon us from the 
heavens.19 
Father Scollen, who attended Treaty signing, questioned whether Treaty 7 First 
Nations fully comprehended the legal significance of the Treaty.  He believed that the 
signatories of the Treaty signed because they  
hoped that it simply meant to furnish them plenty of food and clothing, and 
particularly the former, every time they stood in need of them…Crowfoot, who, 
beyond a doubt, is considered the leading Chief of the Plains, did seem to have 
a faint notion of the meaning of the treaty…All the other Chiefs followed 
Crowfoot…20 
It is evident from the historical record that Crowfoot had the understanding that 
the Treaty was a pact between Nations ensuring that, not only would the Red Coats 
continue to protect their territories, but that the Queen would come to their aid as the 
buffalo disappeared, in exchange for opening their land to white settlement. 
2.2.1 Treaty 7 First Nations Understanding 
Oral history indicates that all of the First Nations at Blackfoot Crossing in 1877 
understood the Treaty to be a Treaty of Peace, putting an end to the whiskey trade and 
the heightened violence associated with alcohol consumption. Secondarily, it was a 
                                                 
19  Address by James F. Macleod, Lieutenant Colonel, North-West Mounted Police, 
and Special Indian Commissioner, to the Indians of Treaty 7, September 21, 1877, in 
Morris, supra note 15 at at 257. 
20  Father C. Scollen to Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Irvine, April 13, 1879, No. 14924 
in the Indian Affairs Archives, Ottawa, quoted in Dempsey, supra note 16 at 106. 
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Treaty to share their land in return for economic assistance in the form of annuities.21  
The Blackfoot Confederacy understanding of Treaty 7 is that it conferred shared 
jurisdiction over land and water for mutual beneficial use: 
We believed and understood [that we would] share this territory amongst each 
other and we also believed that the land could not be given away because of its 
sacredness; therefore, it did not belong to us or anybody else.  The earth is just 
put there by our creator for only our benefit and use.22 
The Treaty 7 First Nations signatories certainly did not understand the treaty to be a 
cession of their rights to their traditional lands and waters as is illustrated by the peace 
and good order clause in the treaty.  They interpreted the treaty as being an agreement to 
share the fruits of the land, but not the land itself.  The concept of surrendering land was 
foreign to the Bloods who tell a story about Red Crow’s offer to the Commissioners: 
At the signing of the treaty at Blackfoot Crossing, Red Crow pulled out the 
grass and gave it to the White officials and informed them that they will share 
the grass of the earth with them.  Then he took some dirt from the earth and 
informed them that they could not share this part of the earth and what was 
underneath it, because it was put there by the Creator for the Indians’ benefit 
and use.23 
They understood that they would continue to have jurisdiction over the land and waters 
and the right to hunt and that certain portions of their land would be set aside and 
protected for their use as cattle ranches and farms in the event that the buffalo 
disappeared. 
2.2.2 The Federal Crown’s perspective on the purpose of Treaty 7 
The Crown was driven to sign Treaties with the Blackfoot Confederacy by the 
desire to take control of the western frontier.  The Crown intended that southern Alberta 
                                                 
21  Treaty 7 Elders, supra note 7 at 113. 
22  Louise Crop Eared Wolf, Blood, Ibid. at 114. 
23  Louise Crop Eared Wolf, Blood, Treaty 7 Elders, supra note 7 at 114. 
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be put to similar uses as land south of the border that supported successful ranching 
operations.  The presence of American traders compromised Canadian sovereignty and 
Canada was required to show the strength of its forces to keep American expansion in 
check.  Part of MacDonald’s plan in uniting Canada and facilitating its settlement was to 
construct a transcontinental railway, thus opening the area to immigrant settlement, but 
first a series of Treaties with the Indians of the territory needed to be finalized to ensure 
the safety of European immigrants.24 
Besides securing peaceful settlement, treaty-making was viewed by the Crown as 
the final step in transferring of land for settlement to the Crown.  Although the Crown 
had purchased Rupertsland from the Hudson’s Bay Company by the Rupertsland 
Transfer Agreement, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 required that the Crown purchase 
the Indian interest in lands according to the prescribed process before subsequently 
granting those lands to settlers.  Although the language of the treaty is not the language 
of purchase, it does include the standard land cession clause found in all the numbered 
treaties, stating that the First Nation signatories: 
                                                 
24  As early as 1857, the British Government dispatched an expedition lead by 
Captain John Palliser to evaluate the economic potential of the lands between Red River 
and the Rocky Mountains.  The Canadian government likewise, in the same year, sent 
out Henry Youle Hind with a similar mandate.  Palliser and Hind determined that a 
fertile belt conducive to agriculture extended along the Red River and Assiniboine 
valleys and throughout the parkland region bordering the North Saskatchewan River.  
Palliser journeyed through the southern region in eastern Alberta during the middle of a 
drought cycle.  He described the treeless prairies as being too arid for agricultural 
development.  See Kinichi Matsui, Reclaiming Indian Waters:  Dams, Irrigation, and 
Indian Water Rights in Western Canada:  1858-1930, PhD. Thesis (Vancouver:  U.B.C., 
2003) at 32-33. 
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do hereby cede, release, surrender, and yield up to the Government of Canada 
for Her Majesty the Queen and her successors for ever, all their rights, titles, 
and privileges whatsoever to the lands included within the following limits…25 
The territory ceded is then described as land bounded by certain rivers and 
bodies of water, suggesting that the Treaty territory may differ from Aboriginal 
territories.  It is also unclear from the wording of the treaty that “rights, titles, and 
privileges” to water were ceded along with lands, a subject which will be dealt with 
below. 
In addition to acquiring territory, the Crown further intended to secure Indian 
livelihood rights.  In every territory entered by the Treaty Commissioners, the Indians 
voiced concerns for the loss of their traditional livelihood and for the means to make the 
transition to the new mode of living.  The Crown consistently assured the Indians of its 
intention to protect hunting, fishing, and trapping throughout the territory ceded 
excepting those lands “taken up” as well as to assist with securing a modern livelihood 
through farming. 
Treaty 7 was concluded the year following Treaty 6 “with a view to preserving 
the present friendly disposition of these tribes, which might easily give place to feelings 
of an unfriendly or hostile nature, should the treaty negotiations be much longer 
delayed.”26 The Crown’s intention can also be ascertained by the conduct of the parties 
after Treaty signing.  It is quite clear from the events immediately following the 
conclusion of Treaty 7 that one of the primary purposes of the Treaty was to assert 
British sovereignty in the west. 
                                                 
25  Treaty No. 7, made 22nd Sept., 1877, between her Majesty the Queen and the 
Blackfeet and other Indian Tribes, at the Blackfoot Crossing of the Bow River, Fort 
Macleod (Ottawa:  Queen’s Printer and controller of Stationery, 1966). 
26  Morris, supra note 15. 
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It appears that there is a common understanding between the Crown and Treaty 7 
First Nations that the primary purpose of Treaty 7 was to establish law and order in the 
North-West Territories and to create peace between warring nations.  With the Sioux 
uprising in the United States, Canada was afraid that war might likewise break out North 
of the 49th parallel.  Although requested at various times  to join the Sioux and the Cree 
in their campaign to wipe out the presence of Europeans, Crowfoot remained loyal to the 
Treaty of Peace signed in 1877 was able to restrain his young men from joining battle. 
In 1885, Treaty 7 First Nations were promised that the government would 
“always protect its faithful subjects, so long as they abided by the Treaty.”27  Crowfoot 
sent a telegram to Prime Minister MacDonald pledging his loyalty to the Crown.  
Clearly he viewed the Treaty as a solemn covenant for peaceful relations, not to be 
broken regardless of circumstances, as he was forced to choose between personal loyalty 
to his adopted son, Poundmaker, and political loyalty to the Crown: 
…Should any Indians come to our reserve and ask us to join them in war, we 
will send them away.  I have sent messengers to the Bloods and Piegans who 
belong to our treaty to tell them what we are doing and what we intend to do 
about the trouble…We will be loyal to the Queen whatever happens.28 
Clearly, one of the priorities of Treaty 7 First Nations at the time of Treaty was 
to secure their interests along the rivers that supplied them with their livelihood.   At the 
time of Treaty signing, Crowfoot suggested a common reserve for the Blackfoot, 
Bloods, and Sarcees.  He asked Colonel Macleod to set aside land twenty miles 
upstream from Blackfoot Crossing, extending two hundred miles down the Bow River to 
its confluence with the Red Deer, and passing through the best hunting territories on the 
                                                 
27  Calgary Herald, April 16, 1885 quoted in Dempsey, supra note 16 at 171. 
28  Crowfoot to Macdonald, April 11, 1885, in the Outgoing Telegrams from the 
North-West, 1885, at 107-108 quoted in Dempsey, supra note 16 at 172. 
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plains.  A similar plot of land on the south side of the Bow River was set aside for ten 
years, to prevent traders from camping too close to the Indians and to stop them from 
building hunting shacks along the river where the buffalo grazed.29  
It was some time before all the Treaty 7 First Nations settled on reserves.  By the 
winter of 1878-1879 there were not enough buffalo in Canada to support Treaty 7 First 
Nations.30  Edgar Dewdney responded to their request for assistance by bringing 
supplies to Blackfoot Crossing.  There he found “about 1,300 Indians in a very destitute 
condition, and many on the verge of starvation.”31  A number of them went south of the 
border in search of remaining buffalo, only to return to finally settle and try their hands 
at agriculture and ranching.  
It is clear from the written records that the government and Treaty 7 First 
Nations had the common intention of creating peace on the prairies, although each had 
their own reasons.  Both parties understood that a great change was about to take place 
and that a new relationship was required to move into a future of prosperity. It was also 
commonly understood that the finalization of a Treaty would open up the prairies of 
Southern Alberta to settlement.  In exchange for allowing peaceful settlement, Treaty 7 
First Nations were to receive assistance with pursuing both their traditional and modern 
livelihoods as they chose. 
                                                 
29  Ibid. at 104-105; the reserves were ultimately surveyed in their present locations.  
The government denied including the rivers in any of the reserves. 
30  Ibid. at 111. 
31  Report of Edgar Dewdney to the superintendent general of Indian Affairs, 
Ottawa, January 2, 1880, in Sessional Papers of Canada, 1880, No. 46, at 78. 
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2.3 Application of the Principles of Treaty Interpretation to Treaty 7 
When the principles of treaty interpretation are applied to Treaty 7 it is apparent 
that both the Crown and Treaty 7 First Nations intended to establish peaceful relations 
and protect First Nations livelihood, albeit they may have each had a different view in 
how these goals would be achieved.  First Nations did not have any intention of ceding 
Aboriginal title to their territories, as they did not believe they had the power to grant 
land that had been given to their ancestors by the Creator.  Given that the treaty terms 
must be interpreted in the sense that they would naturally have been understood by the 
Indians at the time of the signing,32 land cession could not have been a common 
intention of the parties. 
That being said, the Supreme Court stated clearly that the terms of the Treaty 
cannot be altered “[w]hile construing the language generously… by exceeding what “is 
possible on the language” or “realistic.”  However much First Nations may argue that 
Treaty 7 was not a land cession, the fact remains that the black letter of the treaty 
provided that the First Nations signatories have yielded up all their “rights titles and 
privileges” to the territories described.  Furthermore, an interpretation of the numbered 
treaties as being anything other than land cessions would shake the legal foundations 
upon which Alberta has established its rights to resources.  In theory, Treaties will be 
interpreted in a manner which maintains the integrity of the Crown.  The honour of the 
Crown is presumed and no appearance of “sharp dealing” will be sanctioned.  It could be 
argued that given the principle of the honour of the Crown, and the fact that there was no 
common understanding regarding land cession, Treaty 7 First Nations did not cede their 
                                                 
32  R. v. Badger, supra note 5 at para 52. 
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Aboriginal title.  However, practically speaking, while the cession clause of the treaty 
might be challenged, it is likely to be interpreted in such a way as to reconcile the 
divergent interpretations without challenging the validity of the land cession. 
One of the central disputes regarding treaty interpretation is over the allocation 
and use of natural resources, particularly water.  The oral history of Treaty 7 reveals that 
the Aboriginal signatories perceived treaty-making as a means of protecting their 
livelihood through the sharing of their lands and resources.  While the provincial 
government tends to argue that the treaty permits the taking up of lands for resource 
extraction, First Nations did not agree to allow the government to promote the depletion 
or degradation of water and aquatic ecosystems for the benefit of industrial or 
agricultural development.  An examination of the terms of Treaty 7 sheds light on the 
environmental and natural resource rights of Treaty 7 signatories. 
As discussed below, Treaty 7 did not extinguish Aboriginal rights, but rather 
protected Aboriginal practices, customs, and traditions exercised at the time of treaty-
making.  The Supreme Court has stated that these treaty-protected Aboriginal rights are 
dynamic and that the treaty protects traditional rights in their modern exercise.  
Identification of modern treaty rights involves determining what modern practice is an 
outgrowth of a Treaty right. 
3. Did Treaty 7 Extinguish Aboriginal Rights and Title to Water? 
To determine the effect of Treaty 7 on Aboriginal rights, it is necessary to apply 
two different tests:  One to examine whether Treaty 7 extinguished Aboriginal title, and 
one to assess the effect of Treaty 7 on Aboriginal rights. 
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3.1 Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title 
It has been argued that from First Nations’ perspectives, their sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over their lands were recognized and affirmed in making treaties with the 
Crown.  However, “[c]olonization theory interpreted the treaty purchases as 
extinguishing Aboriginal tenure and replacing it with Crown tenure.”33 Henderson, 
Benson, and Finlay have argued that 
The division of authority in the treaties between government and title reinforces 
the purpose of cession as a protective, not proprietary, nature.  The chiefs and 
headmen did not transfer all the interests in the land.34 
In coming to this conclusion the authors point out that British jurisprudence 
distinguishes the acquisition of territory, which is the subject matter of the right of 
sovereignty, from the acquisition of property, which is the subject matter of the right of 
ownership.  The language of the treaties does not lend itself to interpretations 
supporting the Crown’s acquisition of title and ownership, as there is no mention of 
“purchase.”  The Crown may have acquired territory under Treaty without acquiring 
property to the lands and waters, but even that is not clear from an Aboriginal 
perspective: 
…in the treaties the Aboriginal tribes did not agree to the Crown’s taking over 
their lands, nor did they agree to come under the control of the Crown.  Under 
the vague term “settlement,” there is no evidence in the treaty negotiation or 
text that the chiefs authorized the Crown to alienate their lands to others, or 
apply British land law within the ceded territory.  On this basis, the Crown had 
no authority to use the land as a market commodity in the absence of discussing 
rents and profits from the land settlement.35 
 
                                                 
33  J. Y. Henderson, M. L. Benson & I. M. Findlay, Aboriginal Tenure in the 
Constitution of Canada (Scarborough:  Carswell, 2000) at 436. 
34  Ibid. at 443. 
35  Ibid. at 441. 
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The source of Aboriginal title is the prior occupation of Canada by Aboriginal 
peoples.  It is a legal right arising from occupation and possession of lands prior to the 
assertion of British sovereignty which pre-dated colonization and survived European 
claims to sovereignty. 
Aboriginal title may only be extinguished by consent of First Nations.  This rule 
is derived from the common law36 and reinforced by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
which required that Indian lands be ceded collectively, willingly, and only to the Crown 
at a public meeting held for that purpose.  The numbered treaties followed this formula, 
however, it is not clear from the reports of the treaty commissioners that it was always 
understood by First Nations that they were giving up their Aboriginal title to their lands. 
Treaty 7 First Nations understood the primary purpose of Treaty 7 was to 
peacefully share the land with in-coming settlers.  However, the British focus of the 
written Treaty 7 was the standard land cession clause: 
…the Blackfeet, Blood, Piegan, Sarcee, Stony and other Indians inhabiting the 
district hereinafter more fully described and defined, do hereby cede, release, 
surrender, and yield up to the Government of Canada for Her Majesty the 
Queen and her successors for ever, all their rights, titles, and privileges 
whatsoever to the lands... 
3.1.1 Test for Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title 
It is usually taken for granted that this clause of the numbered treaties effectively 
extinguished Aboriginal title to land and waters appurtenant thereto based on the 
assumption that the very broadly-worded “cede, release and surrender” provision in the 
Treaties included rights to the beds of watercourses, despite the fact that water rights are 
                                                 
36  St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. R. (1877), 13 S.C.R. 577 at 612-13; 
Calder v. A.G.B.C. (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 at 192 (S.C.C.). 
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not expressly mentioned, and despite the paucity of evidence that Aboriginal peoples 
intended to forever give up “all their rights title, privileges, whatsoever.”37 
There are several cases considering the 1923 treaties which decided that the 
“basket clause” or “cede, release, surrender” was effective.  The signatories of the 1923 
treaty were entirely competent and completely aware that the treaty was a land cession.  
The same could not be said about Treaty 7.  The oral and written record shows that 
Crowfoot and Redcrow specifically requested that the land not be taken from them 
forever and either did not understand the effect of signing the treaty, or did not agree to 
land cession:  They understood the treaty as an agreement for sharing the resources of 
the land.  Moreover, Treaty 7 First Nations were not capable of making such a cession 
under their own legal systems. 
According to the principles in Delgamu’ukw,38 the treaty-making legal traditions 
of the Blackfoot confederacy must be given equal weight with the common law.  Treaty 
7 First Nations perceive Treaty 7 as setting the framework for sharing First Nations 
lands and resources and the Crown’s wealth without compromising their legal interests.  
Their understanding that they would retain jurisdiction over their lands is reflected in 
last article of the treaty wherein the Blackfoot Confederacy agreed to “strictly observe 
this Treaty, and also to conduct and behave themselves as good and loyal subjects of Her 
Majesty the Queen.”  Furthermore, they promised to 
obey and abide by the Law, that they will maintain peace and good order 
between each other and between themselves and other tribes of Indians, and 
                                                 
37  Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 71 (QL); 2005 SCC 69 at para 2; Badger, supra note 5; R. v. Sundown, [1999] 
1 S.C.R. 393; [1999] S.C.J. No.13 (QL). 
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between themselves and others of Her Majesty's subjects…and that they will 
assist the officers of Her Majesty in bringing to justice and punishment any 
Indian offending against the stipulations of this Treaty, or infringing the laws in 
force in the country so ceded. 
Even if Treaty 7 First Nations accepted the assertion of Crown sovereignty, 
which is not supported by either the written or oral record, the Chiefs retained 
jurisdiction, including the power to make and enforce the law, throughout their 
territories.  The Crown’s view of complete surrender of all legal rights is inherently 
incompatible with Treaty 7 First Nations’ view of the treaty. 
It is evident from Alberta water policies and regulations that the provincial 
Crown takes the position that the cession clause was effective in extinguishing all 
Aboriginal title, and specifically title to the waterbeds, in the “tracts surrendered.”  
However, in applying the principles of treaty interpretation which require common 
intent and understanding, we can conclude that there was no shared intent with regard to 
the surrender of lands and resources.    
3.1.2 Did the Cession of Land Include Title to the Riverbeds? 
Assuming that Treaty 7 did result in a land cession to the crown, at the time of 
Treaty, two presumptions may have operated, unbeknownst to Treaty 7 First Nations, 
affecting their interests in the rivers and waters upon which they relied.  At common law 
it was presumed that a general transfer included all waters appurtenant to the land unless 
expressly excluded, and transfers of land along rivers included the bed of the rivers ad 
medium filum aquae.  The provincial and federal governments take the position that 
Treaty 7 extinguished Aboriginal title to water and the waterbeds and that the riverbeds 
do not form part of the reserves. 
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Whether the date of assertion of sovereignty was 1763, 1869 or 1877, the 
common law at the time of assertion of British sovereignty was that riparian owners 
owned the beds of streams ad medium filum aquae.  Assuming that the common law 
applied without exception at the time of Treaty 7, title to waterbeds was either not ceded 
by Treaty, or if it was, reserves included waterbeds ad medium filum aquae.39 
3.1.3 Title to Water, Waterbeds and Watercourses Runs Separately from the land 
Even if Treaty 7 did effect the cession of land, Supreme Court decisions 
regarding land transfers suggest that title to the waters and waterbeds may not have been 
included with the ceded land.  If Aboriginal title to water runs separately from the land, 
Aboriginal title to water and waterbeds may continue to exist independent of Aboriginal 
title to land generally and title to Treaty 7 reserves. 
However, there is a common law presumption that a general conveyance of land 
passes all interests except those specifically reserved in the deed or transfer.  In 
Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada40 the Supreme Court rejected the Crown’s main 
argument that “the mineral rights were transferred, not because anyone intended them to 
be transferred, but by reason of the presumption of law that a general conveyance of 
land passes all interests except those specifically reserved in the deed or transfer 
(emphasis mine).”41  McLachlin J. noted mineral rights can be severed from surface 
rights or realty and form the basis of a separate chain of title.  Because water is 
                                                 
39  The question of whether treaty reserves include the riverbeds is dealt with more 
fully below. 
40  [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 193, [1996] 2 C.N.L.R. 25, 190 N.R. 89, 
102 F.T.R. 160. 
41  Ibid. 
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analogous to oil, the ruling in Blueberry would suggest that Aboriginal title to water may 
not have passed in the general land cession, without intention to doso. 
Parliament passed the Northwest Irrigation Act42 in 1894, fully seventeen years 
after Treaty 7 was signed, severing riparian lands from rights to water, preferring instead 
to allocate water through a water licencing system based on prior appropriation.  The 
British common law presumption at the time of Treaty was that the waterbed passed 
with the land to the centre of the stream.43  Although there is no agreement as to whether 
the common law applied to the then Northwest Territories, particularly in relation to 
navigable streams, the courts of Alberta have applied this presumption to non-navigable 
streams in the province.44   Assuming that Treaty 7 was a land cession treaty and that 
this common law principle can be applied to land cessions by First Nations, the 
reference in the “cede, release and surrender” provision to “all rights, titles and 
privileges whatsoever to the lands” would be deemed to include not only cession of the 
land itself, but the waters appurtenant to lands surrendered.   Likewise, reserve lands set 
aside would have included riverbeds ad medium filum aquae. 
This presumption has since been denied in Nikal45, where the Court held that the 
common law presumption did not apply and the presumption ad medium filum aquae did 
not apply to navigable streams.  While this case is distinguishable, it raises the issue of 
when the common law presumption applied to transfers of land at the time of treaty.  It 
would appear from the text of Treaty 7 that the Crown recognized First Nations rights to 
                                                 
42  S.C. 1894, c.30. 
43  Johnston v. O’Neill, [1911] A.C. 552 (H.L.). 
44  Flewelling v. Johnston (1921), 59 D.L.R. 419 (Alta. S.C., A.D.), [1921] 2 
W.W.R. 374. 
45  R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013; [1996] S.C.J. No. 47 (QL). 
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the riverbed and waters when it expressly reserved the right of navigation as a separate 
right.  If the presumption ceased to apply after Treaty 7, the Crown may have obtained 
title to the riverbeds ad medium filum aquae and reserves boundaries would have 
extended ad medium filum aquae.  If the presumption ceased to apply before Treaty 7, 
the Crown would have already assumed title of navigable streams.  This seems to 
directly conflict with the Blackfoot Confederacy’s understanding of the Treaty. 
Delgamuukw, Guerin, and more recently, Osoyoos46, confirm that Aboriginal 
title to traditional lands and title to reserve lands are to be treated the same way.  
Delgamuukw further establishes that the statutory regime governing reserve lands is 
relevant to defining the nature and content of Aboriginal title generally,47 and that 
Aboriginal title includes mineral title, although mineral title runs separately from title to 
land.  By analogy, Aboriginal title also includes title to waterbeds and waters, despite the 
fact that such title is severable from title to the land. 
In Blueberry, the Supreme Court held that First Nations’ intentions regarding the 
surrender of mineral rights must be clear and based on full, free and informed consent.  
McLachlin J. emphasized that the evidence in that case established that mineral rights 
had never been mentioned or considered by the Band in relation to the transaction in 
question.  The failure of the conveyance document to exclude mineral rights constituted 
a weak and ultimately insufficient evidentiary basis for finding that the Band had the 
necessary intention to surrender its mineral title.  The Court stated that when “the written 
                                                 
46  Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town), [2001] S.C.J. No. 82; 2001 SCC 85; 
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 746. 
47 As seen in the passage from Delgamuukw quoted earlier, Lamer C.J. expressly 
referred to the Blueberry decision and the Court’s reliance on the Indian Act in that case 
to bolster his own use of the Indian Oil and Gas Act as a basis for concluding that the 
Aboriginal interest in reserve lands includes mineral rights. 
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source is silent where one would have expected clear wording” to transfer title, and “the 
oral testimony establishes that the issue was never even discussed”, this silence, “cannot 
be evidence of intention” to cede their title.48 
The Treaty was silent regarding the transfer of water and it appears from the oral 
testimony that the transfer of the waters and waterbeds was never discussed.   McLachlin 
J.’s observations in Blueberry that “the Indians were unsophisticated and may not have 
fully understood the concept of different interests in land and how they might be lost,” 
and that “they were never advised of the transfer of [their] mineral rights” are also 
directly pertinent to the issue of title to water at the time of Treaty.  The Court’s 
insistence in Blueberry on an express and independent surrender of mineral title rejects 
any presumption that a generally-framed surrender of all interests in traditional lands 
necessarily includes water which, like minerals, attach to the land.  
In the Osoyoos case, land had been removed from the reserve under s.35 of the 
Indian Act to build a canal for the neighboring town.  That section allowed the 
expropriation of Indian lands in the public interest.  One of the questions before the 
Court was what interest in land had actually been transferred, as the Order in Council 
effecting the transfer had been vague and ambiguous.  The majority of the Supreme 
Court clearly affirmed Delgamu’ukw’s earlier holding that Aboriginal title and the 
Aboriginal interest in reserve land are equal and “in a category of their own,” being “sui 
generis interests in land that are distinct from ‘normal’ proprietary interests.”49  
Furthermore, “traditional principles of the common law relating to property may not be 
helpful in the context of aboriginal interests in land.”  Because reserve land does not fit 
                                                 
48 Emphasis added. 
49  Osoyoos supra note 45. 
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neatly within the rationale underlying the law of compulsory takings, and because the 
Aboriginal interest in land has important cultural components, courts must “ ‘go beyond 
the usual restrictions imposed by the common law,’ in order to give effect to the true 
purpose of dealings relating to reserve land”.50  Moreover, because the Crown owes a 
fiduciary duty to the band, a clear and plain intention to remove lands from the reserve 
must be evident.  The Court concluded, applying the principle of minimal impairment, 
that although there had been a transfer in the interest in land, it amounted to the granting 
of a statutory easement, leaving the canal lands “in the reserve.” 
A number of key propositions emerge from the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Delgamuukw, Blueberry and Osoyoos that suggest that Aboriginal title to water was not 
extinguished by Treaty 7.  Among other things these cases demonstrate that 
extinguishment of title to water and waterbeds must be clear, express, and based on full, 
free, and informed consent.  Furthermore, these case demonstrate that clear words 
specific to extinguishment of title to water is required:  General language and the fact 
that the matter was never discussed cannot be taken as evidence of the intention to 
extinguish title to water.  Finally, it is clear from these cases that First Nations’ intention 
must be considered.  At the time of Treaty, Treaty Seven First Nations would have relied 
on their own legal tradition of Treaty-making and would not have appreciated the British 
common law relating to land transfers. 
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Woven together, these various threads from recent Supreme Court of Canada 
jurisprudence provide a strong basis for challenging the effectiveness of the “cede, 
release and surrender” provisions in extinguishing Aboriginal title to water. 
3.2 Extinguishment of Aboriginal Rights 
The Court in Sparrow, adopted the test for extinguishment stated by Hall J. in 
Calder51: The Crown has the onus to prove that it was Sovereign’s clear and plain 
intention to extinguish an Aboriginal right prior to 1982.52  Aboriginal rights may have 
been extinguished by treaty provided this test has been met.  As discussed below, Treaty 
7 does not meet the test of clear and plain intent to extinguish Aboriginal water rights 
and title to water in their entirety.  The question is, then what Aboriginal and treaty 
rights to water continue to exist after Treaty 7 and did subsequent legislation or Crown 
policy extinguish them in part or in whole? 
There is no clear and plain intention in Treaty 7 to limit or extinguish Blackfoot 
uses of water.  In Adams, the Crown relied on the surrender of lands around the fishing 
area as demonstrating “clear and plain” intention to extinguish the Aboriginal right to 
fish.  The Court found this evidence to be insufficient proof.53  In coming to this 
decision, the Court explained that the surrender of proprietary interests in the land is 
separate from “the free-standing aboriginal right to fish for food which existed in the 
waters adjacent to those lands.” 54 
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There is no evidence to suggest what the parties to the surrender agreement, 
including the Crown, intended with regards to the right of the Mohawks to fish 
in the area; absent such evidence the Sparrow test for extinguishment cannot be 
said to have been met.” 55 
Thus Aboriginal rights, that have their roots in pre-contact distinctive Aboriginal 
practices, customs, and traditions, may exist independent of land cession Treaties.  
Aboriginal rights to water, in so far as they are related to Aboriginal practices, customs, 
and traditions, may continue to exist as free-standing rights in the wake of 
extinguishment of title to the beds of lakes and watercourses.  Aboriginal rights and title 
may have survived Treaty 7 and may have been afforded more protection under treaty.  
Furthermore, Treaty 7 may have created new rights for Aboriginal signatories or altered 
existing rights.  The only way to ascertain what rights existed after entering into Treaty 
is to inquire into the meaning of Treaty 7. 
4. Rights to Water Under Treaty 7 
As set out in the previous chapter, the Blackfoot Confederacy possessed 
Aboriginal rights to draw water from rivers and streams for drinking, washing, tanning 
hides, watering horses, and other domestic purposes prior to entering into Treaty.  They 
also possessed the right to use the waters for transportation and for ceremonial purposes.  
All of these uses of water supported their Aboriginal lifestyle as buffalo hunters on the 
plains.  Furthermore, it was determined in the previous chapter that the Blackfoot 
Confederacy had Aboriginal title to the waters within their Aboriginal territories. 
Water rights and their cession or retention, with the exception of the Queen’s 
right of navigation, were not clearly enumerated in the written terms of Treaty 7. Water, 
essential to all life, was a necessity to ensuring both parties’ prosperity.  The Crown 
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must have intended to use water for future developments, such as irrigation and 
transportation, and First Nations must have assumed that they would continue to have 
unfettered access to the rivers, streams, and ground-water that nourished them and their 
stock since time immemorial.  Failure to directly address the issue of the transfer of 
water raises a question about the lack of shared intent and the meaning of Treaty rights 
to water.  Complete silence on the issue of water implies that no agreement with regard 
to water was reached, unless it can be inferred that references to lands included the 
waters appurtenant to them. 
To ascertain the nature of Treaty 7 promises relating to water rights, it is 
necessary to apply the principles of Treaty interpretation.  Assuming that waters were 
included in references to land, extinguishment of Aboriginal title to the waters may be 
reasonably incidental to the extinguishment of Aboriginal title to the land under the 
territorial clause.  However, a right to use of or access to water may be reasonably 
incidental to the livelihood rights guaranteed under Treaty.56 
The Crown is obligated by its honour to fulfill its promises: 
the honour of the Crown was pledged to the fulfilment of its obligations to the 
Indians. This had been the Crown's policy as far back as the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, and is manifest in the promises recorded in the report of 
the Commissioners.57 
Among the promises made relating to water resources were: livelihood rights, 
hunting rights, and the right to a reserve. 
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4.1 The Treaty Right to a Livelihood 
It is clear that the protection of livelihood rights formed part of the common 
intention of the parties during Treaty negotiations.  The written terms of Treaty 7 
included specific, but regulated, protection of the “avocation of hunting” and the 
promise of assistance with agricultural pursuits.  Reserves were created to protect the 
traditional livelihood of Treaty 7 First Nations. 
Brian Slattery argues that  
Where a treaty recognizes and guarantees aboriginal rights, it does not convert 
them into treaty rights, in the absence of very clear language to that effect.  
Treaty rights throw a protective mantle over aboriginal rights, providing an 
extra layer of security.  The latter become “treaty-protected” aboriginal 
rights…(emphasis added)58 
Far from extinguishing rights to exercise Aboriginal practices, customs, and traditions, 
Treaty 7 cast a “protective mantle” over Aboriginal rights, including the right to use 
water. 
4.1.1 The Treaty Right to a Traditional Livelihood 
The traditional livelihood rights of Treaty 7 First Nations were protected under 
Treaty 7.  Commissioner Laird reported “They were also assured that their liberty of 
hunting over the open prairie would not be interfered with, so long as they did not 
molest settlers and others in the country.”59  To protect Treaty 7 first Nations’ livelihood 
rights, Laird promised that “the Great Mother” would pass a law “to prevent them from 
                                                 
58  Simon, supra note 55 at 812-16; Marshall, supra note 4 at para 47; Brian 
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at  210. 
59  Report by David Laird, Lieutenant-Governor and Special Indian Commissioner, 
in Morris, supra note 15 at 257. 
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being destroyed.”60  The written Treaty promised First Nations “the right to pursue their 
vocations of hunting throughout the Tract surrendered” albeit “subject to such 
regulations as may, from time to time, be made by the Government of the country.”  
Hunting rights would not extend to “such Tracts as may be required or taken up from 
time to time for settlement, mining, trading or other purposes” by the Government. 
The Commissioners, in promising to protect Treaty 7 First Nations’ traditional 
livelihood by buffalo hunting, appear to have anticipated the end of intensive buffalo 
hunting as the primary means of livelihood.  Annuities, relief rations, and ammunition 
were meant to sustain Treaty 7 First Nations in their traditional livelihood for the short 
term while they made the transition to agrarian farming.61 
It follows that rights such as the right to hunt and the right to a livelihood were 
afforded added protection by the Treaty.  It matters little that part of the government’s 
“game plan” in affording Treaty protection to Aboriginal rights was to persuade First 
Nations to embrace civilization and to force them to settle on reserves in an effort to 
transform them into yeoman farmers.62  If the Aboriginal right to hunt is a “treaty-
protected” Aboriginal right, Treaty 7 First Nations have incidental rights to access and 
use water, regardless of whether the waterbeds were ‘ceded’, to enable them to exercise 
their right to hunt.  Such uses would include transportation, drinking, and other domestic 
                                                 
60  Report from the Globe correspondent (17October 1877) in Morris, supra note 15 
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uses.  It may be further argued that the aquatic environment must be of such a quality as 
to sustain wildlife that would ensure the continuing viability of Treaty 7 First Nations 
hunting lifestyle.  If the water is so contaminated as to destroy the livelihood of First 
Nations, this may constitute a breach of the Blackfoot Confederacy’s treaty-protected 
aboriginal right to hunt. 
4.1.2 The Treaty Right to a Modern Livelihood 
The British written accounts of the Treaty clearly indicate the intention of First 
Nations and the Crown to establish cattle ranching and agricultural operations along the 
rivers chosen by Treaty 7 First Nations and to facilitate the continuation of traditional 
hunting, and trapping practices along river valleys. 
Despite the promise to protect Indian traditional livelihood, the Commissioners 
were aware that the days of buffalo hunting were numbered. They expanded their 
promise to include a commitment to help the Indians in making the transition to a new 
mode of livelihood, specifically ranching: 
But in a very few years the buffalo will probably be all destroyed, and for this 
reason the Queen wishes to help you to live in the future in some other way.  
She wishes you to allow her white children to come and live on your land and 
raise cattle, and should you agree to this she will assist you to raise cattle and 
grain, and thus give you the means of living when the buffalo are no more. 
The written terms of the Treaty indicate that the intention was to establish ranches and 
farms on reserve.63 
Minister of the Interior, Hon. David Mills in his Annual Report for 1877 
speculated that the First Nations within Treaty 7 territory “are unlikely to become 
farmers, but as the country they inhabit presents unusual facilities for that industry, they 
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may be induced to adopt a pastoral life. They already possess large herds of horses, and 
may be taught to raise cattle also.”64 
Laird reported that cattle ranching would likely succeed in the Treaty 7 territory: 
The land around the fort, and indeed for almost the whole distance between the 
Bow and Old Man’s Rivers, is well adapted for grazing; and where cultivation 
has been fairly attempted this season, grain and vegetables have been a 
success.65 
Shortly after signing the treaty, the government breached the treaty promise to 
assist Treaty 7 First Nations in making the transition to self-sustaining farmers and 
ranchers.  When they were experiencing their greatest desperate need Dewdney advised 
them to go into the United States in search of buffalo: 
I advised them strongly to go and gave them some provisions to take them off.  
They continued to follow the Buffalo further and further south until they 
reached the main herd and there they remained…I consider their remaining 
away saved the Govt. $100,000 at least.66 
A few weeks after their return to Canada, Crowfoot resigned himself and his 
people to the agricultural way of life. 
The Treaty Commissioners had undertaken to “encourage the practice of 
agriculture among the Indians” and to assist in the development of a ranching and 
farming economy. The terms of Treaty 7 and the facts surrounding the establishment of 
Treaty 7 reserves strongly suggest that the Crown intended to provide lands suitable for 
agricultural purposes to assist Treaty 7 First Nations in making the transition from a 
subsistence livelihood to agriculture.  Without access to the waters of the rivers, most of 
the land within the reserves would not be suitable for agriculture.  Therefore, it is 
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reasonable to conclude that Treaty 7, by implication, secures water rights for agricultural 
and ranching purposes as well as a sufficient quantity of water to irrigate reserve lands. 
4.2 The Treaty Right to a Reserve 
The right to a reserve was a new right created by Treaty 7, the purpose of which 
is closely connected to the livelihood rights protected under treaty.  Reserves were 
created in part to encourage First Nations to make the transition from buffalo hunters to 
settled farmers and ranchers.  While the right to hunt requires a supply of clean water 
and a healthy aquatic and riparian environment to facilitate resource use, the right to a 
reserve implies a proprietary interest in the bed of watercourses. This proprietary interest 
is sui generis in nature, but may be similar to that of common law riparian owners.  If 
that is the case, First Nations may have a more solid and direct right to the undisturbed 
quality, quantity, and flow of water on reserve.  The question remains whether reserve 
lands include ownership of the bed of the river ad medium filum aquae.  
4.2.1 The Treaty Right to Water Appurtenant to a Reserve 
Treaty 7 First Nations maintain that their reserves include the rivers running 
appurtenant to them.  The Crown, however, surveyed Treaty 7 reserves so as to exclude 
the rivers.  By applying the principles of Treaty interpretation it is possible to determine 
the purpose of establishing the reserves in Treaty 7 territory and to ascertain whether 
reserves included sui generis or riparian ownership of the waterbeds appurtenant to the 
reserve.  “[T]he wording of the Treaty, the record of negotiations and the surrounding 
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historical context” are essential to determining the common intention of the parties in 
setting aside reserves at the time the treaties were negotiated and executed.67 
At the time of Treaty, Commissioner Laird had promised that “a reserve of land 
will be set apart for yourselves and your cattle, upon which none others will be 
permitted to encroach…”68  The Commissioner’s Report indicates that the Indians were 
aware of their continuing need for an adequate water supply for various purposes.  In 
allotting the reserves, Lieut.-Col. McLeod spoke to the Chiefs at their camps and they 
chose the localities of their reserves.69  Significantly, each Treaty 7 First Nation chose a 
locality along a river.  Their choice of land and the rivers running appurtenant to them 
were inferentially entered into the Treaty document by their choice of reserve lands. 
Clearly, water rights were crucial to the establishment of agriculture and 
ranching.  A.S. Williams, in his capacity as a legal officer,70 wrote to Duncan Campbell 
Scott recommending recognition of on-reserve water rights: 
the rights of Indians in Canada to have water for domestic, agricultural and 
irrigation purposes must practically stand upon the same footing as that of the 
Indians of the Unites States…The avowed purpose of the Crown when making 
treaties with Indians, as shown by the policy of this treatment of them 
extending over many years, was and is to encourage Indians in habit of industry 
and to induce them to engage in pastural [sic] pursuits and in the cultivation of 
the soil in order that they may not only become self-supporting but that they 
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para 154. 
68  It was not until 1881, upon returning starving and disappointed from chasing 
diminishing buffalo herds, that Crowfoot and the Blackfoot were finally ready to choose 
and settle on their reserve: Indian Agent N.T. Macleod to Lieutenant Governor 
Dewdney, Fort Macleod, June 1, 1881, in the Blood Correspondence, Vol. 1, 89. 
69  Morris, supra note 15 at 259. 
70  A.S. Williams later became Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs. 
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may eventually take up the habits and busy themselves with the enterprise of 
civilized people…71 
Early in the development of water law in the west, H. W. Grunsky, legal advisor for the 
Dominion Water Power Branch concluded that it was: 
fair to assume that when the Indian reserves were created, waters required by 
the Indians for domestic, irrigation, and other purposes went with the lands, 
irrespective of any provincial statutes relating to the recording of water 
rights.(emphasis mine)72 
Treaty 7 is silent on the issue of whether the area of land set aside for Treaty 7 
First Nations reserves included the beds of the rivers.  The written treaty expressly 
delegated or reserved to the Crown “the right to navigate the above mentioned rivers, to 
land and receive fuel cargos on the shores and banks thereof, to build bridges and 
establish ferries thereon, to use the fords thereof…” The necessary implication to be 
drawn from this language is that the Crown intended to use the rivers for navigation 
purposes, but it is not clear that the bed of the rivers were granted as part of the 
Blackfoot, Blood, and Sarcee reserves.  Similar clauses were not included for the rivers 
of appurtenant to the Peigan or Stoney reserves.  The absence of clear language in the 
treaty implies that the English drafters did not intend to exclude the beds of the rivers 
from the reserve.  The only clear intention is that the Crown use the river for navigation, 
construction of bridges, or other such purposes.  The contra proferentum rule of 
construction set out by the Supreme Court in Nowegijick supports the idea that, if the 
Crown had intended to exclude the bed of the Bow River from the reserve, it would have 
stated this intention in clear and express terms in the treaty.  Moreover, it is an 
                                                 
71  A.S. Williams to Duncan Campbell Scott, 27 July 1920, RG10, vol. 3660, File 
9755-4. 
72  Grunsky to Challies, 5 September 1919, RG10, vol. 3660, File 9755-4. 
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established principle of Treaty interpretation that any ambiguity in the survey documents 
must be resolved in favour of Treaty 7 First Nations. 
4.2.1.1 The Effect of the Common Law Rule of ad medium filum aquae 
It may be anticipated that Nikal and Lewis73 will be used to refute the argument 
that reserves include title to the riverbeds of navigable streams.  These cases applied the 
ad medium filum aquae presumption to the creation of reserves.  It is a common law rule 
by which ownership of the bed of non-tidal river or stream belongs in equal halves to the 
owners of riparian lands.  The English common law rule is as follows: 
... the owner of land through which a non-tidal stream flows owns the bed of 
the stream unless it has been expressly or impliedly reserved; and if the stream 
forms the boundary between lands owned by different persons, each proprietor 
owns the bed of the river ad medium filum aquae -- to the centre thread of the 
stream.74 
In Lewis, the Court considered whether the Squamish River was included within 
the boundaries of the reserve and concluded that it was not, having considered that it 
was the Crown’s policy to treat Indians and non-Indians equally as to the use of the 
water and not to grant exclusive use of any public waters for the purpose of fishing.  The 
ad medium filum aquae presumption did not apply to the creation of the reserve because 
it does not apply in western Canada to navigable rivers.   
In R. v. Nikal,75 the Supreme Court considered whether an Indian reserve 
spanning both sides of a river, non-navigable at the site of the reserve, included the bed 
of the river ad medium filum aquae.  The Court concluded that the presumption ad 
                                                 
73  R. v. Lewis, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 921; [1996] S.C.J. No. 46 (QL). 
74  G. V. La Forest, Water Law in Canada: The Atlantic Provinces, Dept. of 
Regional Economic Expansion (1973) at pp. 241-42 (Hereinafter LaForest). 
75  R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013; [1996] S.C.J. No. 47 (QL). 
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medium filum aquae could not apply to navigable rivers in Canada because Crown title 
superseded private rights where waterways were used for public navigation.  The Court 
reasoned that courts in western Canada had not applied the presumption ad medium 
filum aquae to navigable rivers as a matter of policy.  The Court accepted the argument 
that title to the waterbeds of navigable waters vested in the Crown from at least 1869, 
even without first extinguishing Aboriginal title.76  The Court justified exemption of 
navigable waters from the common law rule stating that: 
In a country occupied from the earliest days by hunters, trappers, fishers and 
traders whose main and almost exclusive highways were the rivers and streams, 
such laws were contrary to the requirements and necessities of the whole 
community.77 
Without any consideration of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 which requires 
cession of Aboriginal title to the Crown by Treaty, the Court declared that, “In this 
country the public right of navigation and of fishery in all navigable waters has always 
existed and been recognised.  The Court reasoned that public rights in all navigable 
rivers “have been deemed always existent in the Crown ex jure naturae, so that the title 
in the bed thereof remained in the Crown after it had made grants of land bordering upon 
the banks of such rivers, the doctrine of ad medium filum aquae not applying thereto.” 78  
So long as the waters “are navigable in fact, whether or not the waters are tidal or non-
tidal, the public right of navigation exists” as is the case for the Oldman River. 79 
                                                 
76  Re Iverson and Greater Winnipeg Water District, (1921), 57 D.L.R. 184 at 202-
203. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Ibid. 
79  Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport) [1992] 1 
S.C.R. 3, at p. 54 per La Forest J. 
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To assess navigability, the entire length of the river from its mouth to the point 
where its navigability terminates must be considered.80  A whole river or lake may be 
regarded as navigable “even though at some point navigation may be impossible or 
possible only for small craft by reason of rapids or shoals.”81  The court concluded in 
applying this criteria, where a river is navigable, the ad medium filum aquae 
presumption has no application.  “On this basis alone” the Court felt that “it can be 
concluded that reserve does not include the river.”82 
Nikal presents some problems for Treaty 7 First Nations, however it may be 
distinguished.  First, Nikal was decided in the context of an Aboriginal right to fish in an 
area not covered by treaty:  The lands and rivers described fell outside the boundaries of 
Rupertsland, the territory covered by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and a reserve had 
been granted without first extinguishing Aboriginal title to the land.  Therefore, the 
Court did not explore First Nations understanding by applying the principles of treaty 
interpretation and considering the historical context or the common intention of the 
parties regarding the protection of Aboriginal rights to livelihood and water use.  
Second, although an argument was made that the reserve included title to the 
riverbed ad medium filum aquae, the Court did not apply full analysis of the existence of 
Aboriginal title, nor did the Court consider how exemption from the common law 
presumption served to reconcile pre-sovereignty occupation by Aboriginal people with 
the sovereignty of the Crown.  The framework for analysis of Aboriginal title claims was 
not released by the Supreme Court of Canada until two years later in the Delgamu’ukw 
                                                 
80  Nikal, supra note 74 at para 73. 
81  LaForest, supra 73 note at 181. 
82  Nikal, supra note 74 at para 74. 
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decision.  It can only be hoped that, had Nikal been decided after Delgamu’ukw, it would 
have at least recognized the possibility of unextinguished Aboriginal title to the riverbed. 
Nikal and Lewis may summarize the Crown’s intent to assert sovereignty over 
navigable streams, but these cases did not consider the continuing jurisdiction of First 
Nations over their territories.  Treaty 7 First Nations specifically allowed the right of 
navigation to the Queen without surrendering jurisdiction.  Furthermore, the North-West 
Territories Act may have exempted Canada from applying the common law rule of ad 
medium filum aquae in Canada, but that Act was passed a full eleven years after Treaty 7 
was signed and after most if, not all, of the reserve lands were surveyed. 
These considerations, coupled with the contra preferendum rule, raise the 
question of whether the Crown would have been legally capable of excluding the rivers 
from the reserves when they were surveyed.  If Treaty 7 First Nations understood that 
their livelihood would be protected by the creation of reserves, and if their livelihood 
depended in large part on the availability of water for hunting, farming, and ranching, 
and if they specifically chose their reserves along certain rivers (as was the case for 
Crowfoot who initially chose a reserve along the Bow), then the riverbeds and waters 
cannot be excluded from the reserves. 
4.2.2 The Crown’s Assumption of Title to Navigable Streams 
As discussed above, the Crown may have acquired rights in territory without 
acquiring rights in property.  The language of Treaty 7 indicates that the treaty officially 
granted the Queen and her subjects the right of navigation without granting title to the 
rivers and waterbeds.  Treaty 7 clearly distinguishes the right of navigation from title to 
the rivers: 
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...reserving to Her Majesty, as may now or hereafter be required by Her for the 
use of Her Indian and other subjects, from all the Reserves hereinbefore 
described, the right to navigate the above mentioned rivers, to land and receive 
fuel cargoes on the shores and banks thereof, to build bridges and establish 
ferries thereon, to use the fords thereof and all the trails leading thereto…83 
The black letter of the Treaty appears to reinforce the continuing existence of Aboriginal 
title to waterbeds and waterways. 
It could be argued that exclusive ownership of navigable waterways would be 
difficult to prove given Canada’s long history of traders and travelers employing the 
natural waterways as highways of commerce.84  Research would be required to inquire 
further into the extent that the waters of Southern Alberta were used as public highways.  
It would appear from the historical record that the preferred mode of transportation of 
the Blackfoot was by horseback, as horses allowed them to follow the movements of the 
buffalo.85  The Hudson’s Bay Company did not have a strong presence in Southern 
Alberta, the traders doing business with First Nations, at least before the presence of the 
N.W.M.P., were transient American traders.  Even after forts were established on the 
prairies, supplies were brought in overland to the Forts by Metis freighters traveling with 
Red River carts. 
The assertion of British sovereignty in Canada, assuming it was 1869, the year 
Rupertsland was transferred to Canada, pre-dates the use of navigable waters as public 
highways.  Even if the date of the assertion of sovereignty is as late as 1877, the date of 
Treaty, navigable streams were not used as public highways, except for use in the fur 
                                                 
83  Treaty 7, supra note 24. 
84  It has been argued that Canada has had exclusive ownership of navigable streams 
since 1869 – Nikal. 
85  See generally, Dempsey, supra note 16. 
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trade and then largely by Cree middlemen.  David Mandelbaum has suggested that the 
river systems were historically used as highways for trade. 86  Safe passage through 
enemy territories was allowed by the operation of Blackfoot treaty laws.  
Special permission was granted for the safe passage of the Queen and her 
subjects.    It could be argued that Treaty 7 First Nations, by signing Treaty 7, intended 
to assert their title to their territories while allowing safe passage by the Queen in 
exchange for protection and assistance.  In the case of non-navigable waterways, 
Aboriginal title might be easier to establish.87 
If equal weight is given to the common law and Aboriginal legal perspectives, it 
is seriously open to question whether either the common law presumption ad medium 
filum aquae or that the incorporation of the common law “except as where appropriate” 
with the effect of exempting navigable streams from the ad medium filum aquae 
presumption could have ever applied to Aboriginal title lands.  A determination of the 
existence of Aboriginal title is never so simple as a mere recitation of existing common 
law principles.  There must always be a consideration of Aboriginal legal perspectives, 
which is impossible without an inquiry into the language, land tenure, culture, and social 
organization of the Aboriginal group in question. 
                                                 
86  See generally David G. Mandelbaum, The Plains Cree (New York : AMS Press, 
1979): by 1763, the Cree, acting as middlemen in the fur trade traveled along 
watercourses as far east as Montreal and as far west as the Saskatchewan River.  
European presence followed the Cree.  Other prairie peoples were less interested in the 
fur trade as long as buffalo were plentiful on the prairies.  The Cree “were a canoe-using 
people and so were readily able to utilize the network of waterways in their terrain to 
transport the raw materials to the posts. This trait influenced their later status as 
middlemen. Their…ability to travel by canoe, gave them a great advantage over the 
more distant people who lacked… the technique of water transport.” 
87  Kenneth J. Tyler, “The Division of Powers and Aboriginal Water Rights Issues”:  
National Symposium on Water Law, Environmental Law CLE Programme, 1999, 
unpublished. 
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It is legally possible for water rights to run separately from the land. The specific 
protection of the Queen’s right to navigate on some reserves appears to add credence to 
the view that Treaty 7 First Nations did not generally give up water rights under the 
Treaty:  They merely agreed to share jurisdiction.  Therefore, it follows that, although 
the Treaty may have been a general transfer or cession, it was the intention of Treaty 7 
First Nations to retain water rights throughout their transferred lands and in particular to 
those waters appurtenant to the reserves. 
Even if the Court was correct in Nikal, that title to the beds of navigable waters 
rests with the Crown, free-standing Aboriginal rights to water use having their origin in 
pre-contact practices, customs, and traditions had not been extinguished by the Crown’s 
assumption of title.  In fact, Treaty 7 establishes the shared jurisdiction over navigable of 
the rivers:  Her Majesty is bound to uphold the honour of the Crown by protecting 
Blackfoot navigation by water and the incidental rights of water quantity, flow and 
access to navigable streams. 
5. Conclusion 
There was no common intention to extinguish Aboriginal title to the water and 
waterbeds. 
Even if it was possible for the Crown to unilaterally extinguish Aboriginal rights 
to water, Treaty 7 does not meet the test of clear and plain intent to extinguish 
Aboriginal water rights to water.  The bundle of Aboriginal rights to water use was not 
extinguished under Treaty 7.  In fact, Treaty 7 conferred a blanket of protection on 
existing Aboriginal rights to water by protecting Treaty 7 First Nations’ livelihood 
rights, right to a reserve, and a right to navigate.  Moreover, Treaty 7 First Nations’ 
jurisdiction throughout the Treaty 7 territory was reinforced. 
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Treaty 7 did not extinguish Aboriginal title.  None of the so-called “land cession 
treaties” have been examined as to whether they meet the test of extinguishment.  When 
the tests for Treaty interpretation, as set out in Badger and Marshall, are applied, it is 
clear that there was no common intention to cede the land to the to give up jurisdiction 
over their territories.  While the Crown believed that by signing treaty, Treaty 7 First 
Nations would forever relinquish all “their rights, titles, and privileges” to the land 
forever, oral history, as told by Treaty 7 Elders and written reports of the negotiations, 
indicates that Treaty 7 Chiefs were willing to share the fruits of the land with the Queen, 
but not the land itself, as it had been granted by the Creator and was not theirs to 
surrender.  The land could not have been claimed by the prerogative power of the Crown 
because the Royal Proclamation required that Indian lands be ceded, collectively, 
willingly, to Crown at a public meeting.  The Blackfoot Confederacy clearly did not 
cede their territory willingly, nor were they conquered.  This raises the question of 
whether Aboriginal title has ever been extinguished. 
The next step in determining what Aboriginal and treaty rights to water continue 
to exist, such as to give rise to a duty to consult, is examine whether subsequent 
legislation or Crown policy extinguished Aboriginal and Treaty rights to water in part or 
in whole. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  EXTINGUISHMENT OF ABORIGINAL AND TREATY 
RIGHTS BY FEDERAL LEGISLATION, CROWN ACTION, OR CROWN 
POLICY 
1. Introduction  
The first step in determining the scope of the duty to consult is to identify 
existing Aboriginal and treaty rights.  Previous chapters revealed that the Blackfoot 
Confederacy possessed a bundle of rights related to water including rights to navigation, 
rights to gather aquatic plants and medicines, rights to hunt, rights to assert jurisdiction, 
and rights to use water for all manner of domestic use and livelihood such as drinking, 
washing, tanning hides, and watering stock.  This bundle of rights was further protected 
by the provisions in Treaty 7 that added a layer of protection to their livelihood rights.  
Title to the waterbeds and waters was not extinguished by consent, as there was no 
common intention to transfer Aboriginal title to the Crown and the Crown could not 
unilaterally extinguish Aboriginal title.  Thus, post-treaty, Treaty 7 First Nations 
possessed, not only rights to water quality, quantity, and flow that enabled them 
continue practices, customs, and traditions involving water use, but also Aboriginal title 
to the waters and waterbeds throughout their territories. 
Seventeen years after the conclusion of Treaty 7, the federal North-west 
Irrigation Act was passed, declaring an end to common law riparian water rights and 
imposing a priority licencing scheme for water users.  More than half a century after the 
signing of Treaty 7, the Crown, assuming the federal government had jurisdiction and  
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power to do so, transferred jurisdiction over water resources to the province. The 
Natural Resources Transfer Agreement of 1930 impacted treaty rights, both explicitly 
under s.12 and implicitly by establishing environmental trusts.  The question to be 
answered is whether, in passing this legislation, Aboriginal and treaty rights were 
extinguished or altered in any way.  Whatever rights survived the NWIA, the NRTA, and 
Alberta’s Water Act are protected under s.35(1) of the constitution and trigger the duty 
to consult with Treaty 7 First Nations. 
1.1 Extinguishment by Crown Action, Crown Policy, or Legislation 
Crown policy, Crown action, or legislation may extinguish Aboriginal rights.  
During the colonial period the power to extinguish aboriginal rights lay with the 
Imperial Crown.  Unless the Crown can prove that an Aboriginal or treaty right has been 
extinguished, Aboriginal claimants have a prima facie case for the existence of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights to water, giving rise to a duty to consult.   
1.1.1 Extinguishment by Crown Policy and Crown Action 
Prior to 1982 and the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights, 
the Crown could extinguish Aboriginal rights so long as the Crown could prove it had 
demonstrated a clear and plain intention to do so. 
In Adams, the Crown attempted to prove that its “clear and plain” intention to 
extinguish the Aboriginal right to fish had been demonstrated by flooding the fishing 
area as part of process of constructing a canal.  The Supreme Court rejected that 
argument, stating that while the action the Crown took, when read together with the 
Treaty “may be adequate to demonstrate a clear and plain intention in the Crown to 
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extinguish any aboriginal title to the lands of the fishing area,” it is not adequate to 
demonstrate a clear and plain intention to extinguish the Aboriginal right to fish.1 
In R. v. Nikal it was decided that there was no exclusive Aboriginal right to fish 
on navigable waters because it was the Crown’s policy in Western Canada not to apply 
the ad medium filum aquae presumption to navigable waters.2  The convention or 
custom by which the Crown claimed title to the beds of navigable waters was based on 
post-contact use as a means of transportation in the fur trade.  Based on this 
determination, the Court went concluded that the band had no proprietary right in the 
fishery on the river.  However, extinguishment of a proprietary right to the fishery does 
not amount to extinguishment of the right to fish. 
1.1.2 Extinguishment by Legislation 
The Crown does not have to use express language to extinguish Aboriginal 
rights, but the legislation must be consistent in its intention to extinguish Aboriginal 
rights.  The Crown “must demonstrate more than that, in the past, the exercise of an 
aboriginal right has been subject to a regulatory scheme.” 3  The mere “failure to 
recognize an aboriginal right, and the failure to grant special protection to it, do not 
constitute the clear and plain intention necessary to extinguish the right.”4 
                                                 
1  R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; 138 D.L.R. (4th) 657; 202 N.R. 89; 110 
C.C.C. (3d) 97; [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 1. 
2  R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013; [1996] S.C.J. No. 47 (QL) at para 64 and 
following; quoting Keewatin Power Co. v. Kenora (1906), 13 O.L.R. 237; see also 
Barthel v. Scotten (1895), 24 Can. S.C.R. 367 and Re Provincial Fisheries (1896), 26 
Can. S.C.R. 444. 
3  R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; [1996] S.C.J. No. 79 (QL) at para 34. 
4  Ibid. at para 36. 
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To determine whether the Crown clearly or plainly intended to extinguish an 
Aboriginal right, regulations and legislation may be “viewed individually or as a whole.”  
Where express language is not used, the regulatory regime must demonstrate a 
“consistent intention on the part of the Crown.”  In Gladstone the Court found that 
because the regulatory regime was inconsistent in its regulations, at times prohibiting the 
harvesting of herring spawn on kelp and at times encouraging Aboriginal commercial 
fishing.  With this kind of inconsistency, the legislation cannot “be said to express a 
clear and plain intention to eliminate…aboriginal rights.”5  
In Sparrow, the Court found that the licensing provision of food fishing had not 
extinguished Aboriginal fishing rights because the intention of the regulation was to 
control the fisheries, not to deal with Indian rights.  Applying the Sparrow test for 
extinguishment, the Court in Gladstone decided that federal fisheries regulations did not 
extinguish the Aboriginal right to commercial fishery.  In coming to this determination, 
the Court took a purposive approach.  It was decided that  
The government's purpose was to ensure that conservation goals were met, and 
that the Indian food fishery's special protection would continue; its purpose was 
not to eliminate aboriginal rights to fish commercially.6 
It is clear from the case law that if the Crown can prove a clear and plain 
intention to extinguish Aboriginal and treaty rights, extinguishment may be effected by 
either legislation, Crown policy, or Crown action.  Below I will consider whether the 
Crown could prove that the NWIA, NRTA, or the Water Act had extinguished Aboriginal 
and treaty rights to water prior to the constitutional protection afforded by s.35(1). 
                                                 
5  Ibid. at para 34. 
6  Ibid. at para 36. 
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2. Did the North-West Irrigation Act Extinguish Aboriginal and Treaty Rights 
to Water? 
The previous chapter revealed that Aboriginal rights to water not only survived 
the cession of title in Treaty 7, but were protected by the treaty.  The previous chapter 
also raises a doubt as to whether Treaty 7 extinguished Aboriginal title to water and 
waterbeds.  However, Aboriginal rights and title to water may have been subsequently 
extinguished by federal statute.  An inquiry into the purpose of the North-west Irrigation 
Act7 reveals that the framers had no intention of extinguishing Aboriginal rights or title 
to water. 
The North-west Irrigation Act was enacted in 1894, seventeen years after the 
conclusion of Treaty 7, to replace common law riparian rights to water with government 
regulation based on a “prior appropriation” licencing scheme.  All property and rights of 
use in any river or waterbody was, by the passage of the Act, vested in the Crown and a 
licence was required for domestic, irrigation or other purposes: 
After the passing of the Act, acquisition by riparian title or Crown grant or 
‘otherwise’ of rights to appropriate water was barred except in pursuance of an 
‘agreement or undertaking’ existing at the time of passing of the Act or in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act.  The effect of the statute was to 
abrogate the common law notion that water was not the subject of ownership 
and the common law concept of riparian rights to water appropriation.” 
(emphasis mine)8 
Any Aboriginal rights and title protected by Treaty 7, being both an “agreement” 
and an “undertaking” existing at the time of the passage of the Act, would have 
survived the passage of the North-west Irrigation Act. 
                                                 
7  The North-west Irrigation Act, S.C. 1894, c.30. 
8  Richard H. Bartlett, Aboriginal Water Rights in Canada:  A Study of Aboriginal 
Title to Water and Indian Water Rights, (Calgary:  Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 
1988) at p.153-154. 
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To date, there is no Canadian decision considering the effect of the North-west 
Irrigation Act on Aboriginal and treaty water rights and title.  In the absence of clear and 
plain language in the Act that would extinguish Aboriginal water rights, the purpose of 
the Act must be considered.  As held in Gladstone, if the government’s purpose was 
something other than the elimination of Aboriginal rights to water, Aboriginal rights to 
water would not have been extinguished.  If the legislation failed “to recognize an 
aboriginal right,” or to “grant special protection to it” this does “not constitute the clear 
and plain intention necessary to extinguish the right.”9  
The primary purpose of the legislation was to replace the British common law 
riparian rights with a licencing scheme.  “The debates in Parliament made no reference 
whatever to Indian reserves or water rights.”10  The Supreme Court has recognized that 
Aboriginal rights must be understood by taking into account Aboriginal legal 
perspectives as well as the common law, and, in fact, equal weight is to be placed on 
each.  By replacing common law riparian rights with a legislative scheme that did not 
consider Aboriginal rights, Aboriginal water rights were not automatically extinguished:  
Aboriginal legal systems would have remained in tact. 
As in other areas of the world faced with scarcity of water and a potential for 
water-intensive industrial or agricultural development, the doctrine of riparian rights was 
inadequate to the task of regulating water use.  The doctrine of riparian rights, which 
vests water rights exclusively to riparian owners, governed the use of water, it was seen 
as an impediment to development on the Alberta prairies.  Canada decided to vest all 
                                                 
9  Gladstone, supra note 3 at para 36. 
10  Bartlett, supra note 46 at p.155. 
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rights to water within the Northwest Territories in the Crown,11 without considering 
whether this federal Act infringed the peace and order clause of the imperial 1877 treaty 
and the Blackfoot Confederacy’s jurisdiction for beneficial use. 
William Pearce of Calgary, Superintendent of Mines in charge of natural 
resource development, began promoting irrigation agriculture in southern Alberta in 
1884.  Pearce shared the view of his American colleagues that riparian rights to water 
were an obstacle to the economic interests of industrialists and agriculturalists.  By 
passing federal legislation to extinguish traditional common law water rights and put in 
their place the right of prior appropriation, it was hoped that large-scale irrigation 
schemes would facilitate the development of large agrarian settlements.12  There is no 
evidence in his writing and correspondence that he consulted the terms of the Indian 
Treaties in drafting his irrigation bill.13  
Even if the intention to extinguish treaty protected Aboriginal rights, title, or 
jurisdiction had been clear, the Crown would not have had the prerogative power to 
unilaterally extinguish those rights.  The test for extinguishment is not met by merely 
ignoring Aboriginal and Treaty rights to water.  Brian Slattery argues that  
the Crown cannot exercise unilaterally any residual prerogative powers in a 
manner inconsistent with an historic treaty…where the Crown guarantees 
certain aboriginal rights in a treaty, it forfeits any asserted power to alter those 
rights by a unilateral prerogative act.14 
                                                 
11  Maureen Boyd Clark, “Water, Private Rights and the Rise of Regulation:  
Riparian Rights of Use in British Columbia, 1892-1939” The Advocate 253 at 255. 
12  Kinichi Matsui, Reclaiming Indian Waters:  Dams, Irrigation, and Indian Water 
Rights in Western Canada:  1858-1930, PhD. Thesis (Vancouver:  U.B.C., 2003) at 135. 
13  Ibid. at 139. 
14  Brian Slattery, Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” [2000] 79 Can. 
Bar Rev. 196 at 210. 
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The Crown had undertaken and promised in Treaty negotiations to protect Treaty 7 First 
Nations’ means of livelihood, whether by traditional or modern means.  The Crown 
specifically promised to support agricultural development on their reserves.  According 
to Slattery, “treaty undertakings made by the Crown to aboriginal peoples give rise to 
particular fiduciary obligations to honour those undertakings.”15 
2.1 Early Treatment of Treaty 7 First Nations Title to Water 
The water surrender agreements negotiated with the Stoneys demonstrate that the 
Department of Indian Affairs and hydroelectric companies recognized the rights of the 
Stoney people to the waterbeds and waters of the Bow River after the passage of the 
North-West Irrigation Act. 16  Beginning in the 1890’s several hydro-electric companies 
sought to obtain the right to build waterpower sites on the Bow River on the Stoney 
Reserve.  There was a legislative gap:  The NWIA did not apply to water power and there 
was no clear indication that the Stoneys’ treaty and Aboriginal rights had been 
extinguished. 
Initially when the Stoneys were approached about surrendering part of their 
reserve for the construction of the Horseshoe Falls and Kananaskis dams, water power 
projects to be built on reserve, Chief John Chiniquay, the only Chief consulted, refused.  
The Stoneys maintained that Kananaskis Falls and Rapids were “our water powers and 
land”17 and that they should receive $110,000.00 for the length of one mile of the Bow 
River.  DIA suggested separating the cession into two parts:  waterpower rights and land 
rights, because the officials were not sure if the river was the property of the Indians. 
                                                 
15  Ibid. at 211. 
16  Statutes of Canada, 1905, 4-5 Ed. 7, c.3 
17  Matsui, supra note 12 at 179. 
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The DIA asked McDougall to relay to the Stoneys that “as far as they have a 
proprietary interest in the water powers their interest will be fully protected by the 
department when these are disposed of.”18  In the end, the Stoneys agreed to surrender 
approximately 1,000 acres of land for the development of the Horseshoe Falls site by the 
Calgary Water and Transmission Company at $10 per acre; $5 per annum per capita, 
Chiefs and councilors to receive $25.00 per annum - payments to be made in the same 
manner as Treaty payments; fifty range brood mares; and $1,500 annual payment for 
waterpower.  “The Indians also agreed to release the larger waterpower rights on the 
condition of receiving an additional annual five dollar per capita payment similar to 
what they received as Treaty 7 entitlements.”19 
The Calgary Water and Transmission Company merged with two other 
companies and became the Calgary Power Company led in part by none other than 
lawyer Richard B. Bennett.  The goal of the Company was to gain control over all the 
power sites on the Bow River.  The Company started by applying to the Interior 
Department for the right to develop waterpower at Kananaskis Falls.  The Company held 
meetings with Stoneys in 1913, but the Nation refused to surrender the land unless they 
got a better deal:  They drafted a surrender agreement similar to the previous agreement, 
insisting that the land and water rights belonged to them.  They requested, but were 
unsuccessful in negotiating per capita payments upon signing, monetary compensation 
                                                 
18  The DIA to McDougall, 6 June 1906, RG10, vol. 3686, file 13, 119-234. 
19  Stoney Indians and chiefs to the DIA, 6 June 1906, RG10, vol.3686, file 13, 119-
2,3,4. 
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for surrendered land, annual per capita payments, and a rental payment of $1,500 per 
year, this time based on a claim of riparian rights to water.20 
In a move that appears to have been made to circumvent the claims of Indians to 
Aboriginal and treaty water rights, the federal government passed the Dominion Water 
Power Act in 1919, replacing the waterpower provision in the Dominion Lands Act, 
1908.  The new Act filled the legislative gap and declared water and waterpower as 
national property.  Under the new Act, Calgary Power Company applied for approval of 
the Ghost River water power site on the Stoney reserve in 1927.  The Stoneys 
surrendered the land necessary and a licence was issued under the new Act for a term of 
fifty years beginning December 31, 1929.  The following year the NRTA was passed, 
raising questions about provincial jurisdiction.  Specifically, which department was 
entitled to collect rental payment on behalf of the Stoney from the Ghost development:  
The DIA, the Department of Interior, or the province in part or in whole?  In 1933 
Deputy Minister of Justice issued his opinion that a “portion of the water power rental is 
payable to and administrable by the Dominion for the benefit of the Indians, and that the 
Province (although the Director of Water Resources of the Province has indicated that 
the Province claims the whole of the amount of such rental) has no well founded rights 
or claim to receive such portion of the rental.”21 
History shows that the Crown had not demonstrated a clear and plain intention to 
extinguish Aboriginal and treaty rights to water in passing the North-west Irrigation Act, 
and that the Act had no effect on Aboriginal water rights or their exercise.  The federal 
                                                 
20  Matsui, supra note 12 at 189. 
21  W. Stuart Edwards for H.H Rowat, 19 July 1933, RG 10, vol. 8057, file 772/32-
3-3, pt. 3. 
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government saw that it was necessary to pass the Dominion Water Power Act to 
facilitate the development of hydroelectricity because of the existence of Treaty 7 First 
Nations water rights.  It remains to be considered whether Aboriginal and treaty water 
rights were extinguished by the transfer of jurisdiction over water from the federal 
crown to the province of Alberta. 
3. Did the NRTA Extinguish Aboriginal and Treaty Rights to Water? 
The duty to consult and accommodate is grounded in the assertion of Crown 
sovereignty which pre-dated the Alberta Act and the NRTA.  As the court stated in 
Haida, it follows that the province of Alberta, created as it was in 1905 by federal law 
and not by imperial act, and without a beneficial interest in the land ceded by Treaty 7, 
took the lands subject to the duty to consult.  The lands in the province are "available to 
[the province] as a source of revenue whenever the estate of the Crown is 
disencumbered of the Indian title."22  In St. Catherine's Milling, the Privy Council held 
that, on extinguishment of Aboriginal title, “the province would take complete title to 
the land.”23  As has been argued in the previous chapter, Aboriginal title to the 
waterbeds and waters of the province could not have been extinguished by Treaty 7 
because there was no common intent to extinguish Aboriginal title.  To the extent that 
there is some form of sui generis proprietary interest, Aboriginal title, or environmental 
trust in the waters in the province of Alberta, the province’s jurisdiction must be 
exercised subject to that interest or trust.   
                                                 
22  Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 70 (Q.L.); 2004 SCC 73 at para 59; St. Catherine's Milling and 
Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.). 
23  Delgamu’ukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108 (QL); [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
1010 at para. 175; St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber, supra note 22. 
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The NRTA did not extinguish any treaty-protected Aboriginal rights.  Rather, the 
NRTA adds another layer of protection over Indian hunting, fishing, and trapping, and 
rights incidental thereto to water quality, quantity and flow sufficient to support fishing 
and hunting on Crown lands and lands to which they have a right of access.  The NRTA 
created a corresponding duty for the province to ensure that sufficient resources remain 
to support the Indian traditional livelihood to protect an environment conducive to 
maintaining wildlife populations. 
3.1 Principles for Interpreting the NRTA 
The degree of consultation required may be influenced by the historical context 
of the relationship between the Crown and First Nations.  It has been suggested that 
“[u]nderstanding the historical relationship between the Crown and Aboriginals is a 
necessary precondition to conceptualizing reconciliation and articulating what 
reconciliation demands.”24  The negotiations leading up to the finalization of the NRTA 
was a turning point in the on-going historical relationship between the Crown and First 
Nations.  In Blais,25 the Court stated that an analysis of livelihood rights under the NRTA 
“must be anchored in the historical context of the provision.”26  
                                                 
24  Michael Hudson, “Reconciling Diversity with Unity:  Canadian Federalism in 
the 21st Century” unpublished paper presented to the Canadian Bar Association 
Canadian Legal Conference in Vancouver, August 14-16, 2005. 
25  The Supreme Court in R. v. Blais, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 236; [2003] S.C.J. No. 44; 
2003 SCC 44, considered whether Metis were Indians such that their rights were 
protected by the NRTA. 
26  Frank Tough argues, the Court has “not encountered a grounded historical 
analysis in respect of the effect of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement on treaty 
rights.”  He points out that the wording of the provision addressing Treaty rights in the 
NRTA is cited by the Courts “mechanically and completely without historical depth:” 
Frank J. Tough, “The Forgotten Constitution:  The Natural Resources Transfer 
Agreements and Indian Livelihood Rights, CA. 1925-1933” 2004 41 Alta. L. Rev. 999 
at 1000 [hereinafter “Tough”]. 
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Interpretation of constitutional guarantees further requires a purposive approach.  
The Supreme Court, in Blais, referred to the principles of interpretation set out in Big M 
Drug Mart: 
it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right or freedom in 
question, but to recall that the [constitutional provision] was not enacted in a 
vacuum, and must therefore ... be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic 
and historical contexts.27 
The rules of legislative and constitutional interpretation require a purposive 
approach.  In Big M Drugmart, the Supreme Court stated that “[a]n understanding of the 
scheme of that Act and its basic purpose and effect is integral to any analysis of its 
constitutional validity.28   
[E]ither an unconstitutional purpose or an unconstitutional effect can invalidate 
legislation.  All legislation is animated by an object the legislature intends to 
achieve. This object is realized through the impact produced by the operation 
and application of the legislation. Purpose and effect respectively, in the sense 
of the legislation's object and its ultimate impact, are clearly linked, if not 
indivisible. Intended and actual effects have often been looked to for guidance 
in assessing the legislation's object and thus, its validity…Moreover, 
consideration of the object of legislation is vital if rights are to be fully 
protected.29 
Thus an analysis of the objectives of the NRTA and the impact that it has had on 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights is necessary to protect those rights that pre-existed the 
NRTA.   
The purposive approach to interpreting constitutional documents was again 
extolled by Supreme Court in Van der Peet: 
because constitutions are, by their very nature, documents aimed at a country's 
future as well as its present; the Constitution must be interpreted in a manner 
                                                 
27  Blais, supra note 25 at para 17 quoting R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. 
No. 17; [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at p. 344. 
28  Big M Drug Mart, supra note 27 at para 5. 
29  Ibid. at para 80-81. 
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which renders it "capable of growth and development over time to meet new 
social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers": 
Hunter, supra, at p. 155.30 
The first step in the analysis, therefore, is to ascertain the purpose of the NRTA.  
To do so, it is necessary to make a detailed historical inquiry into the events and ideas 
leading to the final draft of the provisions affecting Indians and Indian rights.31 
3.1.1 The Purpose of NRTA s.12 
Section 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA) addresses the 
status of the right to hunt, trap and fish following the transfer of unoccupied Crown 
lands from Canada to the Province. 
In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the supply 
of game and fish for their support and subsistence, Canada agrees that the law 
respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall apply to the 
Indians within the boundaries thereof, provided, however, that the said Indians 
shall have the right, which the Province hereby assures to them, of hunting, 
trapping and fishing game and fish for food at all seasons of the year on all 
unoccupied Crown lands or on any other lands to which the said Indians may 
have a right of access.32 
The over-arching purpose of the NRTA was “to put the provinces of Alberta, 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan on an equal footing with the other Canadian provinces by 
giving them jurisdiction over and ownership of their natural resources.”33 The NRTA 
transferred all the lands and minerals from the federal Crown to the province subject to 
any existing trusts.  Chapter 5 established that Treaty 7 First Nations have existing sui 
                                                 
30  R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para 21. 
31  I have relied heavily on the meticulous historical research of Dr. Frank Tough.  
All further references to historical documents in this chapter appear in his various 
published and unpublished works on this topic.  He may or may not agree with my legal 
arguments. 
32  Constitution Act, 1930, 20-21 George V, c. 26 (U.K.), Schedule 1. 
33  Blais, supra note 25 at para 10. 
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generis proprietary or other rights to the waters of the province by virtue of the Treaty.  
Furthermore, Treaty 7 First Nations’ rights to a healthy aquatic environment may be 
“incidental rights” meaningfully linked with their hunting, fishing, and trapping rights.  
These rights constitute “trusts” or “interests” limiting provincial jurisdiction with regard 
to conduct affecting the aquatic environment. 
The Government of Alberta, in its Consultation Guidelines, recognizes First 
Nations rights respecting public lands as provided for in the Treaties and the Natural 
Resources Transfer Agreement, including the rights to hunt, fish, and trap for food.34  
Clearly the Alberta government has knowledge of the existence of Aboriginal rights, and 
is aware of the corresponding duty to consult with First Nations regarding any conduct 
contemplated by the province that might adversely affect those rights. 
Despite acknowledgement by the province of the existence of hunting, trapping, 
and fishing rights, it remains necessary to determine the scope of the duty to consult 
pursuant to rights protected under the NRTA.  The factors to be considered are 1) the 
strength of the case supporting the existence of the right or title; and 2) the seriousness 
of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title claimed. 
The overall purpose of the NRTA was to transfer natural resources from the 
jurisdiction of the Dominion government to the provinces.  The motivation for doing so 
was simple economics.  The prairie provinces wanted the same opportunities as the other 
provinces for development and profit from the wealth of natural resources within their 
respective borders.  The Department of Indian Affairs was primarily concerned with the 
                                                 
34  Alberta Environment, “First Nation Consultation Guidelines (Regulatory 
Authorizations and Environmental Impact Assessments) Draft 1, May 18, 2006” 
accessed at 
http://www.aand.gov.ab.ca/AANDFlash/Files/AENV_FN_Guidelines_Draft_1_May_18
_2006.pdf, on July 31, 2006. 
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protection of Indian livelihood rights from encroachment by non-Indian trappers.  The 
Hudson’s Bay Company, while not a party, was concerned about protecting trapping as a 
commercial industry as well as any rights the Company may have to the fishery.   
At the early stages of negotiation, Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy 
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs advocated for “hunting and fishing reserves 
and for exemptions in favour of Indians who are hunting and fishing purely for their own 
sustenance.”35  His concern was that provincial authority to enact game regulations 
would negatively affect Indian hunting.    
Lieutenant-Colonel O. M. Biggar, K.C., counsel for the Dominion was not in 
agreement.  He pointed out that “[i]n southern Alberta the Indians have become 
agriculturists and have ceased to depend for their livelihood on hunting, but this is by no 
means the case in the north, where many of the bands depend upon trapping and fishing 
for a livelihood.”36  By ‘livelihood’ Biggar clearly meant to include commercial 
trapping, and fishing:  Trapping an inherently commercial activity.  It was the 
dependence on commercial trade in fish and game of the northern Indians that motivated 
Dominion officials to consider the protection of livelihood rights from encroachment by 
the province.  It appears that the Treaty rights of Treaty 7 First Nations were not given a 
great deal of consideration.  Nonetheless, Treaty 7 First Nations benefited from the 
protections that were ultimately afforded all Indians of the province under the NRTA. 
The Department of Indian Affairs was motivated in large part by the concern that 
the province would not adequately protect game populations.  Biggar explained: 
                                                 
35  Memorandum, Scott (29 January 1925), Ottawa, NAC (RG 10, vol. 6820, file 
492-4-2, pt.11) in Tough, supra note 26 at p.1019. 
36  Memorandum, Biggar (30 January 1925), Ottawa, NAC (RG 10, vol. 6820, file 
492-4-2, pt. 1) in Tough, supra note 26 at p 1020. 
163 
The Department of Indian Affairs is just as much, or even more concerned to 
secure the preservation of game…In the old days the Indians themselves took 
care to conserve and protect the game so as to yield them their livelihood as 
readily as possible, and they were in effect the only trappers.  Now, however, 
the commercial trappers show no such concern…notwithstanding the game 
laws, they should be allowed to hunt and fish out of season for their own food. 
37 
The framers of s.12 could not agree to the wording for the protection of Indian 
hunting.  Biggar felt that hunting “should be limited to continuing to the Indians the 
same rights in unoccupied Crown lands after their transfer to the Province as they now 
enjoy in respect of them.”38 Indian Affairs solicitor A.S. Williams advocated that Indians 
should be immune from provincial game laws based on federal jurisdiction over Indians 
and Indian lands.   
Clearly the primary purpose of the NRTA s. 12 was to protect the traditional 
livelihood of First Nations.  In the final version, hunting, fishing, and trapping were 
included as means of obtaining subsistence.  Where the Indian hunting and fishing right 
had been “freely and fully” exercisable under the 1926 version, it was restricted “for 
food” under the 1930 Agreement.  Closed seasons would not affect hunting and fishing 
as the wording “at all seasons of the year” was included.  The geographical territory was 
expanded to include unoccupied Crown land as well as “any lands to which the said 
Indians may have a right of access.”39 
                                                 
37  Ibid. 
38  Memorandum, Biggar to Scott (12 February 1925), Ottawa, NAC (RG 10, ibid.) 
in Tough, supra note 26 at 1021 to 1022. 
39  Frank Tough points out that the protection of Indian hunting and fishing rights 
were not achieved “by arguing for the exchange of some rights for other rights.” Tough, 
supra note 26 at 1036. 
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The framers of the NRTA s. 12 intended to protect fish and game populations.  
The preambular phrase, “In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the 
continuance of the supply of game and fish for their support and subsistence” placed an 
obligation on the province to pass laws that would support the continuing supply of 
game and fish for Indian subsistence.  Tough argues that “the province acquired the 
obligation to ensure through conservation that the resources existed in order to secure a 
supply of game and fish to the Indians.”40  If such is the case, any time the province 
contemplates conduct that would adversely affect the environment supporting Indian 
hunting, fishing, and trapping, the province would not only be under a duty to consult, 
but would also be in breach of its obligations under the NRTA. 
3.1.2 The Effect of the NRTA on Treaty 7 First Nations’ Water Rights 
The second stage of inquiry into the meaning of constitutional documents is an 
analysis of their effect.  Section 12 of the NRTA has been held to have significantly 
altered the nature and scope of Treaty rights in the Province of Alberta:  The NRTA 
created an environmental trust responsibility of the provincial Crown, expanded the 
exercise of Treaty rights geographically, added the right to fish and trap, and limited the 
right to hunt and fish “for food.”  
3.1.2.1 Creation of Trust Obligations 
The Alberta Act,41 had provided that the Crown’s interest waters in Alberta, 
under the Northwest Irrigation Act, 1898, would “continue to be vested in the Crown 
                                                 
40  Tough, supra note 26. 
41  Alberta Act, 4-5 Edward VII, c. 3 (Canada), [Assented to 20th July, 1905]. 
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and administered by the Government of Canada for the purposes of Canada.”42  The 
federal Crown retained jurisdiction over the lands and waters of the province until the 
Western provinces took jurisdiction over the lands and resources through the NRTA in 
1930.  The province took jurisdiction subject to existing interests and trusts.  “[T]he 
interest of the Crown in all Crown lands” including all “lands, mines, minerals or 
royalties” would thereafter “belong to the Province, subject to any trusts existing in 
respect thereof, and to any interest other than that of the Crown in the same.”  
Furthermore, “the said lands, mines, minerals and royalties [were to] be administered by 
the Province.”43 
The province covenanted to maintain the Crown’s obligations and to  
carry out in accordance with the terms thereof …every other arrangement 
whereby any person has become entitled to any interest [in land] as against the 
Crown, and further agrees not to affect or alter any term of any such … other 
arrangement by legislation or otherwise, except either with the consent of all 
the parties thereto other than Canada or in so far as any legislation may apply 
generally to all similar agreements relating to lands, mines or minerals in the 
Province or to interests therein, irrespective of who may be the parties thereto.44  
The Natural Resources Transfer Agreements were largely concerned with the 
transfer of contractual and related liabilities from Canada to the provinces.  The NRTA 
was not a grant of title, but an administrative transfer of the responsibilities, including 
obligations to "the Indians within the boundaries" of the Province.45  The historical 
record reveals that the drafters did not turn their minds to the possibility that First 
Nations may have interests in the land and waters of the province, other than for 
                                                 
42  Constitution Act, 1930, 20-21 George V, c. 26 (U.K.), Schedule 1, commonly 
referred to as the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement. 
43  NRTA, supra note 42 at para 1. 
44  NRTA, supra note 42 para 2 
45  Blais, supra note 25 at para 19. 
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unfulfilled Treaty promises to a reserve.  It could be argued that implied rights to water 
under Treaty 7 constitute “other arrangements” for the purposes of s.2.  If that is the 
case, the province would have no power to “affect or alter any term of any such … other 
arrangement by legislation or otherwise.” 
If Treaty 7 First Nations have unextinguished rights to water, the Water Act’s 
priority licencing system, combined with Treaty 7 and the NRTA, which provided that 
“the interest of the Crown in all Crown lands...shall belong to the Province subject to 
any trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any interest other than that of the Crown,” 
results in the priority and protection of Treaty 7 First Nations’ rights to water.  While 
there is no Canadian jurisprudence yet on this point, American case law has established 
that the date of reservation of water rights on an Indian reserve for irrigation was the 
date of the establishment of the reserve.46  An early priority date will require other water 
rights holders to take water subject to Indian water rights.  The Water Act has capped the 
date of priority at 1894.  It would appear that riparian rights holders predating 1894, 
which includes Treaty 7 First Nations, have priority water rights. 
3.1.2.2 Geographical Expansion 
Writing for the Supreme Court of Canada in Badger, Cory J. described the NRTA 
as having had “the clear intention of both limiting and expanding the treaty right to 
hunt.”  Traditional livelihood rights were reduced by being expressly limited “for food” 
as opposed to commercial purposes.  The geographic scope of the right was expanded, 
                                                 
46  Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), 52 L.Ed. 340 aff’g 143 F.740 (9th 
Cir. 1906).  A representative of AENV stated that the American system is based on a 
system of prior appropriation while Alberta’s system is based on prior allocation.  The 
implication is that First Nations, not having an allocation, would have no prior right to 
water.  This position is not supported by historical legal opinion, see quote by Challies.  
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no longer being confined to “the tract surrendered” but extending to all unoccupied 
Crown lands throughout the Province and any other lands to which Indians have a right 
of access.” 
Supreme Court of Canada cases such as R. v. Horseman47 and Badger48 dealing 
with the effect of the NRTA on Treaty rights in Alberta have arisen in the context of 
Treaty 8.  The same analysis would apply to Treaty 7, with one notable exception: the 
NRTA appears to result in a further expansion of Treaty rights in the context of Treaty 7, 
insofar as it assures the right to hunt, fish, and trap.  Treaty 7 does not refer to fishing 
and trapping - only to the right of Indians “to pursue their avocations of hunting,” 
presumably because the Blackfoot considered the consumption of fish to be taboo and 
they were not typically commercial trappers.  Under the NRTA, Treaty 7 First Nations 
have the additional right to fish and trap in the Treaty area as well as on all unoccupied 
Crown lands and other lands to which they have a right of access.  In addition, they have 
rights incidental to rights to hunt, trap, and fish. 
In the Horseman case, the Supreme Court considered whether Indian hunting 
rights included the right to hunt commercially.  It was determined that, as a result of the 
NRTA s.12, Indian hunting rights were restricted to subsistence while being expanded to 
include the entire province.  Cory J., writing for the majority, rejected the appellants 
arguments that the passage of the NRTA required the approval or consent of First 
Nations prior to reducing or abridging Treaty livelihood rights, and that a unilateral 
change to and derogation of Treaty rights would bring dishonour to the Crown.  The 
Court also rejected the argument that “the Crown should be looked upon as a trustee of 
                                                 
47  R. v. Horseman, [1990] S.C.J. No. 39 (QL); [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901. 
48  R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771; [1996] S.C.J. No. 39 (QL). 
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the Native hunting rights.”49  Horseman has directed a long line of cases that appear to 
restrict Indian hunting.   
The doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty allowed Treaty and Aboriginal rights 
to be unilaterally altered by statute passed by a competent legislature, “in the absence of 
constitutional barriers such as those embodied in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and 
s.35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.”50  This doctrine, apart from the historical record 
of negotiations, appears to have influenced the Court in its decision in R. v. Horseman.  
In that case, the appellant had argued that the NRTA “was meant to protect the rights of 
Indians and not to derogate from those rights.”51  The Court rejected this argument, 
relying on Dickson J.’s decisions in Frank v. The Queen; R. v. Sutherland, and 
Moosehunter v. The Queen.52  The Court stated that “[i]t is also clear that the Transfer 
Agreements were meant to modify the division of powers originally set out in the 
Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly the British North America Act, 1867).”53  In exchange 
for the restriction of Indian hunting to food only, “[t]he geographical areas in which the 
Indian people could hunt was widely extended.”54 
The test for extinguishment, as set out in R. v. Sparrow, “is that the Sovereign’s 
intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish an aboriginal right.”55  In R. v. 
                                                 
49  Horseman, supra note 47 at para 57. 
50  Brian Slattery, Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” [2000] 79 Can. 
Bar Rev. 196 at 204. 
51  Horseman, supra note 47 at para 57. 
52  Frank v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 95; R. v. Sutherland, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 451; 
Moosehunter v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 282. 
53  Horseman, supra note 47 at para 59. 
54  Ibid. at para 60. 
55  R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; [1990] S.C.J. No. 49 at para 37. 
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Badger, Mr. Justice Cory, for the majority of the Supreme court, made it clear that the 
same ‘clear and plain’ test applied to the unilateral extinguishment of a Treaty right: 
…the onus of proving that a treaty or aboriginal right has been extinguished lies 
upon the Crown.  There must be “strict proof of the fact of extinguishment” and 
evidence of a clear and plain intention on the part of the government to 
extinguish treaty rights. 
The majority concluded that, although the Natural Resources Transfer 
Agreement did not entirely extinguish and replace all Treaty hunting rights, it 
extinguished commercial hunting rights and otherwise altered the exercise of hunting 
rights.  The language that effectively extinguished commercial hunting rights  
did not make express reference to such a right, nor was it shown that the Crown 
made any acknowledgement of the right’s existence…Nevertheless the 
statement that Indians would be required to abide by the game laws of the 
Province, combined with the omission of any reference to rights to hunt for 
purposes other than food, was, in the Supreme Court’s view, a sufficient basis 
to conclude that the clear and plain standard had been met.56 
The Supreme Court in R. v. Gladstone explained the reasoning in Badger: 
Section 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA)… is a 
provision in a constitutional document, the enactment of which provides for a 
permanent settlement of the legal rights of the aboriginal groups to whom it 
applies…The NRTA was aimed at achieving a permanent clarification of the 
province's legislative jurisdiction and of the legal rights of aboriginal peoples 
within the province…[T]he NRTA can be seen as evincing the necessary clear 
and plain intention to extinguish aboriginal rights to hunt commercially in the 
province to which it applies…57 
This interpretation of the purpose of the NRTA seems to be at odds with the 
historical record.  As discussed above, the Department of Indian Affairs had specifically 
set out to protect existing Indian interests in hunting and fishing for commercial 
                                                 
56  Kenneth J. Tyler, “The Division of Powers and Aboriginal Water Rights Issues”:  
National Symposium on Water Law, Environmental Law CLE Programme, 1999, 
unpublished at 55. 
57  R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; [1996] S.C.J. No. 79 (QL) at para 38. 
170 
purposes against encroachment of white trappers because they feared that the provinces 
would not.  To a certain extent the intended purpose of the drafters of the provision were 
met in that “[b]oth the area of hunting and the way in which the hunting could be 
conducted was extended and removed from the jurisdiction of provincial 
governments.”58  The historical record is silent as to why “for food” was included in the 
final draft, but it does not appear from the historical record that there was any intention 
to expand the geographical right in exchange for restrictions on commercial hunting and 
fishing rights. 
The inclusion of the right to fish, combined with the geographical expansion of 
fishing, hunting, and trapping rights means that Treaty 7 First Nations have a right to 
fish on all lakes and watercourses within the province to the extent that they are “lands 
to which they have a right of access.”  The expansion of Treaty 7 livelihood rights, 
coupled with a positive duty to protect environmental resources that support Indian 
livelihood rights, leads to extended environmental rights:  Any conduct by the province, 
such as authorizations under the Water Act to pollute, divert, or otherwise adversely 
affect Treaty 7 First Nations’ hunting, fishing, and trapping rights under the NRTA 
would trigger the duty to consult.  The end result is that First Nations of the entire 
province must be consulted on all matters affecting the environment throughout the 
province, not merely within their traditional territories.  The question then becomes one 
of how to determine whether a First Nation is “directly affected” as defined by the Water 
Act.  Alberta’s answer has been to chart the traditional land use areas of First Nations 
and to only consult on developments within those areas.  However, this does not address 
                                                 
58  Horseman, supra note 47 at para 60. 
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the geographical expansion of Treaty 7 First Nations’ rights which extend far beyond 
their traditional land use areas. 
3.1.2.3 Incidental Rights 
Certain activities related to hunting, fishing, and trapping, protected under the 
NRTA, may be rights incidental to protected livelihood rights. 
Simon and Sundown set the test to determine whether certain activities are 
reasonably incidental to the right to hunt, trap or fish.  In Sundown the Court applied the 
reasonable person standard to define what rights are “reasonably incidental” to 
livelihood rights.  The standard of reasonableness is that of the reasonable person who is 
dispassionate, “fully apprised of the circumstances of the treaty rights holder,” and 
aware of the manner of hunting and fishing at the time of Treaty.59 
To be effective, a right must embody those activities reasonably incidental to the 
act of hunting itself.  A right reasonably incidental to a treaty right to hunt, will be 
ascertained using a factual and historical inquiry.  The right will be “significantly 
connected” to “an actual practiced treaty right.”  It will include activities that are not 
only “essential, or integral” but will include, more broadly, “activities which are 
meaningfully related or linked.” 60  
While Simon and Sundown dealt with the rights of Indians to participate in 
reasonably incidental activities, rights to the protection of resources and the environment 
may also be reasonably incidental to the right to hunt, trap, and fish.   The hypothetical 
reasonable man would likely conclude there is no substance to rights to hunt, trap, and 
                                                 
59  R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393; [1999] S.C.J. No.13 (QL) at para 28-30 at 
para 29. 
60  Ibid. at para 28-30. 
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fish unless there are animals or fish and the habitat to support them.  Section 12 of the 
NRTA was intended “to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the 
supply of game and fish for their support and subsistence.”  This suggests that the 
province has the corresponding duty to ensure a supply of healthy fish and game 
sufficient to support Indian traditional livelihood needs. 
The Court has not gone so far as to mandate the province to pass conservation 
laws to protect Treaty rights.  However, the Court recognized in Sundown that “[i]n 
many, if not most, situations, the conservation of fish and game requires the preservation 
of their habitat.”61  Badger and Sundown held that “both Treaty No. 8 and the NRTA 
specifically provided that hunting rights would be subject to regulation pertaining to 
conservation.” 
[B]y the terms of both the Treaty and the NRTA, provincial game laws would 
be applicable to Indians so long as they were aimed at conserving the supply of 
game. However, the provincial government's regulatory authority under the 
Treaty and the NRTA did not extend beyond the realm of conservation.62 
It is well settled that provincial laws could only restrict treaty hunting and fishing 
rights so long as they related to conservation and only to the extent that they could be 
justified under the Sparrow test.   In Claxton v. Saanichton Marina Ltd., a treaty case in 
British Columbia where there was no equivalent of the NRTA s.12, the Court 
acknowledged that a healthy habitat is required for the exercise of the right to fish.  The 
B.C. Court of Appeal held that the Treaty right to a fishery “meant not only the right to 
catch fish but also the place where the right can be exercised.”  The court further stated 
that the right to the fishery does “not amount to a proprietary interest in the sea bed nor a 
                                                 
61  Ibid. at para 38. 
62  Badger, supra note 48 at para 70. 
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contractual right to a fishing ground.” Nonetheless, “it protects the Indians against 
infringement of their right to carry on the fishery as formerly. This includes the right to 
travel to and from the fishery.”  The construction of a marina would “derogate from the 
right of Indians to carry on their fisheries as formerly in the area protected by treaty.”  It 
would “impede their right of access to an important area of the bay” and “destroy an 
aquatic habitat.”  Having determined that the development would have a “harmful 
impact on the right of fishing granted by the treaty,” the Court granted declaratory 
relief.63 
To exercise the right to fish, First Nations must have, not only the incidental 
right to access waters, but also a right to quality, quantity and flow of water sufficient 
“to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the supply of game and fish 
for their support and subsistence.”  The environmental rights of First Nations and the 
corresponding positive duty to conserve the aquatic eco-system are “meaningfully 
related or linked.” Moreoever, they are in keeping with the provision in the NRTA and 
the spirit and intent of Treaty 7 which protects the livelihood of First Nations.  The 
positive duty on the Crown to pass legislation protecting water quality, quantity, and 
flow and to otherwise manage natural resources is a necessary aspect reconciling the 
British common law with Aboriginal legal perspectives and triggers the duty to consult. 
Arguably, the right to water quality, quantity, and flow is a right incidental to the 
exercise of livelihood rights protected by the NRTA.  In the alternative, Treaty 7 First 
Nations have an incidental right to engage in activities that would ensure that a healthy 
aquatic environment is maintained to enable them to exercise their livelihood rights 
                                                 
63  Claxton v. Saanichton Marina Ltd., [1989] 3 C.N.L.R. 46. 
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under the NRTA.  The NRTA mandates the province to conserve water resources to 
support Indian subsistence, and, thereby giving rise to the duty to consult with Treaty 7 
First Nations regarding water allocation and use, and any development affecting the 
waters in the province. 
3.1.2.4 Lands to Which Indians Have a Right of Access 
The geographical expansion of Treaty hunting, fishing, and trapping rights is 
limited to unoccupied Crown lands.  Although the province may have a duty to protect 
the environment, the wording of the NRTA suggests that this duty is restricted to 
unoccupied Crown lands to which Indians have a right of access.  Where Indians have a 
right of access to Crown lands, the exercise of the Treaty right must be compatible with 
the Crown’s use of the land.64  The measure of incompatibility with the Crown’s 
occupancy is whether the exercise of the right is not only “contrary to the purpose 
underlying that occupancy”, but it “prevent[s] the realization of that purpose.”65  If the 
exercise of the right to fish was “wholly incompatible” with the Crown’s use of the land 
and appurtenant waters, use of the waters for fishing or other purposes would be 
disallowed and any rights in the water would be extinguished.66 
Any existing Treaty rights to water are further restricted to lands not “required or 
taken up for settlement or for any other purpose.”67 Although Indians do not have a right 
to access to lands once they are “taken up,” Mikisew suggests that the Crown has a duty 
to consult with First Nations prior to “taking up” lands.  With the exercise of certain 
                                                 
64  Sundown, supra note 59 at para 39. 
65  R. v. Sioui; 1990 CarswellQue 103; [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, 109 N.R. 22, 56 
C.C.C. (3d) 225, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 427, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 127 at p. 1073 
66  Sundown, supra note 59 at para 40. 
67  Ibid. at para 42. 
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Treaty rights, such as the right to hunt, it is difficult to conceive of the waters being 
taken up by the Crown for a purpose that would be wholly incompatible with the 
exercise of the Treaty right to water.  While the province may argue that the Northwest 
Irrigation Act was as a “taking up” of lands, this argument cannot succeed.  The Act 
gave jurisdiction over water to the Crown and replaced common law riparian rights with 
a regime structured around the doctrine of prior appropriation.  It did not preclude 
Indians from fishing, hunting, or trapping on waters in the province, as the exercise of 
their livelihood rights was not “wholly incompatible” with the purpose of the Act. 
4. Were Aboriginal and treaty rights extinguished by the Water Resources Act 
or the Water Act? 
After Alberta received jurisdiction over water, the province passed various pieces 
of legislation leading up to the Water Resources Act,68 replacing the federal North-west 
Irrigation Act in regulating water use, and continuing the priority licencing scheme.  The 
Water Act, 2000 replaced the Water Resources Act, but maintained the licencing scheme.  
The province of Alberta is constitutionally incapable of extinguishing an Aboriginal 
right: 
Since 1871, the exclusive power to legislate in relation to “Indians, and Lands 
reserved for the Indians” has been vested with the federal government by virtue 
of s.91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.  That head of jurisdiction, in my 
opinion, encompasses within it the exclusive power to extinguish aboriginal 
rights, including aboriginal title.69 
The Water Act of Alberta and its precursors do not address Aboriginal water rights, but 
even if they did, the province of Alberta has no power to extinguish existing Aboriginal 
rights. 
                                                 
68  Water Resources Act, R.S.A., 1980, c.W-5. 
69  Delgamu’ukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108 (QL); [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
1010 at para 37. 
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5. Conclusion 
The North-west Irrigation Act did not clearly or plainly extinguish treaty-
protected Aboriginal rights to water.  Mere regulation does not extinguish Aboriginal 
rights.  Treaty 7 First Nations continued to possess Aboriginal and treaty rights 
unrestricted by the North-west Irrigation Act, the only purpose of which was to impose a 
licencing scheme on water use.  Indeed, crown action and crown policy reinforces the 
proposition that Treaty 7 First Nations had continuing rights to water after Treaty 7 was 
negotiated:  The Crown say fit to negotiate an additional treaty with the Stoneys relating 
to the use of the Bow River for hydro-electric power.  
Assuming the federal crown had the power to transfer jurisdiction over water to 
the province without the consent of First Nations where treaties had been negotiated, the 
purpose and effect of the NRTA was not to extinguish Aboriginal or treaty rights.  If 
anything, the NRTA added yet another blanket of protection over treaty-protected 
Aboriginal rights.  The Crown has interpreted the legislative protection promised in 
Treaty negotiations and reinforced by NRTA s.12 as a limitation to the Treaty right to 
hunt, fish, and trap.  Treaty 7 First Nations had been guaranteed the right to hunt under 
Treaty.  Under the NRTA their right to hunt was expanded to include fishing and 
trapping rights.  The NRTA may have actually expanded livelihood rights to include 
incidental rights to the quality, quantity and flow of water sufficient to support their 
livelihood by trapping and fishing.  To the extent that Treaty 7 First Nations have 
unextinguished sui generis proprietary interest or a Treaty arrangement for the use of 
water, the exercise of provincial jurisdiction may be subject to these interests and 
arrangements. 
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I have argued in this chapter that recent developments in consultation law may be 
applied to Indian hunting, trapping, and fishing rights under the NRTA s.12.  While the 
Court may have rejected the duty to consult with Treaty First Nations prior to the 
finalization of the NRTA,70 s.35(1) of the Constitution now mandates consultation 
whenever there is a prima facie case for the existence of an Aboriginal or Treaty right 
and the province contemplated conduct that will adversely impact those rights.  The 
province of Alberta has recently developed its consultation policies in acknowledgement 
of its duty to consult regarding impacts on First Nations’ rights under the NRTA. 
Rights to water quality, quantity and flow, and access to water are incidental to 
the right to hunt, trap and fish.  Arguably, if there is a poor aquatic environment, animal 
populations will be depleted resulting in an inability to fish for food.71  Although the 
right to fish does not appear in the Treaty, Treaty 7 First Nations nevertheless have a 
right to fish for food pursuant to s.12 of the NRTA.  Any negative impact on the aquatic 
environment anywhere in the province that might deplete or contaminate fish stocks 
would be an infringement of the right to fish for food.  Thus the NRTA has potentially 
expanded Treaty 7 First Nations’ right to water to extend throughout the province.  
All that is required to trigger the duty to consult is a prima facie case for the 
existence of an Aboriginal right.  It is evident from the analysis of the various means of 
extinguishment that Aboriginal rights to water have not been extinguished by Treaty 7, 
Crown policy and action, the Northwest Irrigation Act or the Water Act.  A prima facie 
case having been made out, the province has a duty to consult, the exact scope of that 
                                                 
70  Horseman, supra note 47. 
71  Halfway River First Nation v. B.C. (Ministry of Forests), [1999] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 
para 144 (emphasis in the original) per Finch J.A. 
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duty depending on the potential seriousness of the adverse effect on the Aboriginal right 
claimed. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  CONCLUSION 
Purpose of thesis: 
This thesis answers the question of whether Treaty 7 First Nations have a prima 
facie case for a claim to Aboriginal or Treaty rights to water so as to trigger a duty to 
consult with them regarding water management, and whether Alberta’s consultation 
policy and Water for Life Strategy satisfy the duty to consult.  I have concluded that not 
only did Treaty 7 and subsequent legislation not extinguish Aboriginal rights and title to 
water and waterbeds, but that Treaty 7 and the NRTA added a layer of protection over 
existing Aboriginal rights.   Section 52 of the Constitution and the principles of 
constitutionalism and rule of law require that all government policy and action is 
consistent with the s.35(1) protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights.  Thus the province 
has a duty to engage in “deep consultation” with Treaty 7 First Nations, especially 
regarding treaty-protected and NRTA-protected Aboriginal rights. 
Alberta’s consultation policy 
Alberta’s consultation policy fails to recognize any proprietary rights to water 
and any jurisdiction over water.  The Water for Life policy treats First Nations as 
“stakeholders” with no priority over other stakeholders such as industry, agriculturalists, 
or municipalities.  Likewise, Alberta’s consultation policy only recognizes traditional 
uses of the land and fails to protect Aboriginal and treaty rights in their full force and 
vigour.  These policies fail to recognize and protect the unique relationship of Treaty 7 
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First Nations with the Crown.  The Supreme Court in Mikisew held that consultation and 
accommodation are processes that reconcile the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty with 
the prior occupation of First Nations.  Engaging in consultation and making efforts to 
accommodate First Nations interests, are part of the process of managing the treaty 
relationship.   Alberta’s consultation policy is inconsistent with protection of existing 
Aboriginal and treaty rights under s.35(1) and is therefore void. 
Reconciliation and consultation 
The overarching purpose of consultation with First Nations on matters relating to 
resource use and management is reconciliation.  Reconciliation is a processes that is 
never concluded:  It is an on-going relationship arising from the Constitutional guarantee 
of Aboriginal rights, the assertion of Crown sovereignty over the lands and resources of 
Aboriginal peoples, and the honor of the Crown. 
The Supreme Court has not consistently defined the process of reconciliation:  
The characterization has ranged from a “balancing of interests” approach to “managing 
the treaty relationship.”  Alberta has chosen to use the balancing of interests approach in 
developing its consultation policy, placing societal economic needs, interests, and 
ambitions on par with Aboriginal and treaty rights.   True reconciliation must take into 
account Aboriginal laws and perspectives.  By circumventing the Crown’s historical 
relationship with First Nations, devolving responsibility for consultation to proponents, 
and focusing on balancing the economic interests of industrialists, agriculturalist, and 
municipalities with the Aboriginal and treaty rights of Treaty 7 First Nations, the 
province has exploited Treaty 7 First Nations and deprived them of the exercise of their 
rights to water and water use. 
181 
WPACs represent an opportunity to assert Treaty 7 First Nations’ jurisdiction 
and share governance of the watershed in a way that reconciles Aboriginal interests, 
legal systems, and cultures with the assertion of Crown sovereignty and other competing 
interests.  However, so long as the balancing of interests approach is the framework 
being used in a power-imbalanced environment, Treaty 7 First Nations are at risk of 
exploitation. 
Aboriginal rights and title 
Prior to entering into treaty the Blackfoot Confederacy possessed a bundle of 
rights relating to water including proprietary interests in the rivers and riverbeds, rights 
to navigation, rights to gather aquatic plants and medicines, rights to hunt and rights to 
use water for a variety of domestic uses including drinking, washing, tanning hides, and 
watering stock.  These practices, customs, and traditions involving water use were 
integral to the distinctive culture of the Blackfoot Confederacy and satisfy the test in 
Sappier to prove Aboriginal rights. 
Effect of treaty 7 on water rights 
The principles of treaty interpretation require common intention to establish the 
validity of terms of the treaty.  There was no common intention of the parties to 
extinguish Aboriginal rights and title to water under Treaty 7.  The black letter of the 
treaty includes a basket clause that purports to extinguish Aboriginal rights, but oral and 
written accounts of treaty negotiations reveal that the Chief had no intention of 
relinquishing their rights, titles, and interests to their waters. 
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Extinguishment of aboriginal and treaty rights by federal legislation and crown 
action 
The North-west Irrigation Act, the only purpose of which was to replace riparian 
rights with a priority licencing system, did not clearly or plainly extinguish Aboriginal 
or treaty rights to water:  Mere regulation does not extinguish Aboriginal rights.  Neither 
did the NRTA extinguish Aboriginal and treaty rights.  In fact, NRTA s.12 adds another 
layer of protection over treaty-protected Aboriginal rights, extends protection to the 
rights to fish and trap, and expands the area of protection to include the whole province.  
Arguably, the NRTA protects water rights which are incidental to the right to hunt, trap 
and fish.  Any contemplated action that may negatively impact the right to hunt, trap, or 
fish anywhere in the province triggers the duty to consult with Treaty 7 First Nations. 
The principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law mandate that provincial 
government action, including consultations with First Nations, must be consistent with 
the protection of existing Aboriginal and treaty rights.  In so far as Alberta’s consultation 
legislation, regulations, and policies have failed to fully recognize and affirm Aboriginal 
and treaty rights in a manner that is consistent with their constitutional protection, they 
are of no force or effect. 
Consultation may take many forms ranging from mere notice to sharing 
information to consensus-building negotiations.  The duty to consult has been 
interpreted by the Alberta government as being required only after lands have been 
designated for development and thereby “taken up” and before the project proponent 
receives approval for a particular project.  Alberta views the duty to consult to arise on a 
project-by-project basis at each stage of development approval.  This means that there is 
no comprehensive consultation for long-range sustainability of development, which is 
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exactly what watershed management plans are about.  Planning for sustainable 
development, including economic and community development requires shared 
governance of water resources.  Alberta’s Water for Life Strategy has failed in that 
regard, as it does not take into consideration the unique relationship of Treaty 7 First 
Nations to the Crown and treats Treaty 7 First Nations as any other “stakeholders” in the 
process of watershed planning. 
If First Nations share in the governance of the watershed, they would be active 
participants in land use and water management planning for the watershed areas laying 
within their traditional territories.  If their jurisdiction to manage the watershed was 
recognized, their consent may be required before approving any developments that may 
adversely effect the watershed. 
This is not, however, how the current water management scheme works in 
Alberta.  The province has not, to date, engaged First Nations in comprehensive 
watershed planning.  Rather, Alberta has created policy directives that require project 
proponents to give notice to those who are “directly affected” by posting ads in local 
papers.  After the proponent has created a proposal for development, the proponent must 
consider whether consultation with First Nations is required.  If First Nations’ traditional 
uses of the land may be adversely effected, consultation may be required, but the 
responsibility for consultation lays with the proponent.  If First Nations were active 
participants in land water management planning there would be a standard set for 
considering all proposals – proposals might be rejected at the outset if they do not meet 
those standards. 
The Alberta Water Council recognizes that there are difficulties with governing 
water use through multi-stakeholder volunteer Water Policy and Advisory Comittees.  
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One of the major problems with WPACs is that First Nations do not participate in them.  
WPACs are organized by volunteers who do not engage First Nations because they do 
not fully understand the necessity of involving First Nations and, moreover, First Nation 
do not attend out of fear that their participation will be interpreted as consultation.  First 
Nations feel that, as their relationship is with the Crown, they should be engaged in 
negotiations directly with the province and not with multi-stakeholders groups. 
1. Questions for Further Research 
This thesis is merely a beginning:  There are very many more questions to be 
answered.  Limited time and resources meant that I could not do any primary research.  
Much of the information that would have been useful in doing my research was 
privileged or buried in archives.  To access this information would have required money 
and time resources that I did not have.  I also did not have access to people who are well 
informed on the subject matter of my thesis.  I have been slowly building a network of 
contacts with valuable experience in the area of Aboriginal water rights, some of whom 
have worked in the area their whole lives but have never written or published.  I did not 
go to the archives, rather I relied heavily on historians such as Frank Tough and Kinich 
Matsoui who have done the meticulous job of reviewing archival sources.  
I attempted to access the points of view of Treaty 7 First Nations by contacting 
individuals responsible for land management at the various Band administration offices.  
However, I was contacted immediately by their counsel and warned not to talk to their 
clients – if I wanted any information I would have to go through counsel.  As it turned 
out, counsel could not share information with me because water management in the 
process of negotiations and is privileged. 
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Members of the Alberta Water Council and the Bow River WPAC were also 
cautious in talking to me, but were willing to share some of the issues that they struggle 
with regarding consultation and shared governance.  However, they could not offer 
many solutions to the problem without the involvement of First Nations. 
The limitations and frustrations I encountered in finishing this thesis actually 
highlight the need and opportunity for further study. 
Conclusions are supposed to be ends, but this conclusion is a beginning.  
Recently I attended a Legal Education Society of Alberta seminar on environmental law.  
There counsel to the EAB stated that the areas of environmental practice that are 
emerging as the most important and the least understood are consultation law and water 
law.  That is certainly my experience in researching and writing this thesis.  Every day I 
learn something new, but everything I have learned leads to more questions. 
When I started writing this thesis, Delgamu’ukw was the leading consultation 
case and Halfway River had just been decided.  Taku and Haida were decided shortly 
thereafter.  Those who practiced Aboriginal law realized the establishment of the duty to 
consult was important First Nations, but no one dreamed how of what the impact would 
be.  The duty to consult is now the platform on which First Nations resist such 
developments as the CANDU reactors near the Peace River, the Site C dam on the Peace 
River, and oilsands development along the Athabasca.  The duty to consult will only 
become more important as we work through the practical meaning of “managing the 
Treaty relationship” and reconciling “aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples and 
their respective claims, interests and ambitions.”1 
                                                 
1  Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 71 (QL); 2005 SCC 69 at para 1. 
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Further research must be done on the legal history of water rights and water 
management for the various treaty areas.  I devoted only one chapter to treaty rights to 
water, but legal historical research could be done to more fully analyze the existence and 
development of a treaty and Aboriginal rights to water. 
Dovetailing with historical research should be a cultural linguistic study of 
Aboriginal laws relating to water.  Because I speak and read only English, my research 
and writing was limited.  There are many people in Treaty 7 who are fluent in their 
languages and could participate in a linguistic study of the meaning of the treaty, the 
practices, customs, and traditions involving water, and traditional relationships to water, 
governance, and treaty relationships.  To determine the specific sites and how 
Aboriginal practices, customs, and traditions were conducted at those sites would require 
considerable research.  In my view, the study of Aboriginal laws as they manifest in 
Aboriginal languages and cultures is the most important work to be done because law is 
in the language and in the land.  The laws of Aboriginal people cannot be known without 
extensive inquiry into the workings of the language:  Aboriginal laws are in embedded 
in Aboriginal languages, in their lexicon and organization.  The only way to figure out 
how to reconcile the assertion of Crown sovereignty with pre-existing Aboriginal legal 
systems, is to study Aboriginal legal systems as articulated in their languages. 
There is a great need for a handbook on best practices in Aboriginal consultation 
with industry and government.  There is currently no national standard for consultation.  
Perhaps most importantly, further policy analysis must be done on the concept of 
reconciliation and the political process that best accomplish this gargantuan task.  In my 
view, reconciliation will only truly be achieved when governance of water is shared with 
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First Nations:  The next phase political and legal evolution is to create a vision of shared 
governance of natural resources.   
Further inquiry should be made into historical and cultural geography.  As stated 
earlier, the law is in the land.  The Blackfoot Confederacy described their territory as 
Napi’s body.  The territory addressed by Treaty 7 did not include the entire Blackfoot 
Confederacy territory.  This raises interesting questions about whether there are different 
layers of Aboriginal and treaty rights inside and outside the treaty territory. 
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